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Preface
Who should operate our social services, and how are service contracts to
be distributed and managed? These are among the most important social
issues today. In Scandinavia, there is little disagreement that the public
should pay for the most important services in education, health, and
social services. However, there is considerable variation in how welfare is
delivered and managed among the Scandinavian countries. Sweden has
gone further in terms of the introduction of user choice and vouchers,
reducing barriers to establishment of new service institutions, and
allowing distribution of profits. This has created a strong growth
incentive in the profit-oriented enterprises offering welfare services.
Denmark, and to some extent Norway, have by comparison a stronger
element of nonprofit providers.
In our opinion, the welfare mix is too important to be left to chance.
The public, nonprofit and for-profit welfare providers each have
advantages as well as disadvantages. The composition of the welfare mix
should, therefore, be deliberately designed in order to maximise these
advantages. There may be political disagreement about the goals of
welfare policies, but we nevertheless need knowledge about the conse-
quences of the welfare mix to get a fruitful political discussion.
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This was the starting point for our research project Outsourcing of
Scandinavian Welfare Societies? Consequences of Private and Nonprofit
Service Provision for Active Citizenship—which led to the publication of
this book. The project was funded by the Research Council of Norway’s
programme on Welfare, Working Life and Migration (VAM) and directed
by Karl Henrik Sivesind at the Institute for Social Research (ISF) in
Oslo, Norway. However, the project has been a truly Scandinavian
comparative effort. An extensive data collection has been carried out in
selected case municipalities in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. We
would like to thank Malene Thøgersen (Denmark), Håkon Solbu
Trætteberg (Norway), and David Feltenius (Sweden) for their work with
data collection and documentation. This work also constitutes the basis
for Trætteberg’s Ph.D. dissertation, Does Welfare Mix Matter? Active
Citizenship in Public, For-Profit and Nonprofit Schools and Nursing Homes
in Scandinavia (2016).
Many individuals and institutions have provided valuable help and
comments during the process. We wish to thank the contributors to the
book for all the work they have done in writing their chapters, as well as
their valuable comments at project meetings. We would also like to
thank Prof. Lars Skov Henriksen at the Department of Sociology and
Social Work, Aalborg University, for his contributions to the coordina-
tion of the Danish part of the project.
We were lucky with the timing of this project. All the Scandinavian
countries had to implement a new EU directive for public procurement
in 2016. We therefore got many invitations to present findings about
changes in the mix of welfare service providers and about why there are
differences between the Scandinavian countries. The Enterprise
Federation of Norway, Virke, with a department for nonprofit service
providers, arranged a large conference in January 2016 together with
Nordic sister organisations. A panel of Scandinavian Ministers and MPs
responded to Sivesind’s presentation of new findings from this project.
Later there were meetings with the Red–Green government parties and
then the opposition parties in Sweden; in August there were meetings
with the Norwegian conservative government parties and their parlia-
mentary support parties at a ‘Perspective Conference’. We also met with
experts writing public investigations about nonprofit welfare providers in
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Norway (NOU 2016:12) and Sweden (SOU 2016:78), just to mention
some examples. It was a great experience to see that our research could
inform debates about issues high on the political agenda.
Earlier versions of several of the book chapters have been presented at
international conferences, including the 24th Nordic Local Government
Research Conference, Gothenburg, 26–28 November 2015, and the
12th ISTR (International Society for Third-Sector Research) Conference,
Stockholm, 28 June–1 July 2016. We thank the participants at these and
other conferences and seminars for valuable comments.
Finally, we would like to thank the Research Council of Norway for
the funding of the project, and our home institution, the Institute for
Social Research, Oslo, for hosting this project in the best possible way
and for supporting the open access publication of this book.
Oslo, Norway Karl Henrik Sivesind
December 2016 Jo Saglie
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Does Out-Contracting of Welfare Services
Promote Active Citizenship?
Karl Henrik Sivesind and Håkon Solbu Trætteberg
Introduction
In the 1980s, Swedish welfare researchers travelled the world to present
the Scandinavian social democratic model at conferences. The model
represented a ‘modern’ alternative to the market economy and socialism,
combining generous benefits and economic equality with high labour
force participation for both women and men. However, the downside
quickly became apparent: high taxes and swelling public debt. The
transfer value to other countries was in question since the trend inspired
by Thatcherism and Reaganomics was to cut taxes and slash public
budgets. Was the model at all sustainable with an ageing population? But
even as an economic crisis hit Scandinavia in the early 1990s, the welfare
model did not die—it was transformed.
K.H. Sivesind (&)  H.S. Trætteberg
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In the new millennium, the Scandinavian countries—Denmark,
Sweden and Norway—seemed to be on their way to overcoming at least
some of the inherent problems of their welfare model. In a special issue
in 2013, The Economist even presented the Nordic countries as ‘the next
supermodel’ because they had reduced public debt and spending as
shares of GDP, simplified and lowered taxes, and built pension systems
on a solid foundation that made automatic adjustments for longer life
expectancy, while at the same time developing open, innovative and
knowledge-intensive economies. Furthermore, the Scandinavian coun-
tries have high levels of happiness and well-being (Helliwell et al. 2016)
and social trust (Ervasti et al. 2008; Rothstein 2003) and navigated the
2008 global financial crisis better than almost everyone else. Norway had
oil income invested in a sovereign fund and no public debt, but the other
Scandinavian countries did not have such advantages. According to The
Economist, there are compelling reasons to pay attention to these small
countries on the edge of Europe: ‘… they have reached the future first.
They are grappling with problems that other countries too will have to
deal with in due course, such as what to do when you have reached the
limits of big government and how to organize society when almost all
women work. And the Nordic countries are coming up with highly
innovative solutions that reject the tired orthodoxies of left and right’. Of
particular interest is the fact that the Swedish public school system now
has vouchers and for-profit schools competing with public schools.
‘When it comes to choice, Milton Friedman [the neoliberal American
economist] would be more at home in Stockholm than in Washington,
DC’, claimed The Economist.
Changes in the Swedish welfare model are indeed profound. In the early
90s, Sweden probably had the highest proportion of public welfare service
employment of any of the West European countries. The nonprofit share
was just 2% (Lundström and Wijkström 1997; Sivesind and Selle 2010).
This was a result of a huge political project to fight poverty and inequality
by building the most modern welfare state in the world. Popular move-
ments and voluntary organizations supported this venture, to a surprising
degree also when it implied handing over their welfare service institutions
to the state. The historian Lars Trägårdh claims Swedish people’s home
(folkhemmet) built on a social contract between what was perceived as a
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strong and good state and equal and autonomous individuals, liberating
them from traditional, paternalistic and oppressive institutions—‘the
family, the neighborhood, the churches, the charity organizations’ (2007,
27–28). But it was not all harmony, the large state was challenged from
the conservative and communitarian critics, and even on the left-wing
there was a concern that the citizens were becoming passive clients and
that the state was unresponsive and bureaucratized. All groups argued for a
stronger civil society (Trägårdh 2007).
Reforms intended to reduce the Swedishwelfare statewere implemented.
First, from 1991 to 1994, the conservative government gave the country’s
municipalities the opportunity to introduce competition and choice
models. The social democratic government, from1994 to 2006, did little to
slow down this development.With the centre-right coalition, from2006 to
2014, the reforms gained momentum again, in particular with the passing
of a law on public procurement (Public Procurement Act, LOU 2007:
1091) and user choice (Freedom of Choice Act, LOV 2008: 962). Political
reforms intended to empower individuals with the opportunity to choose
welfare providers were introduced in more and more service areas, in
combination with a more liberal system for approving new service insti-
tutions and no restrictions on extracting profits.
However, the expanding quasi-market for welfare services ultimately
strengthened the profit-oriented welfare sector rather than civil society.
State-funded welfare contracts in Sweden attracted private investments
and venture capital, even from abroad. The welfare reforms stimulated
strong commercial growth with a transformative effect. For-profit com-
panies increased their number of employees from 90,000 to 236,000
between 2000 and 2013 and became 2.5 times larger. Their share of
welfare employees rose from 9 to 19%, while the nonprofit share
remained extremely low, at 3%, and the public sector share decreased
from 88 to 78% (see Chap. 2). If the goal was to shrink the large welfare
state, then the process was successful. However, perhaps unintentionally,
private expansion to a large extent resulted in institutions owned by a
small number of welfare conglomerates, with some of their owners sit-
uated in tax havens. What happened to the small, independent service
units owned by local, responsible entrepreneurs, cooperatives or
idea-based, nonprofit organisations? Sweden, the global exemplar for
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moderation, turned their welfare system completely around, from max-
imising public provision to welcoming international for-profit welfare
investors (Henrekson and Jordahl 2012). Reforms signalled by the new
centre-left minority coalition government in 2014 focused on counter-
acting some of the negative side effects of marketising welfare rather than
stopping profit extraction. A widespread assumption seems to be that
economic incentives are a necessary part of the restructuration process
and that in any event, it is very difficult to stop the transfer of profits.
Owners may not extract profits from year to year, but instead generate a
surplus by buying and selling institutions or shares in welfare service
units, or by paying more than market price for services or property rented
from other companies they own. However, Sweden never seriously
attempted to stimulate the expansion of the smallest nonprofit welfare
sector in the EU, with the exception of former Eastern Bloc countries
(Salamon and Sokolowski 2016). Massive goodwill from all political
parties and a Compact (Överenskommelsen) between the Swedish
Government and idea-based social organisations and service providers
inspired by the UK were not enough (Johansson and Johansson 2012).
The legal establishment of user choice as a universal value, which is
currently being introduced step by step in the Swedish welfare system, is
just one example of old principles being sacrificed in order to improve the
Scandinavian welfare system. Market mechanisms are being used in new
ways to create progress in the welfare state. This was not part of the
Scandinavian model promoted by welfare researchers in the 1980s as
‘politics against markets’ (Esping-Andersen 1985). Now, quasi-markets
and tools inspired by New Public Management (NPM) have been widely
implemented in all Scandinavian countries, but in slightly different ways
(Kristiansen 2016). Surprisingly, this does not mean that the core welfare
goals have been replaced. The policy documents still highlight
deep-rooted Scandinavian ideals, such as public funding and regulation
of core welfare services, decentralisation of governance, equal access for
all to high quality services and the adaptation of services to user needs
and preferences. However, there is also a willingness to innovate in order
to better reach these goals. It is not always easy to see how
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market-emulating forms of governance can be the most suitable means to
reach these goals. Maybe we are witnessing a change of welfare goals by
means of governance reforms? When the role of the state changes from
securing the equivalent quality of services for all to providing opportu-
nities for choice, the responsibility for the results of the social policy
shifts to the users, who make choices for themselves (Newman and
Tonkens 2011). The Scandinavian eagerness in welfare reform results in
large, rapidly evolving differences between the countries and between the
service areas. In effect, Scandinavia has emerged as a laboratory for dif-
ferent welfare reform experiments; a proving ground for solving problems
that other countries will also encounter in the future. The main approach
in this book is therefore to compare the consequences of different forms
of governance in three countries with shared welfare goals such as
equivalent service quality and active citizenship.
The changes in Scandinavian welfare services based on public funding
will be analysed in this book mainly by comparing the countries, service
areas, and for-profit, nonprofit and public sectors. Each chapter will
focus on different levels in the governance structure: laws and regulations
at the national level, governance in municipalities and service institutions
in elderly care and schools, and, finally, the consequences experienced by
the users of the services. Which combinations of governance structures,
service sector providers and user choice give the best results when it
comes to promoting active citizenship? To set the stage for the following
chapters, we will present the key service areas of schools and nursing
homes and some of the key dilemmas facing Scandinavian welfare
societies today; we will also describe how these issues will be analysed in
this volume. To understand why it matters who provides welfare services,
we use the concept of active citizenship active citizenship, which is sub-
sequently explained. We then delve into theories about the fundamental
differences between the public, nonprofit and for-profit sectors. Since we
examine publicly financed welfare services, the institutional sectors will
vary depending on how the state governs each service; therefore, it is also
necessary to evaluate the role of the most important governance tools.
Lastly, we give a brief overview of the different chapters in the book.
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Comparing Service Areas and Sectors
The special issue of The Economist that focused on Nordic countries was
particularly concerned with the voucher system, which lets private
schools compete with the public system. However, Sweden is emerging
from an era marked by very strong public sector domination in its welfare
provision and is, in fact, a latecomer among the Scandinavian countries
when it comes to private alternatives and choice in education. In
Denmark, 15% of students attend private schools in a user-choice system
that has existed for 150 years. The free schools are nonprofit organisa-
tions that receive financial support from the government but have few
legal restrictions on the educational content. Norway has a similar but
less liberal system for nonprofit private schools. Only 7% of students in
upper secondary education, and 3% in lower secondary and primary
education, attend private schools. In order to obtain public funding,
these schools must offer alternative pedagogies or ideologies which are
not offered by the public school system. However, at the same time, the
core curriculum must be equivalent to that of public schools. In Sweden,
teaching in private and public schools is subject to the same laws.
In other words, all three countries offer a type of voucher system and
the right to choose private schools, instead of the public default option
offered to all. The main difference is that in Sweden, for-profit businesses
are allowed to run schools, while on paper there is less room for dis-
tinctive alternatives to the public system as there is in the other
Scandinavian countries. This is the kind of ‘experiments’ that makes a
Scandinavian comparison so interesting. The development of a Swedish
system where ‘Friedman would be at home’, as The Economist put it, begs
the question of whether this system is compatible with the ideals of a
Scandinavian welfare model. Swedish school results, for median pupils as
well as low and high performing pupils, have deteriorated more than any
other country in OECD’s PISA enquiry. Moreover, the difference
between high and low performing students has increased: a troubling
trend in light of the legal and normative foundations of the Scandinavian
welfare model (Böhlmark and Holmlund 2012). This raises the question
of whether better opportunities to choose schools have resulted in the
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separation of high and low performing pupils; and if so, whether this has
had negative consequences for school results in general and for equal
access to high quality education for all in particular. The social back-
ground has a very strong influence on how selective parents are, as well as
their children’s school results, and this may be the reason for increasing
social differences in the Swedish voucher system. Perhaps the liberal free
schools of Denmark or the more unitary school system of Norway, with
fewer but more distinctive alternatives, is better suited to Scandinavian
welfare ideals Put another way, what are the best methods for promoting
active citizenship: nonprofit alternatives catering to special interests and
needs, or competition over shares in a more standardised school market?
The importance of governance, the roles and shares of the public,
nonprofit and for-profit sectors for distinctive service profiles and active
citizenship in compulsory schools, will be examined by Thøgersen and
Trætteberg in this book’s empirical chapters.
To obtain a contrast with schools, we will compare them with elderly
care nursing homes, a service area that is also the responsibility of
municipalities in all three Scandinavian countries. In this area, munici-
palities can decide to contract services out to commercial or nonprofit
institutions, and the public administration generally has a much stronger
influence over the allocation of users to service providers. Sweden has an
increasing number of for-profit institutions, while Denmark has a long
tradition of self-owning institutions, which are, in practice, nonprofit
foundations. Norway not only has the most dominant public sector but
also some traditional nonprofit providers owned by voluntary or religious
foundations or associations. Recently, however, the country’s nonprofit
share has decreased while the for-profit share has grown (Statistics
Norway 2016). All Scandinavian countries are moving away from the
traditional framework agreements with private service providers, which
would have been automatically renewed, and towards open tenders and
user choice. Still, most municipal administrations are working hard to
promote an equivalent quality of services to all users at all types of
institutions. The use of quasi-markets and NPM tools has greatly
expanded since the 1980s (Meagher and Szebehely 2013), as it has in
other service areas. The question is whether this has changed the situa-
tion of users in relation to the institutions and municipalities. Since
1 Does Out-Contracting of Welfare Services … 7
governance structures and the space for distinctive services are more
limited in nursing homes for elderly care than they are in schools, we will
compare the service areas to explore the consequences for users and their
representatives. We can learn from such differences, not just those
between countries but those between service areas as well.
The Scandinavian countries have chosen different tools of governance
for influencing the mix of public, nonprofit and for-profit provisions. In
general, quasi-markets with different combinations of competition,
public certification and NPM-steering have become more widespread.
However, Sweden has chosen what Ascoli and Ranci (2002, 6–9) would
call a ‘demand-based model’, with user choice and simplified rules for the
establishment of private services that can receive public funding. Norway
has to a larger extent a ‘supply-side model’, with competition for public
contracts occurring both within the public system and between public,
nonprofit and for-profit providers. Denmark has a well-established but
more liberal model of user choice, where local nonprofit alternatives
flourish. At the same time, in all of the Scandinavian countries, citi-
zenship rights and participation in the welfare field have been reinforced
legally and through new best practices and professional standards
(Rostgaard 2015).
The Concept of Active Citizenship
The balance between governance and user influence is critical in the
Scandinavian welfare model. Services are not only influenced by voters
through the electoral channel. The public administration and the welfare
services it runs should also be directly responsive to affected citizens
(Andersen andHoff 2001; Petersson et al. 1989).Whenmarket-emulating
tools of government have been implemented broadly and the dominance
of the public sector in the service provision has been reduced or challenged,
it is important to understand how different governance tools and types of
providers affect the responsiveness of the institutions.
Historically, the Scandinavian social democratic approach to welfare
has been that public dominance in all aspects of service provision is
necessary in order to insulate citizens from the harmful effects of market
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forces. The public provision of services thus became a method for the
collective creation of a new, democratic welfare society (Blomqvist 2004,
430; Sejersted 2011, 120–121). Indeed, the goal was to create services of
such high quality that they would gain the support of citizens from all
walks of life. Rothstein (1994) labelled this ‘the high quality standardised
solution’: where nearly equal welfare services were allocated to all citizens
via bureaucratic planning. This was not just important for reducing
poverty and social inequality but was also considered crucial for the
legitimacy of a system of welfare services funded by taxpayers.
In addition, the gradual establishment of citizens’ rights meant that
individuals were no longer forced to appeal for core services, but could
demand them with some degree of authority. The combination of
democratic control of services and strong citizens’ rights are central
aspects of what has been called a Scandinavian form of citizenship
(Andersen and Hoff 2001; Hernes 1988). The decentralisation of
influence is an essential tool used to reach the ideals of advanced social
rights and equality. An implication of the decentralisation of influence is
that it places decisions about service provision as close as possible to
individuals and thus gives them influence over their own situations
(Andersen and Hoff 2001).
On the input side, i.e. in the electoral democracy, important services
such as care and education are a governmental responsibility. However,
‘welfare municipalities’ are in charge of important services that affect
people’s lives (Kröger 1997; Kjølsrød 2005; Loughlin et al. 2011, 11).
Decisions about these services are made by local policy makers, who are
closely connected to citizens. On the output side of the democratic
process, Scandinavian citizenship entails that citizens who use services
also have the power and right to influence the implementation of poli-
cies. This is where active citizenship is pursued: either collectively
through user boards or individually when relatives of nursing home users
seek to obtain a certain approach to care or parents request special
follow-ups from their children’s school.
Active citizenship is an analytic concept we use to examine the amount
of control that citizens have over their everyday lives as users of public
services. Their level of control is based on their citizenship role—the
distribution of rights and obligations. To control their lives as users of
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public services, citizens need to have influence. More influence means
more control, but absolute control can hardly occur in real life. If obli-
gations are forced upon citizens who receive services, then this is the
opposite of influence and entails a lack of control.
In the research literature, active citizenship is a contested concept with
no shared definition. Different scholars have emphasised the issue of
obligations in divergent ways. One approach sees active citizenship as ‘a
broad range of activities that promote and sustain democracy’ (Hoskins
2014, 14). These activities include political participation in formal poli-
tics, but also involve activities situated in the workplace, civil society and
the private sphere (Hoskins and Mascherini 2009; Holford and van der
Veen 2003). Furthermore, Newman and Tonkens (2011) emphasised
increased obligations for users as an aspect of the agency of citizens, as they
used the term active citizenship to explain why responsibilities for services
are transferred from the state to the citizens. These obligations can take
the form of care for oneself or for relatives; and in the quasi-market,
citizens are expected to be market actors who influence the welfare sector
by giving market incentives, like enter and exit, to providers.
For our specific purposes, we have developed a conception that enables
us to evaluate whether the citizenship roles of users vary by type of service
provider. In the chapter by Trætteberg, the operationalisation of active
citizenship as it is used in the empirical analysis is further elaborated.
Here, it is sufficient to present the definition and the main dimensions.
Put briefly, the concept of active citizenship reflects three main actors
involved in deciding the content of a public service when a citizen
becomes a user: the user, the staff and the administrators and local
politicians at the municipal level. The user can influence a public service
by meeting with staff and institutional leaders or via changes obtained in
interactions with leaders at the municipal level.
With this analytic concept, one can assess local political processes and
governance of institutions as well as day-to-day interactions between
users and staff members and collective forms of user control via user
boards and related media. The concept of active citizenship thus brings
attention to formal as well as informal ways of influencing services and,
accordingly, the implementation of public policies. Active citizenship
encompasses the activities users can engage in when assessing where to
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become users—at their institutions, in local policy processes and in their
communities—in order to influence the service in question.
The active citizenship of users of public services is the ability citizens
or their relatives have to actively control their own lives while being users
of public services. Active control can be exercised prior to becoming a
user or while being a user. Both choice and voice are important instru-
ments for practicing active citizenship (Hirschman 1970). More specif-
ically, in this book, three dimensions of active citizenship are used to
analyse differences in the capacity for active citizenship for users—and
their next of kin—of public, for-profit and nonprofit welfare services:
choice, empowerment and participation.
With its three dimensions, active citizenship is an analytic perspective
that enables us to measure aspects of users’ experiences with welfare
services. At the same time, it is an ideal type to which an empirical reality
can be compared to see if high or low levels of active citizenship are
observed along its three dimensions.
Fundamental Sector Differences
New tools in the governance of Scandinavian welfare may alter the
relationship between the welfare states and their citizens as well as the
composition of the welfare mix. By welfare mix, we refer to the division
of public, nonprofit and for-profit providers in a service area. Often, the
concept of the welfare mix also includes families or other informal
providers, but this book focuses on publicly funded service institutions;
and in Scandinavian welfare, this means that the focus is placed on
professional providers. However, as we will see, families and relatives can
be important contributors to these services as volunteers by exercising
active citizenship together with or on behalf of the users. The importance
of changes in the composition of the mix of welfare service providers
depends on the substantive differences between different institutional
sectors. Economic theories of nonprofit organisations try in principle to
answer the question of why we need the third sector when we have a
market and a state. In order to do this, these theories identify essential
aspects of each of the institutional sectors and explain why and how they
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are different (Steinberg 2006; Salamon and Toepler 2015). These aspects
are general, theoretical features of the institutional sectors and their
relevance in a Scandinavian context varies according to how the states
govern the providers in the different service areas. To understand the
consequences of the use of particular governance tools and changes in the
welfare mix, it is necessary to grasp the differences between institutional
sectors at a general level.
A key expectation relates to creating a complete selection of service
profiles for the population. Citizens are an increasingly diverse group
with respect to culture, religion, ethnicity and so forth, and thus it is
becoming increasingly difficult to create services tailored to individual
citizens (Phillips and Smith 2011). Governments may lack the knowl-
edge, capacity and coordinative ability to create a diverse enough system
to cover the entire population. In addition, the public sector has a ten-
dency to centre its attention on the median voter and majority groups in
society and thus overlook the interests of marginal groups. For-profit
providers offer services to the largest market segment, which is not so
different from the public sector’s emphasis on the median citizen.
Consequently, there is a gap in services for minority populations: a gap
the nonprofit sector is well suited to fill (Weisbrod 1978). By directing
services toward smaller niches in the population, nonprofit compensate
for the lack of breadth in public and for-profit providers’ offerings in
terms of quality, special needs, interests, methodology, ideology or beliefs
(Smith and Grønbjerg 2006, 224; Clemens 2006). In Scandinavian
countries, nonprofit welfare providers are funded by the state and are
thus presumably vulnerable to the decisions of the majority. Yet, in the
multi-party system, the minority groups catered to by at least some of the
nonprofits are represented by parties who see nonprofits as their tool to
provide services to their minority constituencies. In this way, nonprofits
give breadth to the range of services while simultaneously being part of
core services in some service areas.
In welfare services, great information asymmetry exists between pro-
viders and users. Users often have bad health, and the complexity of the
services makes it impossible for one user to acquire the same expertise as
professional providers. Therefore, the ability for users and society to trust
providers is decisive (Hansmann 1980). The less information users have,
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the more important it is for them to be able to trust the service provider.
This applies both to users and public regulators, as there are limited
opportunities for monitoring the quality of this type of service (Evers et al.
1997). Weisbrod (1988) proposed distinguishing between quality indi-
cators that are easy to observe and assess and those that are difficult to
observe and assess. Different market participants have different incentives
to prioritise the two different forms of quality. A profit-oriented provider
typically has an incentive to achieve high measurable quality; but if doing
so reduces profits, this same provider will have an incentive not to devote
resources to having high unobservable quality (Hansmann 1987, 29).
Nonprofit providers do not have the same disincentive to allocate
resources to improve invisible quality (Salamon and Toepler 2015, 2168).
In the Scandinavian context, Meagher and Szebehely (2013) have argued
that tight regulation is a reason why increased plurality in the welfare mix
in elderly care has led to limited differences in quality. As this volume
demonstrates, however, conformity in quality limits the ability to achieve
the supposed benefits of an expanded range of service content that would
stem from plurality in the welfare mix. This demonstrates some of the
difficult trade-offs authorities face when regulating the welfare mix.
The potential benefits of nonprofits when it comes to trust and
broadening the scope of public services can help explain their functioning
in the welfare mix. Yet, it is an all but universal Western phenomenon
that the state shoulders the main responsibility for welfare but cooperates
with nonprofit and for-profit providers in solving social and economic
problems (Salamon and Toepler 2015, 2161). To understand the per-
sistence of this phenomenon, Salamon (1987) developed the theory of
interdependence. Its guiding principle is that each of the three sectors has
strengths and weaknesses, with the strengths of one sector to some extent
compensating for the weaknesses of another.
In spite of the supposed benefits of nonprofit provision, such providers
also have some potential weaknesses that make them unsuitable as the
only type of provider. Their central weakness is that they do not have
sufficient growth capacity to produce all of the services people want.
They do not have access to capital from investors, and they tend to focus
on their care mission rather than on its expansion. Furthermore, the
research literature holds that they are particularistic since they adapt their
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services to small groups and do not reach out to the whole population.
Finally, they are accused of being paternalistic, providing services with a
special vision for the community in mind rather than accommodating
the visions of the users or of society at large (Salamon 1987).
For-profit providers complement the strengths and weaknesses of
nonprofits. Their ability to quickly scale up to serve large portions of the
population is highly valued by Scandinavian policy makers. This capacity
has been particularly demonstrated in kindergartens in Norway as well as
in many service areas in Sweden. Nevertheless, when left unmonitored,
for-profits have potential weaknesses: They may produce too few of the
services parts of the population needs. If the financing of providers is
based on user payments, then their services may be priced at a level often
too expensive for much of the population, thereby limiting access to
them. In addition, as mentioned previously, they have public trust issues
(Anheier 2005, 181–182).
The public sector aims to compensate for the failures of the for-profits.
When for-profits do not provide enough of a service, the public sector
can provide the service itself, as in the traditional Scandinavian model.
To ensure affordable prices for the population, the government can pay
for the service through voucher systems or subsidies. To remedy the lack
of trust, public authorities can regulate the service and provide increased
information flow to users (Steinberg 2006).
However, public authorities cannot fully compensate for the failures of
the for-profits. The government tends to adapt the service it provides
in-house to the median citizen. This makes the range of services inade-
quate for citizens who want a particular quality of service, or who, for
various reasons, want a type of service content that differs from the
majority’s preferences. Furthermore, lack of trust is often based on key
aspects of health and care services not being readily observable (Steinberg
2006). The government can thus encounter difficulties regulating
something it does not know much about, rendering their efforts at best
incomplete. These weaknesses of the state are addressed by nonprofits
that cater to niche populations at the same time as their motivations
provide different incentives from those of for-profits (Anheier 2005, 129–
131).1
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Consequently, the state pursues widespread cooperation with other
providers in the welfare mix. Since the state cannot reach an optimal
service level by providing all services in-house, and since nonprofit and
for-profit providers are dependent on public financing and steering, the
three sectors are interdependent. The theory of interdependence in the
welfare provider mix has set the agenda for extensive research on the
three institutional sectors and how they solve different tasks (Steinberg
2006). Much of the empirical work has been done thus far in an
American context, where the relationship between the sectors is different
from that of Scandinavia, in particular, when it comes to sources of
funding. That said, the theory has a general scope, which suggests that
the mechanisms it describes may also be active in a Scandinavian context.
Governance Through Contracting or User Choice
Because of the perceived differences between institutional sectors, most
countries have policies to manage the composition of welfare service
providers (Boris and Steuerle 2006; Lundbäck and Lundberg 2012). Yet,
given that there are differences between public, for-profit and nonprofit
providers, these differences are not static. Different contexts and condi-
tions may increase or decrease differences.
How the Scandinavian context creates conditions that affect the
prominence of these differences is a central theme in this book. This
dynamic is based on the established literature, which holds that within a
contractual regime with the public sector, nonpublic providers may lose
much of their distinctiveness (Salamon and Toepler 2015, 2169; Toepler
2010; Salamon 2002). However, there is an important difference
between supply-based and demand-based financing of nonpublic service
providers (Ascoli and Ranci 2002, 6–9). Supply-based financing involves
the privatisation of the provision of services. The idea is that the state
wants to change how services are supplied to the public by transferring
management responsibility from a public agency to a nonpublic entity.
This form of financing makes small alterations in the relationship
between citizens and providers, but enables the state to make demands of
potential providers who are seeking to become suppliers of services.
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Demand-based financing means that the state wants to change the
demand structure of the provision by enabling citizens to act as market
customers by selecting their own providers. The changes sought from this
type of financing are thus intended to influence providers by making
changes in the relationship between citizens and providers.
Supply-based privatisation of the provision of services has a tendency
to weaken nonpublic distinctiveness. Particularly, relevant examples are
public tenders. This form of provider privatisation contributes to their
commercialisation and promotes innovation related to management and
organisation, not to the actual content of the service (Goodin 2003,
390–391). Tenders whereby nonprofit and for-profit providers compete
on equal terms may lead the nonprofit to adapt the for-profit operational
logic in order to remain competitive (Haugh and Kitson 2007).
Demand-based financing takes place when the users themselves choose
an institution. As long as the public sector funds the service provider, it
will be dependent on approval from public agencies; once this has been
obtained, it can compete to attract users. Within this regime, market
mechanisms to some extent replace public regulation. Since users are able
to opt in and out of different institutions, it is not necessary for the
government to impose the same level of regulation as it does when all
users are forced to use the same institutions. The idea is that institutions
whose services are not good enough will be uncompetitive and will thus
be eliminated from the quasi-market. In this way, only institutions with
an acceptable level of services remain, as the market does the job that the
state must do when market forces are not allowed to function. This gives
the different providers the increased ability to develop distinct charac-
teristics as long as these are in accordance with users’ preferences (Ascoli
and Ranci 2002). Whether this happens depends on the heterogeneity of
citizens’ demands and the diversity of providers. For example, a
multi-religious population can include schools which cater to different
religious groups, each with their own distinct approach to school oper-
ations. Supply diversity is thus an empirical question for each context.
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Outline of the Book and Its Chapters
To answer the question about the importance of the use of
market-emulating governance tools and changes in the mix of welfare
service providers, we compare between countries; between nonprofit,
for-profit and public sectors; and between schools and elderly care as
different service and policy areas, each with different governance models.
We focus on how different ways of organising services on different levels
of the Scandinavian welfare system affect the users in order to reveal
which factors may promote active citizenship. We have selected cases that
will allow for comparison across the three analytic dimensions:
1. Country: Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Traditionally, within the
Scandinavian model, Sweden and Norway have focused on
strengthening the legal rights of citizens as users, while Denmark has
in addition actively used nonprofit actors to enhance user choice as a
tool for citizen empowerment (Andersen and Hoff 2001). Lately,
there has been some convergence, as all countries have prioritised
more user choice (Segaard 2015, and Chap. 3) despite more diver-
gence in the composition of the welfare mix (Sivesind, this volume).
Since 2000, Sweden has moved towards empowerment through
marketisation, with a rapidly growing for-profit share in the welfare
mix. In this way, one could say that the three Scandinavian countries
currently have three different strategies when it comes to the pro-
motion of active citizenship (Sivesind 2013, and Chap. 2). The three
Scandinavian countries thus represent some interesting institutional
differences regardless of similar welfare ideals. Methodologically,
comparisons between the countries are useful for assessing under what
circumstances the conclusions may have relevance.
2. Institutional sector: public, nonprofit and for-profit providers. Does it
make a difference which of them provides services? It is still an open
question whether traditional coordination by municipalities, reforms
promoting user choice or marketisation is the best-suited means to
achieve active citizenship.
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3. Service area: Schools and nursing homes. These two service areas are
suitable for comparison since, as pointed out in the introduction, each
has a different position in the Scandinavian welfare model. To
compare them in light of the welfare mix and active citizenship is thus
useful for understanding how changes in the former could potentially
have different implications in different areas of the welfare model. At
the same time, they are both core areas of municipal welfare services
with different positions in the current political debate. The school
sector is experiencing a conflict whereby liberal ideas about the rights
of parents to choose schools with different content or better quality
and to opt out of bad schools are challenging adherence to the
‘unitary school’, in which equality and social integration are given
emphasis (Arnesen and Lundahl 2006). In the nursing home sector,
the debate has focused less on variation in the content of care and
more on the most efficient means to obtain sufficient care capacity
with acceptable quality. In addition, the structure of governance is
different. In schools, there is considerable national regulation with
regard to the content of services (Helgøy and Homme 2006;
Rönnberg 2014); while for elderly care, more of the decisions
regarding the content of care are left to the municipalities (Vabo
2012).
What makes the Scandinavian countries particularly suitable for this
kind of analysis is that they have similar welfare models and ideals but
have chosen different governance tools to create changes. The welfare
systems in the three countries are moving in such different directions that
it resembles a natural experiment. This means that there are lessons to be
learnt for other countries that are in the process of reshaping their welfare
services while giving high priority to an active role for service users.
In the next two chapters of this book, we look into developments in
these countries, sectors and service areas at the national level. In Chap. 2,
Karl Henrik Sivesind analyses changes in shares of welfare service
employment between the for-profit, nonprofit and public sectors on a
national level in the three countries. The data are gleaned from national
statistical agencies, public policy documents and studies of particular
services in each of the Scandinavian countries. In Chap. 3, Signe Bock
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Segaard and Jo Saglie discuss the national legal and institutional frame-
work within which local welfare services are provided: the relevant EU
directives and their implementation, national policy instruments and
national politics.
In Chaps. 4, 5 and 6, David Feltenius, Malene Thøgersen and Håkon
Solbu Trætteberg analyse data from comparative case studies at the
municipal level—where policies for schools and elderly care are imple-
mented. Seven municipalities—three in Norway, two in Sweden and two
in Denmark—were selected for matched case studies using similar
data-gathering strategies and interview guides. The data come from three
types of sources: interviews with users, staff and leaders at the institutions
as well as the political and administrative leadership in the municipalities;
local user surveys; and local strategic documents. In total, 27 institutions
were studied in the seven municipalities. Within each municipality, two
institutions were selected from each service area: one public and one
nonpublic. For more information about the methodology used in these
chapters, see the appendix to this chapter.
The chapters written by Feltenius and Thøgersen focus on governance
in the municipalities and the service institutions in elderly care and
schools, as well as the consequences for distinctive profiles and equivalent
service quality. Chapter 4 by Feltenius analyses municipal governance of
nursing homes, comparing the three Scandinavian countries in addition
to in-house, public sector service providers and private service providers
(nonprofit or for-profit) in the same municipalities. Chapter 5 by
Thøgersen examines schools in a similar fashion. Chapter 6 by
Trætteberg compares the two service areas, schools and nursing homes
with regard to active citizenship. Trætteberg asks whether the manner in
which services are governed and the institutional sector the service pro-
vider belongs to make a difference for users. Where do we find the most
important differences: between the countries, between providers from
different sectors or between the service areas? What are the causes for
these differences?
In Chap. 7, Tord Skogedal Lindén, Audun Fladmoe and Dag Arne
Christensen analyse Norwegian population surveys about user satisfac-
tion in elderly care institutions, child care and primary schools in order to
obtain a more generalisable view of the consequences for users of private
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and public service provisions. In the concluding chapter, Sivesind,
Trætteberg and Saglie discuss the lessons that can be learnt from the
‘natural experiments’ in the welfare service provider mix, institutional
contexts and governance tools in Scandinavian welfare services. These
lessons may also be relevant for other countries facing similar social and
economic challenges while pursuing goals of equal access to high quality
services funded by the government.
Appendix: Methods and Data Collection
Comparative Case Studies
Since the same methodology and data are used in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6, a
shared presentation follows. The data were collected in order to make
comparisons across each of the analytic dimensions presented above. The
institutions studied operate at the municipal level in each country under
examination. The strategy was therefore based on selecting municipalities
whereby pairs of public and nonpublic institutions could be compared
within the same context.
Twenty-seven institutions were selected in seven municipalities: three
municipalities in Norway, two in Sweden and two in Denmark. The
most important criterion in the selection process was that the munici-
palities had providers from different institutional sectors in both nursing
homes and schools. In order to obtain findings that were as robust as
possible, we used a strategy incorporating a diverse selection of munic-
ipalities that was beneficial ‘where different combinations of variables are
assumed to have effects on an outcome’ (Gerring 2008, 651). In this
case, variations were assessed in terms of geographic location and the
status of municipalities as either urban or rural. In addition, we con-
sidered the political leadership of each municipality and identified par-
ticular characteristics within the municipalities which were relevant to
the study. Table 1.1 provides the main characteristics for each of the
selected municipalities. Since municipalities cannot be selected in a way
that standardises all relevant characteristics, there were some unavoidable
idiosyncratic features of the municipalities under study that need to be
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Table 1.1 Characteristics of the selected municipalities













































































15 of which are




















1 Does Out-Contracting of Welfare Services … 21
Table 1.1 (continued)
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reported. The column labelled ‘Relevant characteristics’ presents
idiosyncratic information for each municipality.
Within each municipality, we applied the matching case design
strategy (Dunning 2010, 289–290). We selected two institutions from
each service area: one public and one nonpublic. These institutions are
complex organisations comprising a number of attributes that can
together produce a given outcome. Therefore, we tried to minimise
diversity between the selected institutions in each of the municipalities.
In order to achieve a control effect for such attributes to better grasp
variations stemming from the service sector, we limited diversity in terms
Table 1.1 (continued)
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of size, the socioeconomic circumstances of users and geographic loca-
tion. Obviously, in real life, no two institutions are sufficiently similar to
achieve complete control, something we consider in the qualitative case
analysis. Table 1.2 lists the municipalities and institutional sectors of the
selected institutions.
Data Collection
The data were derived from three types of sources: (1) interviews with
users, staff and leaders at the institutions as well as interviews with the
political and administrative leadership of the municipalities; (2) local user
surveys; and (3) local strategic documents. Before collecting the data, we
developed a field guide that specified which sources of data were relevant.
The field guide detailed what kinds of documents and local user surveys
should be collected and analysed, as well as who to interview. It also
contained interview guides that were used to conduct semi-structured
interviews with all groups of interviewees. When appropriate, one could
add extra questions in each country.
In all cases, the interviews were conducted with one or two admin-
istrative leaders in the municipalities and with one or two political
leaders. Because of this, we were not always able to cover the whole range
Table 1.2 Selected municipalities and institutional sectors of the non-public
institutions
Country Municipality Nursing home School



















Løten N/A Nonprofit and public
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of political views, but we nonetheless tried to select key informants with
the best insights about the institutions from the perspective of the
municipality. In all cases, we interviewed the leader of the institutions in
question. From the staff, we selected the safety representative or leader of
the local union. This was done in order to avoid self-selection, i.e. that
the leader of the institution could pick who our interviewees should be
and was based on the expectation that these staff members would be
more informed than the average colleague. To gauge user opinions, we
formed focus groups with either part of the user boards or the user boards
as a whole. We tried to take into account that these users, by virtue of
their seat on the user board, potentially had more personal resources than
the average user. It must also be pointed out that the user boards in
nursing homes mostly consisted of the users’ relatives, not the users
themselves. The same situation occurred in the investigated schools,
where parents constituted the majority of users on the user boards. In
some instances, people who the case study revealed to have potentially
interesting perspectives were also interviewed. For example, the leader of
the council for the elderly in one municipality was interviewed, as was
the leader of a municipal-level council for school parents in another
municipality. In total, we conducted 35 interviews in Denmark, 21 in
Sweden and 57 in Norway.
Local user surveys were conducted by the municipalities. They were
designed differently for each municipality and some municipalities did
not have them at all. They are therefore not useful for making com-
parisons between municipalities; but in some instances, they are useful
for making comparisons within municipalities. The surveys were thus not
only used for procuring background information prior to conducting
interviews, but also served as an independent source of information
about user views. This is the only data source for Chaps. 4–6 where the
opinions of a large number of users are represented. The substantial
survey material used in Chap. 7 thus complements the approach taken in
Chaps. 4–6.
The local strategy and policy documents include documents covering
municipal policies pertaining to the service areas or general approaches to
user influence. In addition, we obtained the corresponding documents at
the welfare institutions. Not all of the institutions had formal steering
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documents; but when they did, this information was used to triangulate
interview data and user surveys. In the analysis, concurrence between
different sources gave robustness to the observations, while divergence
between different sources indicated that further investigation was needed,
for example, by including specific questions about contested topics in the
interviews.
Note
1. Studies from Norway have shown that, generally, volunteer organisations
enjoy more trust in the population than their public sector or for-profit
counterparts (Wollebæk et al. 2000, Fig. 2–11).
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2
The Changing Roles of For-Profit
and Nonprofit Welfare Provision
in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark
Karl Henrik Sivesind
Introduction
It is not so obvious that there is a Scandinavian welfare model if we look
at how the service provision is organized, as the data presented in this
chapter will show. Common features can primarily be recognized as
ideals concerning equal access for all to high-quality welfare services in
core areas of education, health, and social services. In addition, in all
Scandinavian countries, citizens have rights to participate in
decision-making. Adaptation of services to individual needs, interests,
and preferences has been reinforced legally and through new best prac-
tices and professional standards. Another common objective is to
decentralize governance to the municipalities and to lower administrative
levels in order to adapt policies to local needs.
An additional common feature is the broad implementation of new
public management (NPM) tools, influenced by global trends since the
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eighties. Market-emulating types of governance increasingly regulate
relations between public contracting authorities and providers of welfare
services from nonprofit, for-profit, and public sector. EU directives and
stronger national regulation of public procurement are important rea-
sons for this, as the next chapter by Segaard and Saglie will show. Still,
there is very broad political agreement about continued public funding
and regulation of core welfare services. All these intentions are clearly
expressed in policy documents from all the Scandinavian countries.
Despite common welfare ideals and the similar changes in regulation
to other EU countries, this chapter will show that there are large dif-
ferences in the employment shares of the for-profit, nonprofit, and public
welfare providers among the Scandinavian countries. Rather than a single
model, the situation resembles a natural experiment since different modes
of regulation are used in different countries and service areas in order to
better reach the same welfare goals. This is partly a result of historical
differences, but recent policy initiatives and administrative reforms have
increased the diversity in governance structures.
NPM reforms are influenced by international trends sweeping through
advanced welfare societies. Priorities have shifted from the state as a social
provider for the people to the state as a promoter of global competi-
tiveness, Taylor-Gooby claims (2008: 4). Hence, in Scandinavia, the
income tax percentage has gone down, and the welfare costs as shares of
GDP have decreased slightly, while at the same time countries such as
France, Austria, Germany, and Belgium have been catching up. In that
way, the Scandinavian countries have become more similar to other rich,
Western European countries. As a consequence, to reduce the gap
between stagnating public benefits and higher income levels, more people
sign up for private pensions and insurances for illness and disability.
The social investment thinking has not only consequences for transfers
and entitlements but also for reforming the welfare service provision in
order to improve the quality of education and health services and getting
people back into the labour market, expecting that this will pay off in the
future. In order to stay globally competitive, it is also necessary to cut
costs and increase efficiency in services that the government pays for. In
Scandinavia, there is a widespread worry that the dominating public
service provision has become bureaucratized and stale. Many therefore
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see increased private provision of the state-funded services as an instru-
ment for improving capacity, but more importantly, for creating com-
petition, freedom of choice, and ultimately innovation to advance also
the public service provision. However, the discussion about public versus
private service delivery often overlooks the potential for pioneering and
distinctive roles of nonprofit providers that initiated most of the welfare
services we have today (Sivesind 2008).
In short, policymakers are worried that the public welfare spending
may not give the best results, and to find out they wanted to create
competition. This is the background for a very broad implementation of
new public management tools and quasi-markets in Scandinavia. It all
started when local governments made an internal separation between
contracting authorities and providers of services. This happened in the
beginning of 1990s in Sweden (Erlandsson et al. 2013, 27) and late in
the 1990s in Denmark and Norway (Vabø et al. 2013, 171). Since then,
responsibilities for results have been increasingly decentralized from
political councils to lower administrative levels and even to
semi-autonomous agencies, for example, regional health authorities in
Norway. Frame agreements between public purchasers and service pro-
viders that would almost automatically be renewed are being replaced by
contract negotiations, open tenders, and user choice in combination with
voucher systems with national agencies authorizing service providers.
This latter model has been spreading rapidly to new service areas and
governance levels in Sweden since the 1990s, and it is recently getting
wider implementation in Norway and Denmark as well.
User choice, influence, and adaptation are backed by several recent
policy documents from all the Scandinavian countries pointing out that
the dominant public provision is no longer capable of meeting new
challenges that endanger the welfare model’s sustainability. This includes
the emergence of new groups of young users, more old people with a
need for different kinds of help, limited personnel resources, increased
private prosperity, and more social and cultural heterogeneity (An
example from Norway is Report to the Storting (White Paper) nr.
29 2012–2013). These changes make recipients of all kinds of services
require adaptation to individual needs. Traditional, standardized welfare
services are struggling to meet these challenges. ‘To secure the future
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legitimacy and sustainability’ of the model, these policy documents claim
that it is necessary to promote active citizenship by empowering the users
and their next of kin to influence the content of services and also to
assume more responsibility for the services. All sectors of society must be
involved, including the voluntary engagement of families, local com-
munities, nonprofit organizations, and social enterprises. Already in the
1980s, a change in policy orientation from a welfare state to a welfare
society was announced. This development must continue, according to
the recent policy documents. Consequently, the division of labour
between public, nonprofit, and for-profit providers, which is the topic of
this chapter, is critical for the future of the welfare model.
Despite common welfare ideals and the similar changes in regulation
as in many other European countries, differences in the mix of providers
of publicly funded welfare services between the Scandinavian countries
continue to evolve. This is partly a result of path dependencies. Denmark
has the largest shares of nonprofit welfare provision in Scandinavia, but
on a level below what has been called the Western-European welfare
partnership countries, which include Germany, France, and Austria
(Salamon et al. 2004; Salamon and Sokolowski 2016). Norway has a
mixed model; there is a strong dominance of public welfare provision in
some areas combined with a small share of nonprofit actors, but
quasi-markets and open tendering in more areas have brought for-profits
on the rise. However, in the 1990s, Sweden broke away from the past
with strong public-sector dominance and opened up for rapid growth in
profit-oriented private services. To complicate the picture further, dif-
ferent modes of regulation are used in different service areas in each
country.
The next section shows changes in the employment shares of welfare
service providers from the nonprofit, for-profit, and public sector in
Scandinavia. This is followed by more detailed mapping of changes in the
service areas education, health, and social services in each country. This
will be related to changes in how public contracts are allocated to welfare
service providers in the nonprofit, for-profit, and public sectors. The
conclusion looks at path dependencies and policy initiatives that can
explain why common welfare ideals and the implementation of similar
NPM tools of government do not lead to convergence among the
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Scandinavian countries. On the contrary, there are increasing differences
in the shares of providers of publicly funded services. Furthermore, there
is no convergence with other welfare models either, and certainly not in
the Swedish case.
Divergence in Welfare Provider Mix
among the Scandinavian Countries
In Scandinavia, core welfare services in health, social services, and edu-
cation continue to receive public funding to a comparatively high degree,
and the government has assumed a larger part of the responsibility from
the families than in other parts of Europe. This is what is commonly called
the Nordic model in welfare research (Ervasti et al. 2008). These
state-funded services have a huge impact on the lives of most of the
population. In the following, we will be looking at changes in the shares of
these services that are provided by the nonprofit, for-profit, and public
sectors. To do that, we need a common measure that is comparable
between countries and different service areas. Data on output are not
available for all welfare service areas, and they are difficult to operationalize
in a coherent manner. For example, it is difficult to compare the number
of nursing home beds with pupils in primary schools. Alternatively, if we
use expenditures as a proxy for output, the results may show a too large
public sector because it often pays for costly treatments and procedures in
addition to expensive infrastructure and equipment. A simpler solution
chosen here is to compare shares of paid full-time employment as a
common measure for each sector’s ‘market share,’ or, rather, workforce
input. This should work reasonably well in welfare areas compared that
are dominated by employment-intensive services. In Sweden, unfortu-
nately, only data on the number of employees are available. Still, this gives
valid measures of shares of the institutional sectors and changes within
each country, assuming that the distribution of part-time and full-time
employment does not change too much.
Table 2.1 shows paid employment in welfare services in the nonprofit,
for-profit, and public sectors, covering the longest time spans for which
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comparable data are available. This started in the year 2000 in Sweden,
2008 in Denmark, and 2006 in Norway, and ended in 2013 for all three
countries. Although for a limited number of years, this is the first time
comparable data on broad changes in welfare provider mix from the
Scandinavian countries can be presented. The data show employment
shares of the public, for-profit, and nonprofit sector providers in publicly
funded welfare in the service areas education, health, and social services.
To facilitate comparison between countries with data covering different
time spans, changes in 5-year averages have been shown in Table 2.1.
This means how much of the total employment each sector has gained or
lost over the whole available data period in average for 5 years.1
Table 2.1 shows that oil-rich Norway experienced a strong growth in
the total welfare sector employment between 2006 and 2013 with as
much as 12% increase in a 5-year average, in a period when other
countries struggled with a financial crisis. In Sweden, the increase in the
number of employees was 7% in a 5-year average between 2000 and
2012, whereas in Denmark there has been almost no change at all
between 2004 and 2013. The data on employment in the different
economic sectors come from the national statistical agencies (see sources
and typologies in the appendix at the end of the chapter).
Table 2.1 shows furthermore that the nonprofit sector’s share of paid
employment in 2013 was 8% in Norway, 3% in Sweden, and 14% in
Denmark. These shares have been quite stable for a long time. The
changes in shares were 1% point or less in 5-year averages. In fact,
documentation from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector
Project shows that the nonprofit share in Norway has been stable on
about 7.5% of the full-time welfare employment back to 2004 and 1997
(Sivesind 2008a; Sivesind et al. 2004). In Sweden, the nonprofit share of
welfare employees was just 2% in 1992, peaked at 3.5% in the year 2000
(Lundström and Wijkström 1997; Sivesind and Selle 2010), and then
decreased slightly to 3.2% in 2013. The growth was partly due to the fact
that since 2000, the Church of Sweden is no longer under state gover-
nance. This added 24,000 church employees to the nonprofit sector in
several areas, including welfare services. In addition to this, the number
of employees increased in social services (9100), education (1600), and
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nonprofit share was 16.5% in 2003, as shown in the data from the
Hopkins project (Boje et al. 2006, Table 5.9), but then it decreased to
13.8 in 2013 (Boje 2017). A more detailed analysis in the section about
Denmark below shows that this may be a result of particular reforms in
the social service area rather than a trend, at least for now.
However, employment shares do not tell the whole story. Because of
different trends in total welfare employment growth, the nonprofit sector
in Norway has increased strongly in real numbers from 39,000 to 50,000
full-time employees from 2006 to 2013,2 even though the share only
increased by 0.3% points in a 5-year average. Even in Sweden, with
0.1% points decline in a 5-year average, there is a very small real increase
from 36,000 to 39,000 employees from 2000 in 2013. In contrast,
Denmark, with a more stable total welfare employment and a nonprofit
sector decline of 1.1% points in a 5-year average, had a decrease in the
number of nonprofit sector full-time employees from 93,000 to 85,000
from 2003 to 2013, respectively.
It is important to note that the nonprofit welfare shares in all
Scandinavian countries are much smaller than in welfare partnership
countries such as Austria, Germany, and France with well-established,
partly church-based welfare services and nonprofit welfare employment
shares between 20 and 25%. The UK, as an example of a more liberal
model, has nonprofit welfare provision on the same high level, but the
services are funded and organized in a different manner. In fact, the levels
in Sweden and Norway are only comparable to Eastern European
countries that still are marked by the communist era when the nonprofit
sector was kept at a minimum (Salamon and Sokolowski 2016; Sivesind
and Selle 2010).
There are large differences in the for-profit sector shares among the
Scandinavian countries in the most recent data. In Sweden, the share of
the welfare employees is 19%, while in Norway the share of welfare
full-time employment is 13%, and in Denmark just 7%. There has been
growth in for-profit employment shares in all three countries, but mostly
in Sweden. In 5-year averages, there was a little more than 1% point
growth in Norway and half a percentage point growth in Denmark, but
almost 4% points growth in Sweden. This may seem like a small change,
but it means that the for-profit sector in Sweden has doubled its share of
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the welfare employees from 9 to 18% from 2000 to 2013, and the
number of employees has become more than 2.5 times larger, increasing
from 90,000 to 236,000. This is a change rate that in the long term has
the potential of transforming the welfare model in Sweden. In Norway,
there has also been an increase in for-profit welfare from 61,000 full-time
employees in 2006 to 84,500 in 2012. In Denmark, which has the
smallest share of 7.1%, there has been a real growth from 38,000 to
44,000 full-time employees.
At the moment, the public-sector employment share is almost the
same in all three Scandinavian countries, between 78 and 79% of the
welfare employment. However, it is decreasing rapidly in Sweden with—
3.6% points in a 5-year average and—1.5% points in Norway, but it is
increasing by 0.5% points in Denmark. In Norway, the public sector is
still growing in real numbers, from 429,000 full-time employees in 2006
to 500,000 in 2013. In Denmark, the public sector reached a maximum
in 2010 with 549,000 full-time employees, and in Sweden it peaked in
2007 with 974,000 employees.3
Although the public-sector shares still may seem large in comparative
perspective, they are decreasing in real numbers primarily as a result of
for-profit growth. This adds a new feature to the ‘social democratic
model’, previously characterized by high public welfare spending and a
small nonprofit sector. The public sector was preferred as a service
provider to ensure unitary standards and equal access for all (Anheier and
Salamon 2006; Salamon and Anheier 1998). For-profit sector growth
also sets the Scandinavian countries apart from the corporatist and liberal
countries, which have much larger nonprofit sectors (Salamon et al.
2004).
To sum up, in Sweden, the public-sector employment has decreased in
real numbers, and a decline has recently started in Denmark too. In
Norway, with no need for austerity measures, all three sectors still grow
in real numbers, although the public sector’s share decreases slightly. In
all three Scandinavian countries, the for-profit providers are increasing
their shares of the welfare employment faster than the nonprofits. The
gap between the sectors is growing fastest in Sweden, where the non-
profits remain very small while the for-profit share has doubled. This has
resulted in a dramatic shift from the public sector to the for-profit sector
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in Sweden, and while the for-profit sectors grow in Norway and
Denmark too, the changes in provider mix are more moderate. The
changes in Sweden may have significant long-term consequences, because
the tools of governance that have brought the public sector share down to
the same level as the other Scandinavian countries are continuing to
produce rapid growth in the for-profit sector but not in the nonprofit
sector’s share of employees.
The main focus of this chapter is on changes within ‘education,’
‘health,’ and ‘social services,’ which include the sub-categories shown in
Table 2.2. The data presentation thus follows as far as possible the
International Classification of Non-Profit Institutions (ICNPO) (United
Nations 2003). However, to match with national statistical categories
that cannot be broken down, nursing homes (ICNPO 3 200) are moved
from Health to Social Services, and Research (ICNPO 2 400), which is
not typically regarded as one of the welfare services, is excluded from
Education and Research (ICNPO 2). Table 2.2 shows sub-categories for
the most important types of social services in Scandinavia, which, in
addition to nursing homes and home-based care, are day-care for chil-
dren, child and juvenile welfare, and substance abuse treatment. More
specific details about sources and the typologies used in each country’s
statistics are presented in an appendix at the end of the chapter.
Table 2.2 Service areas included in ICNPO main categories
2 Education
2 100 Primary and secondary education
2 200 Higher education
2 300 Other education
3 Health
3 100 Hospitals and rehabilitation
3 300 Mental health care
3 400 Other health services
4 Social Services
3 200 Nursing homes
4 100 Social services, including day care for children, child and juvenile welfare,
substance abuse treatment
Other social services including (4 200) emergency and relief
Note Adapted from International Classification of Non-Profit Institutions (United
Nations 2003)
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In the following sections, we look at changes in the composition of
providers within the welfare service areas in each of the Scandinavian
countries. We also look at relations between the governments and the
for-profit and nonprofit sectors that may explain the different trends.
Denmark: Relatively Stable Welfare Provider Mix
and a Large Nonprofit Welfare Share
Denmark has the largest nonprofit shares in Scandinavia because of a
long tradition of the government engaging voluntary organizations and
self-owning institutions in social service provision. This is because
nonprofit organizations have been pioneers in the welfare service area, as
shown in an analysis of state–voluntary sector relations through the last
150 years (Henriksen and Bundesen 2004). Although many tasks have
later been taken over by the public sector, self-owning institutions still
perform a large part of the welfare services—often in close cooperation
with the public sector. The nonprofit sector has a quite strong position in
primary and lower secondary schools, where its share of pupils increased
from 10 to 15.3% between 1990 and 2011.4 This recent growth is
primarily a result of parents stepping in when the municipalities want to
close schools with too few pupils, exercising their legal rights to establish
schools with public funding. Free schools get state funding equivalent to
72% of the average costs for a pupil in the public schools. Above that, the
schools can determine the level of fees paid by the parents. The tradi-
tional free schools are nonprofit institutions, but even a newer type of
private schools operates on a nonprofit basis (see Chap. 3).
Table 2.3 shows that in education, the nonprofit sector had about
29% of the paid employment and increased from 53,000 to 55,000
full-time employees, while the public sector had 69% of the employment
and an increase from 124,000 to 131,000 full-time employees. The
for-profit educational institutions had a little more than 4,000 full-time
employees, which is just 2% of the total employment in the service area.
There were no changes in the employment shares in education, even
though the total number of full-time employees increased from 181,000
to 190,000.
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In health, the nonprofit share has for a long time been very small in
Denmark because there are no large hospitals or other health institutions
(Sivesind 2008b; Helander and Sivesind 2001; Boje 2006; Boje et al.
2006, Table 5.9). Table 2.3 shows that the employment has further
decreased from 1,600 to 600 full-time employees from 2008 to 2013,
which means that the share has gone down from 1.3 to 0.5%. There are
no important changes in the welfare mix; the for-profit and public sectors
had about 17 and 82% each of the employment from 2008 to 2013.
In social services, there were more profound changes. Table 2.3 shows
that the nonprofit employment decreased from 35,000 to 30,000, and
the employment share went down from 12 to 10%. In contrast, the
for-profits had a small increase from 4.5 to 5.6%, and the public sector
share also increased slightly from 83 to 84%. The for-profit and public
Table 2.3 Paid employment in the nonprofit, for-profit, and public sectors within
education, health, and social services in Denmark 2008–2013, full-time equivalents
and percent
Service area 2008 2013
Employment % Employment %
Education (P)
Nonprofit 52,823 29.1 54,736 28.7
For-profit 4,291 2.4 4,405 2.3
Public sector 124,153 68.5 131,255 68.9
Total 181,266 100.0 190,396 100.0
Health (QA)
Nonprofit 1620 1.3 623 0.5
For-profit 21,268 16.5 23,116 16.7
Public sector 105,703 82.2 114,534 82.8
Total 128,590 100.0 138,273 100.0
Social services (QB)
Nonprofit 34,700 12.4 29,651 10.4
For-profit 12,673 4.5 16,106 5.6
Public sector 233,190 83.1 240,053 84.0
Total 280,563 100.0 285,810 100.0
Welfare field in total
Nonprofit 89,142 15.1 85,010 13.8
For-profit 38,232 6.5 43,627 7.1
Public sector 463,046 78.4 485,842 79.1
Total 590,419 100.0 614,479 100.0
Sources See appendix at the end of the chapter
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sectors had increases in full-time employees of 3500 and 7000,
respectively.
In Denmark, the decrease in nonprofits was partly a result of a
decrease in self-owning kindergartens from 23.5 to 20% from 2007 to
2011. Such self-owning daycare centers for preschool children must have
an operating contract and be supervised by the municipality. Parent
payments must be kept on the same level as similar public-sector services.
A new type of private kindergartens may transfer profits to owners, in
contrast to the self-owning institutions (see Chap. 3), but in practice
most of them stick to the traditional nonprofit form. However, according
to the definitions in UN’s handbook for satellite accounts for non-profit
institutions (United Nations 2003), they should be regarded as part of
the for-profit sector, as long as there is no formal ban on profit distri-
bution. Their share increased from 2.7 to 4.4%, while the public sector
has been rather stable at about 75% (Thøgersen 2013).
In addition, the nonprofit employment share in social services
decreased because the total number of institutions for elderly care
decreased strongly as a result of a change towards home-based care,
similar to the development in many other countries. However, in
Denmark, this seems to have implied an increase in municipal and
for-profit employment. Even though the share of self-owning, nonprofit
institutions stayed between 20 and 22% from 2000 to 2010, the number
of employees decreased because of the reduction in the total number of
institutions. In addition, several self-owning social service institutions
were taken over by the public sector during a local government reform in
2007 that reduced the number of municipalities from 275 to 98.
Additionally, since 2007, it has been possible to establish a new type of
‘independent’ nursing home that does not need an operating contract
with the municipalities, and that may transfer profit to owners (see
Chap. 3). In 2012, they only had 7% of the people enrolled in nursing
homes in Denmark, but further growth can be expected since this is a
relatively new form of organization (Thøgersen 2013).
When it comes to homes for disabled persons, the share of the
self-owning institutions has been stable at around 25% from 2008 to
2011. Among other institutions, such as shelters for battered women,
hostels for the homeless, institutions for drug and alcohol addicts etc.,
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about 50% are self-owning institutions. Before the responsibility was
transferred from counties to municipalities in 2007, the share was stable
at about 55% from 2000 to 2006 (Thøgersen 2013). However, this is a
complex field with overlapping types of services and institutions and
frequent structure changes, so the statistics do not present the full pic-
ture. All in all, this results in a decrease in users of nonprofit social
services and thereby also a reduction in the number of full-time
employees, while the for-profit and public sectors increase.
Sweden: Strong Growth in For-Profit Welfare
Among the Scandinavian countries, the biggest change in welfare pro-
vider mix has happened in Sweden, which in the beginning of the 1990s
probably had the highest proportion of public welfare services among the
advanced welfare states in the world. The reasons for this were brought
up in the introduction to the book and will be further discussed at the
end of this chapter. In the new millennium, there have been dramatic
changes in the Swedish welfare provider mix, as we have seen in
Table 2.1 above, which shows changes for the welfare services in total
from 2000 to 2013. Table 2.4 shows that the changes vary between the
service areas of education, health, and social service, but the data only
cover 2007 to 2013 because there was a change in statistical categories
before 2007. In the recent years, the nonprofit share has been small but
stable in all three welfare service areas, with about 5% in education, just
1% in health, and 3% in social services. However, the for-profit services
increased their share of employees rapidly with 4 percentage points to
14% in education, 3 percentage points to 19% in health, and as much as
8 percentage points to 25% in social services. This resulted in significant
reductions in the public-sector shares, which went down from 86 to 81%
in education, 84 to 80% in health, and as much as from 82 to 72% in
social services from 2007 to 2013.
In education, the nonprofit and public sectors increased with a few
thousand employees each, but the for-profits increased with 25,000
employees. In health the total number of employees declined with
12,000, mainly in the public sector, while the for-profits increased by
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10,000 employees, However, in social services, the number of for-profit
employees almost doubled whereas the other sectors remained stable.
This means that almost all growth in Swedish welfare employees has
happened in the for-profit sector, with the biggest increase in social
services.
In what services more specifically have the changes in provider mix
occurred? The proportion of pupils in private schools, which was around
2% when private school reform was implemented in 1992, has increased
to 15% in compulsory schools and to 25% in upper secondary schools in
2014 (Swedish National Agency for Education 2016). As much as 64%
of the private schools are limited companies (Vlachos 2011), and this
share is increasing because there are few restrictions on the school
owners’ options to take out the surplus, which is quite unique for western
welfare states.
Table 2.4 Shares of paid employees in the nonprofit, for-profit, and public sectors
within education, health, and social services in Sweden 2007–2013
Service area 2007 2013
Employment % Employment %
Education (SNI 85)
Nonprofit 22,284 4.9 24,660 5.1
For-profit 42,754 9.5 68,175 14.2
Public sector 385,757 85.6 388,547 80.7
Total 450,795 100.0 481,382 100.0
Health (SNI 86)
Nonprofit 3,768 1.2 2,485 0.8
For-profit 46,168 14.8 56,456 18.7
Public sector 262,770 84.0 242,411 80.4
Total 312,706 100.0 301,352 100.0
Social services (SNI 87–88)
Nonprofit 12,173 3.1 12,006 2.7
For-profit 58,691 14.8 111,788 25.0
Public sector 324,985 82.1 323,884 72.3
Total 395,849 100.0 447,678 100.0
Welfare field in total
Nonprofit 38,225 3.3 39,151 3.2
For-profit 147,613 12.7 236,419 19.2
Public sector 973,512 84.0 954,842 77.6
Total 1,159,350 100.0 1,230,412 100.0
Sources See appendix at the end of the chapter
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Within care for elderly and disabled, the nonprofit share has been
stable around 2–3% over the past 20 years, while the share of private
services has increased from almost nothing to 15% (Erlandsson et al.
2013; Szebehely 2011). Within care for individuals and families, which
includes care for children and juveniles and substance abuse treatment,
the private share grew strongly in the 1980s and 1990s, but there have
only been minor changes since the year 2000. In 2010, a little less than
10% were employed in nonprofit organizations and 35% in for-profit
companies (Wiklund 2011). Within hospitals and inpatient medical care,
the share of private employment in Sweden is small, as in the other
Scandinavian countries. About 4% worked in 2009 in for-profit com-
panies and 1% in nonprofit organizations and foundations. Within
outpatient health and medical treatment, however, private companies
have about one-third of the employees, and they have taken over an
increasing share of the service area since 1995. Nonprofit organizations
and religious communities and foundations are almost absent (Johansson
2011). The private share has, in comparative perspective, been quite low
in this field in Sweden. In 1994, more than 90% of the doctors were
employed by the public sector, most of them by county councils (Zweifel
et al. 1998). The emerging private sector consists largely of single units or
smaller companies, besides some national chains that are either
co-operatives owned by employees (Praktikertjänst) or corporations
(Capio and Carema). Many new private service providers emerged after
2010, when the County Councils were ordered to organize primary
health services so that users could freely choose providers, in line with the
law on freedom of choice (LOV 2008: 962). Most of the new health
services are established in highly populated areas, as one would expect.
Consequently, half a million people have a second provider within a
5-min drive from their residence, so the number of options has increased
for many (Swedish Competition Authority 2010). Availability is
important as one of the preconditions for real consumer choice.
However, these kinds of concentration and distributional effects indicate
that this is only the beginning of the structural transformations in
Swedish welfare resulting from increased freedom of choice and free
rights to establish private institutions. Larger social differences in access
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to welfare services may be a consequence if there are no regulations on
establishment.
The opening up for private competition within the public welfare
services in Sweden has strengthened the for-profit sector but not the
so-called “ideal sector” with strong ties to civil society organizations.
Government-funded welfare contracts in Sweden have attracted private
investors and venture capital even from international funds. The insti-
tutional and legal changes promoting private competition to the public
service provision have resulted in commercial stimuli strong enough to
transform the welfare model in a few decades. This is quite an unusual
achievement in the welfare area, which is often described as a retrenched
policy field (Pierson 2001). The question is whether there are unintended
consequences as well, such as a small nonprofit sector, high concentration
in ownership, no clear improvement in efficiency, and quality problems,
such as the school results may indicate (Hartman 2011).
Norway: A Stable Nonprofit Share of Welfare
Employment
In Norway, there has been an intense debate on the privatization of
welfare services. It has focused on public versus private services, while the
nonprofit sector often has been left out of focus. Despite this, we have
not seen such dramatic changes as in Sweden. The centre-right minority
government in office from 2001 to 2005 wanted to make it easier to
establish private schools in Norway. The red–green coalition government
that followed immediately put on the brakes before the reform gave any
results of importance for the welfare provider mix. This was in line with
the red–green cooperation statement expressing the wish to give the
voluntary sector good conditions for providing noncommercial services
(Soria Moria-erklæringen 2005). Procurement regulations allowed non-
profit organizations to be selected for closed tenders or negotiations
about service contracts. In some areas, as in child welfare, the red–green
government’s goal was to select nonprofit organizations rather than
commercial firms when the public sector itself did not have sufficient
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capacity (Sivesind 2008a). However, many structural welfare reforms
have led to a decentralization of responsibility for the contracting of
welfare services to more autonomous agencies, and this makes it difficult
to implement such political intentions. Examples of such
semi-autonomous agencies are regional state-funded child welfare and
family counselling services (Bufetat) and regional health authorities
(helseforetak) governed in a similar way as a private company with a
director appointed by a board. The conservative minority coalition
government from October 2013 has looked for opportunities to open up
more for for-profit actors and user choice in health and social services.
However, a new law in 2015 for private primary schools and secondary
schools still requires that all public funding is used for educational
purposes and not for profit distribution. The nonprofit providers con-
tinue to be involved in publicly funded services in areas where they have
been innovators, such as elderly care, substance abuse treatment, medical
rehabilitation, and somatic and mental health care. This results in a
mixed model of public, nonprofit, and for-profit provision, to a large
extent based on a patchwork of ad hoc policies that have emerged over a
long time in different localities and service areas. Table 2.5 shows that
the for-profit employment shares have increased in all service areas, and
the nonprofit sector has had small increases in shares too, while the
public sector has decreased between 2006 and 2013. However, since the
total welfare employment has expanded, all sectors have had real increases
in all service areas. The growth in the for-profit sector is primarily due to
expansion in social services from 30,000 to 46,000 full-time employees,
including elderly care, day care for children, child and juvenile welfare,
and substance abuse treatment. There is a corresponding loss in public
sector employment shares, despite real growth from 176,000 to 213,000
full-time employees. In real numbers, the nonprofit employment
increased strongly from about 39,000 to 49,000 full-time employees.
Ironically, media have mainly focused on nonprofit institutions that have
been closed down. However, this has been more than compensated by
employment growth in other institutions, which shows that the non-
profit sector also can be flexible and entrepreneurial under the right
circumstances. The following analysis focuses on in which type of ser-
vices the changes have happened.
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Statistics Norway does not publish employment data separately for the
economic sectors and has not yet implemented the ESA2010 institu-
tional sector codes as Statistics Denmark has done. Table 2.5 is therefore
based on full-time employment data from the Satellite Account for
Non-Profit Institutions and employment data for the public sector, seen
in relation to national account data for the welfare services in total.
However, Table 2.6 presents data only from Statistics Norway’s Satellite
Account for Non-Profit Institutions and shows the changes in employ-
ment within the nonprofit sector in Norway. Similar detailed data do not
exist for the other sectors. The other Scandinavian countries are in the
process of implementing such satellite accounts but have not yet pub-
lished full reports.
Table 2.5 Paid employment in the nonprofit, for-profit, and public sector within
education, health and social services in Norway 2006–2013, full-time equivalent
employment and percent
Service area 2006 2013
Employment % Employment %
Education (2)
Nonprofit 8,177 5.1 10,609 5.8
For-profit 7,123 4.5 9,991 5.5
Public sector 144,700 90.4 162,300 88.7
Total 160,000 100.0 182,900 100.0
Health (3)
Nonprofit 7,642 5.5 9,122 5.7
For-profit 23,558 16.9 28,278 17.6
Public sector 108,500 77.7 123,300 76.7
Total 139,700 100.0 160,700 100.0
Social services (4)
Nonprofit 23,198 10.1 29,881 10.3
For-profit 29,902 13.1 46,219 16.0
Public sector 175,600 76.8 213,100 73.7
Total 228,700 100.0 289,200 100.0
Welfare field in total
Nonprofit 39,017 7.4 49,612 7.8
For-profit 60,583 11.5 84,488 13.4
Public sector 428,800 81.2 498,700 78.8
Total 528,400 100.0 632,800 100.0
Sources: See appendix at the end of the chapter
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The strongest growth within the nonprofit sector in Norway was in
primary and secondary education. Table 2.6 shows that the number of
full-time employees has increased from 4400 to 6000 from 2006 to
2013. This happened despite stricter requirements for the establishment
of new schools from 2007 to 2015. In practice, only noncommercial and
established educational alternatives such as Waldorf and Montessori
schools were approved. In secondary schools, there has also been strong
growth from 1700 to 2100 full-time employees, but still only 7% of
students in upper secondary and 3% in compulsory education are in
private, nonprofit schools in 2014/2015 (Norwegian Directorate for
Education and Training 2015). As we will see in the next chapter of this
book, in primary and secondary education, the relations between the
Table 2.6 Paid full-time equivalent employment in the nonprofit sector in the
welfare field in Norway 2006–2013
Type of service 2006 2013 Change
2006–2013
Education 8,177 10,609 29.7 %
Primary and secondary education 4,395 6,031 37.2 %
Higher education 1,736 2,136 23.0 %
Other education 2,046 2,442 19.4 %
Health 7,642 9,122 19.4 %
Hospitals, rehabilitation, mental health
care and other health services
7,642 9,122 19.4 %
Social Services 23,198 29,881 28,8 %
Nursing homesa 4,765 5,543 16.3 %
Day care for children 12,161 14,724 21.1 %
Child and juvenile welfare 1,000 1,045 4.5 %
Substance abuse treatment 2,012 2,244 11.5 %
Other social services including
emergency and relief
3,260 6,325 94.0 %
Total welfare employment 39,017 49,612 27.2 %
Nonprofit share of welfare employment b 7.4 % 7.8 %
Source SSB Satellite account for non-profit organizations. Table 08520, FTE
employment by activity (ICNPO)
Notesa‘Nursing homes' belongs to the ICNPO-category health, but here it is moved
to social services to match with Table 2.5, which is set up in line with SN2007,
which is Statistics Norway’s version of EU’s NACE Rev.2.
bWelfare employment in all sectors from SSB National economy. Table 09174, FTE
employment in Education, Health, and Social Work
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public sector as funder and the private providers are regulated by service
concessions and not by tendering under the Public Procurement Act.
This means that there is an opening for private initiatives to establish new
schools as long as they can get approval by the Directorate for Education.
This has resulted in an increase in the number of primary and lower
secondary schools from 165 to 209 and upper secondary schools from 83
to 94 between 2010 and 2014 (Norwegian Directorate for Education
and Training 2015), despite lack of enthusiasm for private schools from
the red–green government in position between 2005 and 2013. In many
cases, this has been schools that the municipalities want to close down
because of too few pupils. In 2014 and 2015, 27 and 28 new primary or
secondary schools received approval from the Directorate for education
under the new conservative government. This means an increase in the
nonprofit sector since the law requires that all public funding has to be
used directly for educational purposes, although some of the schools in
fact are limited companies. However, some schools rent space in prop-
erties and buy services from companies with the same owners as the
schools. The educational authorities have opened investigations when
prices are significantly higher than the general market level. This shows
that it takes vigilance to sustain a nonprofit model when for-profit
companies are allowed to own schools.
The category ‘Higher education’ in Table 2.6, which, for example,
includes the BI Norwegian Business School and diaconal colleges
engaged in nursing education, expanded from 1700 to 2100 full-time
employees, and ‘Other education,’ which includes folk high schools and
other forms of adult education, had an employment growth from 2000
to 2400. This is on par with the growth of the welfare field in total.
Nonprofit organizations in ‘Education’ in total had an employment
growth from 8200 to 10,600 and constituted 5.3% of all employment in
this area in Norway (Statistics Norway 2016a).
The main category ‘Health’ in Table 2.6 includes only ‘Hospitals,
rehabilitation, mental health care, and other health services’,5 which grew
from 7600 to 9100 full-time employees. This includes not only several
diaconal hospitals but also other forms of nonprofit psychiatric centers
and rehabilitation institutions. A large part of this is services that are
purchased by the regional state health authorities in Norway. The
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nonprofit somatic and mental health hospitals and clinics are well inte-
grated into that system for allocation of service contracts, because of their
large capacity and special competence. The contracting authorities have
had the opportunity to reserve tenders and negotiations with the non-
profits, in line with an exception to the rules on public procurements
introduced in 2004 (see Chap. 3). However, this has not been used here
because the for-profits do not have the necessary kind of capacity. Rather,
they are involved in laboratories, radiology, and minor surgery. A large
part of the for-profits public funding comes from patients with certain
diagnoses that may choose from a list of public and private providers.
In rehabilitation, the contracting authorities buy services in a single
market because they find it difficult to distinguish between nonprofit and
for-profit providers. All in all, there is little direct competition between
nonprofit and for-profit providers in health. The challenge for the
nonprofit sector is instead that the public sector may decide to expand its
own activities (Bogen and Grønningsæter 2016). However, the nonprofit
sector also has activities outside the public procurement system and
continues to develop new services such as low-threshold health services
for drug addicts and for migrants who lack documents. These kinds of
humanitarian tasks are difficult for the state or private companies to be
legally responsible for.
Within the main category ‘Social services,’ the growth in nonprofit
employment was from 23,200 to almost 30,000 between 2006 and
2013, as Table 2.6 shows. ‘Nursing homes’ includes both home care and
institution-based care, which is largely a municipal responsibility.
Nonprofit employment here grew from 4800 to 5500. Many munici-
palities have only public service providers, but about 70–80 nonprofit
nursing homes have long-term framework agreements. Very few have got
an operating contract through competitive tendering. There are only
about 20 for-profit nursing homes that are part of the municipalities’
normal systems for user allocation, but in addition, some private insti-
tutions sell single places to municipalities (Vabø et al. 2013, 180–181).
In total for institutions for the aged and disabled, almost 90% of all
beds are operated by the municipalities. The for-profits increased their
share from 4% in 2009 to 7% in 2015, while the nonprofits decreased
from 6 to 5% (Statistics Norway 2016d). The for-profit share is still
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surprisingly small when seen in relation to the intense political debates in
the Norwegian election campaigns about ‘out-contracting of grandma’
(Vabø 2011). There has been much enthusiasm for increased competi-
tion and user choice, but an administrative separation between con-
tracting agencies and service providers have primarily been used to
improve cost and quality control. Only 4% of Norwegian municipalities
had introduced user choice in elderly care in 2012 (NHO Service 2013).
However, this includes the biggest cities, Bergen and Oslo, with many
users. Within home-based care, the public share of the costs is 97%,
while the rest is split between for-profit and nonprofit contractors (NHO
2015, 77). In the small area of practical user-steered assistance6—pub-
licly funded personal services mainly for people with disabilities—the
nonprofit organizations have a major part because the private services, to
a large extent, are organized through a cooperative called ULOBA7
(NHO 2015; NHO Service 2010).
The dominant area in social services is day care for children, with
12,000 full-time employees in 2006 and 14,700 full-time employees in
2013. However, this is a field where the for-profit companies had an even
stronger growth from 12,000 to 20,000 full-time employees in the same
period as a result of generous public funding arrangements designed to
finally reach full coverage of the demand for day care. As a result, the
nonprofit share decreased from 22 to 20%, while the for-profit share
increased from 22 to 27% of total full-time employment in kindergartens
from 2006 to 2013 (Statistics Norway 2016c). In child welfare, we find
institutions and homes funded by the state’s Children, Youth, and
Family Service (Bufetat) with its 5 regional offices. The red–green
coalition government wanted to reduce the use of commercial organi-
zations in this field. This may be part of the reason for nonprofit
employment growth from 1000 to 1200 full-time employees from 2006
to 2008 (not shown in Table 2.6), but in 2013 the employment was
down to the same level as in 2006 again. Other data indicate that the
for-profit full-time employment in public contracts increased by more
than 50% from 2007 to 2015, while the nonprofit and public sectors
were stable (Statistics Norway 2016b). One reason for this may be that
some regions have changed from the traditional framework agreements to
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tenders, and in open competition the for-profits tend to have an
advantage.
In substance abuse treatment, which for the most part is services that
the state health authorities buy, the nonprofit employment grew from
2000 to 2200 full-time employees (Table 2.6). This despite the fact that
here too there have been increasing demands on documentation and
some nonprofit institutions have been shut down (Bogen and
Grønningsæter 2016). However, the nonprofit employment still grows
because they are an important part of the substance abuse treatment with
specific competencies and have had up to 40% of the total capacity in
some regions (Hatlebakk 2014).
The backdrop for these changes is a number of comprehensive welfare
reforms have increased the use of open tendering and quasi-markets in
Norway. In some areas, competition for contracts only applies to the
operation of new institutions and services, or just between the private
providers, while in a few areas there is competition between public,
for-profit, and nonprofit actors. The reforms have created special chal-
lenges for the nonprofit organizations because open tenders demand a lot
of resources, the contracts often have a short duration, and method-
ological and ideological alternatives may not be much of a competitive
advantage, despite the fact that user choice and adaptation have been
requested by the politicians. There is an apparent tendency for the
for-profits to take market shares when there is an open competition with
the nonprofits, such as we have seen in kindergartens, child and family
protection, and nursing homes in a few municipalities. The sectors have
different advantages. The voluntary actors have in particular stood for the
distinctive alternatives, although they are not always good at commu-
nicating that to the outside world (Trætteberg and Sivesind 2015). The
profit-oriented companies on their side emphasize cost control and user
satisfaction and often have a more professional system for quality mea-
surement and preparation of tender documents. This may be because
they have access to competence and capital from welfare concerns owned
by private investors. This makes them more able to expand in a com-
petitive environment.
All in all, Norway has a mixed model; there is a strong dominance of
public welfare provision in some areas, combined with a small share of
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nonprofit actors. However, increased use of quasi-markets and open
tendering in some areas has brought for-profits to grow faster than the
nonprofits, in particular in social services. This has resulted in a decrease
in the public share of the growing welfare employment.
Nonprofit Stagnation and For-Profit Growth
The composition of welfare providers in publicly funded services in the
Scandinavian countries is diverging. Sweden now has the largest
for-profit share—and it is still growing. In Norway and Denmark, the
for-profits also grow faster than the nonprofit providers. In Denmark,
there has even been a slight decline in the nonprofit share, but it is still
large by Scandinavian standards. These changes are mainly due to
changes in social services. The nonprofit sector in Sweden remains small,
although the policy is intended to promote alternatives to the public
services. This is because the private growth is stimulated by commercial
incentives, while there are no tools for regulating the balance between the
public, for-profit, and nonprofit sectors.8 The for-profits have better
access to the economic resources necessary to establish new service
institutions that then seek approval from the government agencies based
on general criteria. After that, it is up to the users to choose providers.
This freedom of choice adds an important quality dimension. However,
the Swedish nonprofits, which lost much of their institutional foothold
before 1990, have difficulty with raising capital to expand their services in
this new regime (Swedish Government Inquiries SOU 2016:78).
Consequently, they are unable to realize their potential for providing a
broader offer of qualitatively distinctive alternatives that the economic
nonprofit theories emphasize (Weisbrod 1977; Steinberg 2006).
There are also differences between the service areas in the three
Scandinavian countries. In education, the nonprofits are able to keep
their employment shares. However, in Sweden, the for-profits have had a
very strong growth. In Norway and Denmark, the nonprofit schools are
still the only alternative to the public school system due to requirements
for public funding, as we will see in the next chapter.
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In health, only Norway has a share of nonprofit service providers of
any significance. This is because they, in particular in somatic and psy-
chiatric institutions and substance abuse treatment, are well integrated
into the public specialist health system (Bogen and Grønningsæter
2016). In Sweden, there has been a decrease in the public sector and a
strong growth in the for-profit shares, which has brought them up to the
same level as in Norway and Denmark. This growth will probably
continue because there is free right to establish new health services,
provided that they get public approval.
In social services, the for-profits have had a stronger growth than the
other sectors in all Scandinavian countries. This is the most important
reason for a change in total shares of welfare providers in Scandinavia
from the public sector to the for-profit sector. This has to do with
increasing use of market-emulating tools of governance, such as open
tenders, short-term contracts and increasing competition between the
sectors. Additionally in Denmark, there have been several reforms that
have reduced the nonprofit employment in social services in the short
term. Consequently, the nonprofit sector’s share goes down while the
public and for-profit shares increase. It is too early to say if this is a new
trend because the changes in full-time employees are quite small.
In general, nonprofit service providers have not been put under the
same competitive pressure in the social services in Denmark as in the
other Scandinavian countries. This is because several Danish munici-
palities include self-owning institutions in an in-house system for allo-
cation of users instead of open tendering. Furthermore, the nonprofit
schools have a positive development in Norway and Denmark, while the
for-profits grow rapidly in Sweden. The difference is that the service
concessions do not allow distribution of profit in publicly funded schools
in Norway and Denmark. The self-owning institutions and smaller
companies still dominate in Denmark, while there is an increasing
concentration of for-profit ownership in a few conglomerates in Sweden
and Norway. This shows that the changes in the mix of welfare providers
are influenced by the different tools of governance used by the
Scandinavian countries.
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Why is the Mix of Welfare Providers
in the Scandinavian Countries Diverging?
The changes in mix of providers of services funded by the public sector
are primarily a result of policies responding to the particular situation in
each country 15–20 years ago. Denmark has for a long time politically
wanted to provide good and stable conditions for nonprofit welfare
provision but has recently allowed for-profit provision in most service
areas; Sweden wanted to decrease the public sector dominance in welfare
provision and has created commercial incentives that promote growth in
for-profit private services; while Norway has preferred public provision as
long as there is sufficient capacity, in particular in the most basic types of
health services and social care. Nonprofit providers have been invited to
closed negotiation and tenders in certain areas, while for-profit providers
have been used to increase capacity primarily in kindergartens, child and
family protection, and some other social services. This has resulted in
diverging changes in employment shares between the nonprofit,
for-profit, and public sectors in the welfare services among the
Scandinavian countries. The differences are so large that one may ask if
there still is such a thing as a Nordic welfare model.
This divergence is happening despite broad implementation of New
Public Management tools of government in all the Scandinavian coun-
tries. Not many years ago, few considered quasi-markets as a suitable
coordination mechanism within the Scandinavian welfare model. Now,
the strong prevalence is striking. This is partly a consequence of EU’s
public procurement directive with formal requirements to open tenders
for contracts over a threshold value.9 This directive also applies to
Norway, which is not an EU member, due to the EEA treaty. However,
the national regulation of public procurement in the Scandinavian
countries is in many ways stricter than the EU directive, which will be a
topic in the next chapter.
Some have assumed that the spread of market-emulating governance
would result in convergence between the welfare regimes (Henriksen
et al. 2012). Looking at the mix of welfare service providers, however,
there is rather divergence among the Scandinavian countries—and with
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other welfare regimes. Sweden still has less nonprofit welfare service
provision than any of the western European countries, but this is now
combined with a rapidly growing for-profit share. The liberal countries
tend to have much larger nonprofit sectors, whereas in the welfare
partnership countries, the third sector plays a much larger and more
independent role as welfare provider (Anheier and Salamon 2006;
Salamon et al. 2004; Sivesind and Selle 2009; Salamon and Sokolowski
2016). In addition, the government, and not the market or the
employment-based social insurances, remains the main source of funding
for core welfare services in all Scandinavian countries. Denmark has a
nonprofit share on a level between the other Scandinavian countries and
the welfare partnership model, but this is a result of self-owning insti-
tutions and free schools and not semi-public welfare associations with
dominating roles in welfare provision as in the welfare partnership
countries. In those service areas that have been opened up for private
providers, Norway has gone further in allocating contracts by open
tenders than the other Scandinavian countries, which has resulted in
for-profit growth. However, in other areas, the nonprofit share has been
protected by continuation of framework agreements, particularly in
nursing homes, and by closed tenders and negotiations in areas like child
and family protection. Still, there has been little focus on taking
advantage of the nonprofit sector’s potential distinctiveness among the
contracting agencies (Trætteberg and Sivesind 2015). All in all, the
diverging development trends between the Scandinavian countries are a
result of policy responses to different compositions of welfare service
providers in each country that had evolved before the NPM tools were
implemented. However, welfare reforms were also motivated by different
political ideologies.
This is not the place to go through the long historic development of
variations of the social democratic welfare model among the
Scandinavian countries, but Sweden’s development of a welfare model
has been characterized by a centralized and paternalistic corporatism.
According to Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein (1994), this was a result of
a system of estate representation that was gradually changed to a liberal
society. In Denmark, in contrast, there was an abrupt shift from modern
absolutism to a representative democracy in 1848–1849. The end of
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absolutism was brought about by liberal movements, based on both
farmers and liberal bourgeoisie. These forces demanded that alternatives
to the public schools should get financial support from the public sector,
resulting in a pragmatic welfare liberalism (Knudsen and Rothstein
1994). This turned out to be a model where different social groups could
create institutions promoting certain views of life, values, pedagogies, or
activities.
The different welfare models in Sweden and Denmark can also be
recognized in the development after WWII. Sweden focused on devel-
oping welfare services provided by the public sector in order to reduce
social inequality, to a large extent with support of the civil society
(Rothstein and Trägårdh 2007). In Denmark, there was broad political
support also for alternatives to the public sector, and the self-owning
institutions and free schools could continue to evolve independently of
which political parties were in government. By the beginning of the
1990s, Sweden had an extremely large public welfare employment share.
For Sweden, the expansion of the private welfare provision after 2000
could be seen as steps towards becoming a normal, western welfare
society. In Denmark, changes seemed less urgent. The larger nonprofit
sector represented more distinct alternatives for choice, and volunteering
and civic engagement were politically promoted as antidotes to bureau-
cratization and passivity that could be the result of a self-contained public
welfare system (Henriksen and Bundesen 2004).
In Norway, the nonprofit sector’s role was smaller than in Denmark
and more fragmented, and the public policy towards it was often par-
ticularistic and pragmatic. Long-term collaborative relationships between
the public sector and the nonprofit providers evolved in services like
elderly care, substance abuse treatment, and health care, often as the
result of the strength of counter-cultural popular movements in the
peripheral districts related to lay Christian communities, new Norwegian
language, or temperance (Sivesind and Selle 2010; Rokkan 1967). In the
1980s, privatization of welfare services was put on the agenda by a
conservative political surge, and there has recently been for-profit growth
in particular in social services like kindergartens, child and family pro-
tection, and rehabilitation.
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However, as we have seen, in elderly care the changes in the welfare
provider mix have been small, despite fierce political debates (Vabø
2011). Even in large municipalities close to larger cities with a conser-
vative majority, only one or two institutions for elderly care have typically
been out-contracted to for-profit providers. This is done to establish a
market price that is then used for benchmarking of similar public sector
services. Because of good economic conditions and expanding welfare
employment, there have been less urgent needs to cut costs by con-
tracting out services. In many welfare areas, it has even been difficult to
get enough qualified professionals in the public sector. Private employers
with lower pay and inferior pension systems would have little to offer in
such a tight labour market. In addition, there was a strong resistance
against privatization fronted by the Norwegian Union of Municipal and
General Employees (Fagforbundet), which is the largest union in The
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO Norway) with nearly
340,000 members. Instead of just arguing for status quo, they collabo-
rated with other trade unions and the Norwegian Association of Local
and Regional Authorities (KS) and political authorities to initiate several
programs for improvement of services in the municipalities that ran
subsequently from 1998 to 2015, in many cases with measurable success
(Vabø et al. 2013, 185–188). In many municipalities, framework
agreements with nonprofit providers have been prolonged, but in the
cases where there has been open tender competition, the for-profit
providers tend to prevail, if not in the first round, then in almost all cases
in the second round of tendering (Herning 2015). In Sweden, the public
sector was under stronger pressure to cut costs, and private service pro-
viders in elderly care could offer lower costs than services provided
in-house by the municipalities (see Chap. 4 by Feltenius).
Like the other Scandinavian countries, Sweden implemented NPM
and quasi-markets as tools of governance. However, in Sweden, addi-
tional steps were taken to create competition between the public and
private welfare providers. A centre-right government from 1991 to 1994
opened up for competitive tendering and user choice in the municipal-
ities. The social democratic governments from 1994 to 2006 did not
reverse these reforms, and the for-profit employment share kept
increasing. There was a debate within the social democratic party
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between the ‘state-socialists,’ who wanted to stop the for-profit welfare
growth and the ‘popular movement democrats,’ who did not see public
monopoly on service provision as a precondition for a social democratic
welfare state (Trägårdh 2007). At the party congress in 2001, this con-
troversy resulted in a compromise involving an enquiry about nonprofit
institutions (Lindbom 2013) that in retrospect has been of little
consequence.
From 2006 to 2014, the centre-right minority government went even
further by strengthening general rights for user choice (Freedom of
Choice Act, LOV 2008: 962), which includes funding through some
kind of voucher systems, reduced barriers for establishment of new
welfare services depending on approval by national public agencies, and
no restrictions on transferring profit to owners. The intention was to
reduce the public sector dominance by creating effective quasi-markets
where the users can reject service providers they dislike, and with low
barriers for establishment of new service providers. The goal was to create
a dynamic where bad institutions would disappear and good institutions
would take over. However, an unintended consequence has been that a
very large share of the for-profit companies is owned by a few con-
glomerates with vested interests in health, education, and social services.
Politicians also argue that stronger and more direct measures against low
performing institutions are necessary in the public as well as the private
sectors.
The venture capitalists may not be taking out revenue from the
companies on a regular basis, even if they have legal right to do so. If they
can develop services and expand the business, they can sell with a profit
after some years. This opportunity to buy and sell shares has introduced
an incentive to growth for private companies. However, it does not work
on the nonprofit actors. Their main concern is developing distinct service
profiles in terms of religion, ideology, or methods, and they may
therefore not be interested in competing on a bid to take over a welfare
institution with its employees, maybe only to lose it again after a 3-year
period. It takes time to form services in line with the organization’s main
goals. Growth is not a goal in itself. Nonprofit welfare providers may also
have a more local basis and therefore lack capital reserves to come back if
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they lose the contract to operate a particular institution. In the long run,
the for-profit providers prevail, and this endangers provision of qualita-
tively different services that, according to some economic theories, are
characteristic for the nonprofit sector (Weisbrod 1977), and such distinct
alternatives to choose from may be important for the long-term support
of government-funded welfare services. A study by Dahlberg et al. shows
that in service areas with the implementation of user choice in combi-
nation with rights to establish new service units in Sweden, there seems
to be faster growth in the for-profit sector than in areas with competitive
tendering. When the law of freedom of choice is implemented through
one political decision on the national level, as it was in primary health
care in 2010, this speeds up the for-profit growth (Dahlberg et al. 2013,
226).
Service providers owned by welfare conglomerates are emerging as a
new type of actor with their own interests, business partners, and
strategic alliances in politics and public administrations, which in turn
results in improvement in their own framework conditions. When
politicians that are sceptical of privatization come to power at the
national, county, or local level, they may have stopped the acceleration
but seldom reversed previous reforms. Political goodwill for the non-
profits is not enough to increase their share of the welfare employees
when they are regulated in the same way as the for-profits. The growth
incentives continue to work on the for-profit sector and not on the
nonprofit sector, and the long-term result will be a fundamental change
of the Swedish welfare model.
In all the Scandinavian countries, the nonprofit welfare providers
enjoy broad political support, and the governments have even signed
compacts with the voluntary organizations providing health services and
social care, inspired by a similar agreement made in the UK (Johansson
and Johansson 2012). The intention is to establish shared principles and
guidelines for effective and high-quality services and dialogue while
securing predictability, autonomy, and distinctiveness for the voluntary
organizations. In Denmark, the compact signed in 2001 is a rather
general declaration of interests, and it is difficult to put the finger on
concrete results. Still, the compact was renewed in 2013.10 However, we
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see clear effects of long-term, broad political support, and a highly
institutionalized relationship between the government and the nonprofit
organizations. An example of this is that the municipalities are stimulated
by the government to involve voluntary organizations on the social ser-
vice field by special funding (§18-collaboration between the municipal-
ities and voluntary social organizations).
In Norway, the compact is followed up by dialogue meetings between
the Minister and representatives of organizations once or twice a year.
Since it was signed in October 2012, there are examples of tenders and
negotiations that are only open to nonprofit actors, and also of a new
type of service contracts that do not have a fixed termination date. When
we consider the Norwegian nonprofit sector’s growth (Table 2.6), there
seems to be an effect of the red–green coalition government’s (2005–
2013) willingness to prioritize nonprofit organizations when the public
sector itself does not have sufficient capacity. The conservative coalition
government from 2013 also supported the compact, but has been more
in favour of sector neutral policies. The for-profit sector has had a
stronger growth rate as a result of the strategy of several governments to
increase capacity through generous funding arrangements in areas like
kindergartens.
In Sweden, the nonprofit sector did not have a real foothold before the
privatization process started in the 1990s and has been lagging behind.
Even though the compact that was signed in 2008 has a very elaborate
strategy for stimulating regional and local processes, this has not resulted
in an increase in nonprofit employment shares. It is difficult to create
growth when the sector is reduced to a minimum and lacks effective
framework conditions for growth. In addition, the population has little
previous experience with distinctive nonprofit sector services so it is
difficult for the stakeholders to muster broad political support.
A general finding from this comparison of welfare service areas and
institutional sectors in Scandinavia is that competitive tendering results
in for-profit growth and nonprofit stagnation or decline. It is difficult to
find one example of a welfare area in Sweden and Norway where this is
not the case. In Denmark, such changes are not yet so easy to see in the
statistics because of a stronger tradition for nonprofit sector services.
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However, recent reforms may encourage increasing for-profit shares in
Denmark too. By comparing the tools of governance used by the
Scandinavian countries, it becomes clear that equal opportunities and
political goodwill are not sufficient to develop a distinctive nonprofit
sector with critical mass. It takes long-term contracts and restrictions on
transfer of profits, a clear preference for the distinctive features of the
nonprofit providers, or negotiations or tenders reserved for nonprofits.
For example, the nonprofit sectors in Norway and Denmark have in
particular had a strong position in primary and secondary education,
which is regulated by service concessions with nonprofit status as a
condition for approval, and not by competitive tendering. Another
example is in-house law that is used to promote self-owning institutions
in kindergartens and elderly care in Denmark. This shows that a dif-
ferentiated welfare provider mix depends on differentiated types of reg-
ulation. However, this is not often recognized in political debates about
how to reduce the public sector dominance and to increase competition,
where arguments about equal competition dominate. Changes in the
welfare provider mix, and in particular the share that remains for the
nonprofit sector, tend to be unintended consequences rather than clearly
formulated political goals. Denmark has been an exception so far, but
now privatization and competition are becoming goals in themselves, and
new regulations open up for profit-oriented companies in more service
areas.
NPM tools are used to regulate the relation between the government’s
contracting agencies and welfare service providers in the public, for-profit,
and nonprofit sectors in all Scandinavian countries in similar ways as in
many other European countries. As such, this does not result in diverging
welfare models. The social democratic welfare ideals, funding model, and a
certain share of nonprofit services can be sustained together with these tools
of governance, as we have seen in Denmark and in some service areas also in
Norway. However, Sweden has chosen to implement an additional set of
policy instruments, including increasingly broad enactment of user choice
and reduced restrictions on the establishment of new welfare institutions,
combined with no limits on transfer of profits. This has set in motion rapid
and broad expansion of the for-profit sector with a long-term
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regime-changing potential. A diversified welfare mix depends on diversified
tools of governance, which includes reserved tendering and negotiations,
service concessions, or in-house service contracts. This can be used to secure
a certain nonprofit share in service areas where policymakers consider it to
be particularly valuable. These different types of regulation and legal
frameworks in the Scandinavian countries will be the topic of the next
chapter.
Notes
1. This means the number of percentage points change divided by the total
number of years and multiplied by five. For total welfare employment,
percent change is divided by total number of years and multiplied by
five. Five-year periods are chosen because 1 year change would result in
very small numbers, and the focus here is on cumulative long-term
changes.
2. The real employment numbers are shown in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
3. Maximum years are not shown in the Table.
4. The main source for the following presentation of changes in the Danish
welfare mix is a report by Malene Thøgersen about self-owning insti-
tutions in Denmark (Thøgersen 2013).
5. ‘Nursing homes’ is moved to social services here to match with
Table 2.5, which is set up in line with Statistics Norway’s version of
NACE.
6. «personlig brukerstyrt assistanse (PBA)».
7. ULOBA is a cooperative that is employer for the personal assistants for
disabled persons who are stake owners.
8. A new Swedish Government Inquiry (SOU 2016: 78) suggests a
replacement of the Freedom of Choice Act (LOV 2008: 962) that
includes tools to promote the nonprofit providers and regulation of the
level of profits, but it is doubtful if there is political support for this in
the Parliament.
9. EU’s public procurement directive 2004/18/EC, which was replaced




2 The Changing Roles of For-Profit and Nonprofit … 67
Appendix
The definition of nonprofit organizations is based on UN’s Handbook on
Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National Accounts (United Nations
2003). The most important criteria are that the organization is not
subordinate to public structures of governance, although substantial parts
of the income may come from the public sector. The organization does
not distribute profit to owners, directors, members, or others, which
means that it does not primarily have a commercial orientation. The
surplus must be used in line with the main goals of the organization.
The Danish data for nonprofit, for-profit, and total employment of the
welfare area cover P Education and Q Health and social services in DB07,
which is Statistics Denmark’s version of EU’s NACE Rev. 2. The source is
Statistics Denmark’s statistics bank, table «LBESK32: Fuldtidsbeskæftigede
lønmodtagere efter branche (DB07 19-grp), sektor og tid». This is the only
source of full-time employment data, but it only covers the years 2008–
2013. To differentiate between health and social services, we use ratios for a
number of employees from the table «RASOFF34 Beskæftigede
lønmodtagere efter branche (DB07), sektor og tid». The data for nonprofit
employment are estimates for the ICNPO categories Education, Health,
and Social Services (Boje 2017, Table 4.10) except for the modifications
described in Table 2.2 above. The data for nonprofit employment are
higher than in table LBESK32, and this difference is subtracted from the
public sector employment. This is because LBESK32 uses sector coding
from ESA2010. This implies that self-owning institutions with operating
contracts with the public sector according to the ‘in-house’ regulations are
included in the public sector. However, according to the Handbook on Non-
Profit Institutions in the System of National Accounts (United Nations 2003),
they should be part of the nonprofit sector. The calculation of employment
in 2008 is based on the assumption that there has been a linear growth from
2003 to 2013, which are the two data points covered by the source (Boje
2017, Table 4.10).
The Norwegian data for nonprofit employment are from Statistics
Norway’s satellite account (Statistics Norway 2015) for the ICNPO
categories Education, Health, and Social Services, except for the
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modifications described in Table 2.2 above. Table 2.5 is set up in line
with SN2007, which is Statistics Norway’s version of EU’s NACE Rev.2.
The for-profit employment data are the residual between the total
employment and the public and the nonprofit sector.
The Swedish data do not show full-time employment but the number
of employed persons from the table «Antal sysselsatta fördelat på sektor
inom vård, skola och omsorg» in Statistics Sweden’s 'Officiella Statistik
Serie Offentlig Economi OE 29 SM 1001 2014' and 'OE 29 SM 1501
2015'. The services are classified according to SNI2007, which is
Statistics Sweden’s version of EU’s NACE Rev. 2.
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Education and Elderly Care in Denmark,
Norway and Sweden: National Policies
and Legal Frameworks for Private Providers
Signe Bock Segaard and Jo Saglie
Introduction
As a starting point for the case studies of the following chapters, this
chapter presents the national context for municipal welfare services:
primary and lower secondary education, and institution-based elderly
care. We aim to shed light on the national political, legal and institu-
tional framework within which local welfare services are provided, and
how different frameworks may have consequences for the welfare mix.
To what extent is the national context in Denmark, Norway and
Sweden different? In the literature on ‘welfare regimes’, there is consid-
erable agreement that the three countries can be placed within the
‘Nordic model’ (Ervasti et al. 2008, 5). This points to several similarities
in the organisation of the welfare state. Welfare services are, to a great
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extent, publicly financed and provided on the basis of universal rights,
and the municipalities play a crucial role in the implementation of these
services. That is also to say that private providers of publicly financed
welfare services operate within a context characterised by mainly public
providers. Furthermore, during recent decades, promoting active citi-
zenship in public service has been and still is an overall aim in all three
Scandinavian countries. This has implied a stronger emphasis on more
user involvement and empowerment as well as on developing a broader
range of services and creating genuine user choice between alternative
service providers. However, and as we will show in this chapter, the tools
of government for promoting this aim have been different in the three
countries. Another common element is that public-sector procurement is
regulated by an EU Directive that all three countries have implemented,
even though the implementation has to some extent taken place in
different ways and at different points in time (Segaard 2015). On the one
hand, an international perspective makes it clear that the Scandinavian
welfare states share many features—which separate them from other
countries. On the other hand, there are also considerable differences
between the Scandinavian countries themselves, and these differences
have become more pronounced during recent decades. As the previous
chapter shows, the differences apply to the mix of public, nonprofit and
for-profit services within education and elderly care. While the extent of
private nonprofit providers is relatively large in Denmark, for-profit service
providers play a more significant role in Sweden. In Norway, the roles of
both of these types of private actors are in fact comparatively modest.
However, in an international context, the sizes of the nonprofit and
for-profit sectors in the Scandinavian countries are still relatively small.
The starting point is thus that some fundamental differences in the
organisation of welfare services exist between the three countries, in spite
of the overall similarities. This chapter aims to explore one possible
explanation for this: the national policy, legal and institutional frame-
work for private service providers. In exploring this, we develop and use
three government models as a framework for comparison of the national
policies on private—both nonprofit and for-profit—actors in service
production. We make a distinction between direct, indirect and dis-
connected government. The underlying question is whether variations in
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such national government models can explain the observed differences in
the national ‘welfare mix’ of public, nonprofit and for-profit services
within both education and elderly care. Regardless of the answer, the
next question is naturally whether some underlying factors affect differ-
ences in national policy models as well as differences in the actual welfare
mix. There is no room for a comprehensive discussion of such factors in
this chapter, but politics as a driving factor will be briefly discussed in the
concluding section.
Three Government Models
As an analytical framework to explore and capture national welfare policy
and legislation for private providers of publicly financed elderly care and
education, we develop three ideal government models of how publicly
funded welfare services might be organised: (1) direct government,
(2) indirect government and (3) disconnected government. The models,
summarised in Table 3.1, reflect different policies for public–private
collaboration on public welfare production and thereby represent different
approaches to the welfare mix on a more general level. The policies might
manifest in contracts and institutional systems for approval and supervi-
sion, for example. The way supervision is organised (self-evaluation or
control by national authorities, general or detailed criteria) is significant
for understanding the freedom of discretion that each actor has.
Table 3.1 Ideal models of government in public welfare production
Actors Discretion
Direct government
Pure public organisation Public Public
Contracting Public/Private Public
Indirect government
Collaborative governance Public/Private Public/Private
Disconnected government
Free market-based organisation Private Private
Philanthropy Private Private
The typology is developed by the authors based on Donahue and Zeckhauser
(2006, 496ff).
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Each of the government models reflects a specific solution for
organisation and interaction between public and private actors—non-
profit as well as for-profit—in the production of welfare services. The
solutions are different with regard to where discretionary power over
central aspects of service production is allocated.
We distinguish between three types of discretionary power. Production
discretion involves the competence and possibility to specify the goals and
means of the welfare service in question. Payoff discretion refers to the
freedom to decide how the final outcome in monetary terms should be
used and distributed by the private service provider. This also concerns
the opportunity for the provider to transfer profits to owners and
investors. Moreover, payoff discretion involves defining the end result:
Should it be perceived as good or bad? The organisation of supervision
and control may be significant in this respect. The service provider will
have a larger extent of payoff discretion if supervision is based on
self-evaluation with general evaluation criteria, compared with supervi-
sion carried out by a national authority and based on detailed criteria.
Finally, preference discretion refers to the normative view and under-
standing of the welfare service and the mission behind it. Preferences and
underlying values may be related to pedagogy, professional ethics, beliefs,
philosophy or religious faith. Discretion in service production therefore
involves a kind of freedom to define the public interest behind the service
provision (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006, 514).
Looking at how discretion is approached in the three government
models, the public sector is assumed to have full discretionary power in
the direct government model, regardless of whether a purely public
organisation or contracting is chosen. In the latter case, the public
principal commissions the work and governs through monopoly of dis-
cretion with regard to production, payoff and preferences. The monopoly
will manifest in the contract, which will appear as a means for control
and performance measuring (Phillips and Smith 2011). In this context,
‘contracting’ does not refer to the existence of a written contract, but
rather interaction between the authorities and a private actor which is
solely based on the simple delegation of tasks without any freedom of
discretion.
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In the disconnected government model, freedom of discretion is
assumed to be fully handed over to the nonpublic service provider
through the free market or pure philanthropy. The model of the free
market assumes that government and organisation of welfare services take
place through users’ freedom of choice and competition between private
service providers. The difference between free market and pure philan-
thropy is not related to discretion, but to the kind of private actors
involved. In pure philanthropy, private actors are nonprofit, whereas a
pure market model includes only for-profit actors. In real life, however,
the picture is more mixed.
The indirect government category in the model comprises collaborative
governance.1 This refers to collaboration between a public principal and
a private—for-profit or nonprofit—service provider characterised by
self-regulation within a specific political and institutional framework
(Sørensen and Torfing 2008, 10). Moreover, with regard to discretion,
we consider collaborative governance to be ‘[t]he murky middle ground,
in which both parties exercise discretion’ (Donahue and Zeckhauser
2006, 514). The empirical question is how and to what extent discretion
is divided when it comes to ‘defining not only the means by which a goal
is achieved but the details of the goal itself’ (Donahue and Zeckhauser
2006, 497). In line with Donahue and Zeckhauser, we underline two
considerations that are important for how discretion is shared between
actors. First, a consideration of democracy requires that ‘a large share of
discretion must rest with a player who is answerable to the public at large’
(2006, 509). At the same time, both the public principal and the non-
public provider must have some share of discretion—otherwise, the
relationship would not be collaborative (2006, 509).
The literature on governance points to ‘relational contracting’ as a
distinguishing feature of collaborative governance:
[a]lthough contracts may continue to be important policy tools, they
would be more than a means of control over the purchase of service (…).
The focus on strengthening relationships should be evidenced by more
relational contracting which puts an emphasis on working toward com-
mon goals, promoting communication and flexibility, and developing
trust. (Phillips and Smith 2011, 5)
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Public–private interaction based on the idea of collaborative governance
is often praised for its flexibility and capacity; but, as Donahue and
Zeckhauser (2006, 497) stated, ‘at the price of more ambiguous lines of
authority and far greater strategic complexity’.
Table 3.1 presents the models of government in welfare production as
ideal types. This is appropriate as an analytic framework when the
intention is to identify similarities and differences; however, we are aware
that it does not necessarily represent the whole empirical reality. The
pure models may be combined with each other to create a more complex
regime of government in welfare production. For instance, such a layered
government may combine the idea of free user choice with elements from
the (in)direct model when the authorities, through pure public organi-
sation, contracting or collaboration with more than one service provider,
facilitate the free choice of the user. Here, layered government implies
organising the welfare mix through two steps: first, the selection of
providers by the authority and then, in the next step, selection by
individual users.
Our approach to and understanding of the welfare mix is (partly)
based on the assumption that government models are chosen and
developed over time in light of political visions and ideologies. This
understanding is in accordance with Phillips and Smith’s (2011) expla-
nation of why private service providers—nonprofit as well as for-profit—
have become more involved in public welfare production. They remind
us that it is not the type of welfare state that explains the development
towards more or less relational governance and involvement by the third
sector, but rather political visions and the ability to collaborate (2011,
23–24):
…a vision of the role of the third sector that sees it as more than a social
safety net or delivery agent of services, but that advances the value of the
sector for democracy and citizenship and/or economic development. The
vision then needs to be driven by strong political leadership. A connection
to democratization or economic development is evident in all cases in
which major reform has occurred (…). However, it is also clear that such a
reform project has to be mutual and that neither government nor the third
sector can drive it alone.
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The remainder of this chapter comprises three sections. Each section
discusses factors at the national level that may affect the use of nonpublic
actors in local service production within primary and lower secondary
education, and institution-based elderly care. We limit the analysis to the
state as of mid-2015. First, in the following section, we briefly outline the
EU Public Procurement Directive (Directive 2004/18/EC) that has been
in effect the last decade and how national legislation in the three
countries is related to it. To fully understand the national framework, it
is necessary to take into account that EU policies set limits for the
national legal framework. Norway, Denmark and Sweden are obliged to
implement EU directives. Regarding outsourcing of welfare services, the
EU Public Procurement Directive is especially relevant. Second, we
address national policies on schools and elderly care. Within each
country, national policy standards are set by means of various policy
documents—legislation, instructions, guidelines, etc. Based on the
analysis of these national policy documents, we compare and discuss
national policies which direct how contracts are awarded and coordinated
within these municipal welfare services. Finally, in the concluding sec-
tion, we summarise our findings and discuss underlying political factors
that may explain national policies as well as the welfare mix.
The EU Public Procurement Directive and Its
Implementation at the National Level
In the Scandinavian countries, the use of public contracts with private
service, work and supply providers is generally regulated by national
legislation and instructions, but also by EU directives. Even though
Norway is not a member of the EU, it is bound by EU directives through
the EEA agreement (European Economic Area). The EU Directive on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public
supply contracts and public service contracts (Directive 2004/18/EC) has in
the last decade served as an important backdrop for national policies on
the use of nonpublic actors in the production of welfare services, when
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these services are produced on the basis of contracts between munici-
palities and providers. It is this directive that is the focus of this section.
The Directive (with attachments) specifies the process and procedures
for public procurements based on written agreements between a con-
tracting public authority at the state, regional or local level and an eco-
nomic operator.2 The overall principles for the award of public contracts
are that the processes must be based on transparency and equal and
non-discriminatory treatment of all operators.3 One implication of these
criteria is that a prior information notice with information about the ‘buyer
profile’must be published and that the informationmust not only be given
to selected operators (see Chapter VI of the Directive). Moreover, the
Directive stresses the standardisation of processes and the specification of
clear requirements and expectations in the contracts. However, the
Directive also defines several categories for public procurement procedures,
each with different implications for which kind of economic operators may
submit a tender. The document distinguishes between open procedures,
restricted procedures and negotiated procedures (Article 1(11)):4
(a) ‘Open procedures’ means those procedures whereby any interested
economic operator may submit a tender.
(b) ‘Restricted procedures’ means those procedures in which any
economic operator may request to participate and whereby only
those economic operators invited by the contracting authority may
submit a tender.
(c) ‘Negotiated procedures’ means those procedures whereby the
contracting authorities consult the economic operators of their
choice and negotiate the terms of contract with one or more of
these.
In addition to these procedures, the Directive defines a procedure entitled
competitive dialogue (Article 1(11)(c)) that is meant to be used when a
public contract is ‘particularly complex’. This implies that the contracting
authority is unable to specify the technical, legal or financial conditions and
requirements without dialogue with the candidates admitted to that
procedure.
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Whether the Public Procurement Directive comes into operation
depends on the value of the contract (cf. the threshold amounts defined
in the Directive) and the type of contract. Regarding the latter, the
Directive defines some specific exceptions. These exceptions include
service concessions (see Chapter 2, Sect. 3, Article 17) which are of
specific relevance for welfare services. A service concession implies that
(CURIA n. d.)5:
…the consideration for the provision of services consists in the right to
exploit the service, either alone, or together with payment.
…the service supplier takes the risk of operating the services in question
(…) In order to find that there is a service concession, it is necessary to
establish whether the agreed method of remuneration takes the form of
the right of the service provider to exploit the service and entails it taking
the risk of operating the service in question. While that risk may, at the
outset, be very limited, it is necessary for classification as a service con-
cession that the contracting authority transfers to the concession holder all
or, at least, a significant share of the risk which it faces.
As the quotation states, the decisive criteria are that the service provider
(concession holder) (also) runs a real risk by operating the right of the
service in question. In other words, a service concession holder admin-
isters the right to provide a service to users.
National Implementation of the EU Public
Procurement Directive
Basically, contract-based public procurement is regulated by a common
EU Directive in Norway, Denmark and Sweden. However, while
implementing the Directive, each Scandinavian country has left its own
distinctive mark on the regulation of public procurement within its own
borders. Here we will describe some of the country-specific conditions at
the national legal level that have implications for the two welfare services,
institution-based elderly care and primary and lower secondary educa-
tion, and more specifically, the scope for nonprofit service providers.
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The EU Directive on public procurement was implemented in
Norwegian legislation through the Public Procurement Act in 1992
(Norwegian: Lov om offentlige anskaffelser m.v.). This act and its regula-
tions have been revised several times since then (Ødegård 2006, Segaard
2015).6 In addition, some other kinds of public procurements outside
the scope of the Directive have been regulated in Norway for years. This
is the case for service concessions (Udbudsrådet 2012, 19-20), pro-
curement with lower threshold amounts than those defined by the EU,
and ‘B’ (non-priority) services. Non-priority services include, for exam-
ple, health and social services. In general, it is stated that all public
procurements must fulfil the requirements of non-discrimination,
transparency and predictability according to §5 in LOV-1999-07-16-69
(The Norwegian Government 2006). The Norwegian government
emphasises that it is always possible to negotiate with the providers. In
this way, national regulations are considered more flexible than the
Directive (Konkurransepolitisk avdeling 2008).
Regarding opportunities for nonprofit organisations to provide welfare
services within the health and social sector, the Norwegian government
implemented an exception to the rules on public procurements in 2004
(FAD 2013). This exception went out of force when Norway imple-
mented new rules on public procurements in June 2016 (Directive 2014/
24/EU). At the time of writing, the majority in the Norwegian Parliament
still want to support the nonprofit sector and be able to give priority to
nonprofit service providers within the health and social sector. However, it
is uncertain how this will be carried out. The Norwegian government is in
the process of clarifying whether it is possible to maintain the exception
through a so-called ‘adaptation text’ (DIFI 2014; Sejersted 2014).
Nevertheless, the exception was important for the regulation of the welfare
mix in Norway because it meant that national and local authorities could
choose between negotiating with nonprofit organisations and following
the ordinary rules for public procurements (Konkurransepolitisk avdeling
2005). Moreover, the exception implied that the contracting authority did
not need to follow Part II of the regulation, including the requirement for
national tender announcements in the Norwegian national notification
online database for public procurement. It was thus possible to exclude
contracts with nonprofit providers from the requirement for competitive
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tendering (Konkurransepolitisk avdeling 2008). However, it was also
stressed that the contracting authority ought to pursue competition
between nonprofit organisations (Konkurransepolitisk avdeling 2008).
The background for this exception was that competitive tendering—
where nonprofit actors must compete on equal terms with for-profit actors
—was seen to contradict the overall aim of promoting societal engagement
and collaboration with nonprofit organisations (FAD 2013, 99; see also
Konkurransepolitisk avdeling 2005). Since 2007, the regulations have
explicitly stated that in the case of public procurement of health and social
services from nonprofit organisations, it is up to the contracting authority
to assess whether the whole legislation on public procurement should be
followed (Part I–III) or the exception should be used (FAD 2006, 2013).
In other words, it is possible to give special treatment to nonprofit health
and social service providers in Norway.
The Norwegian regulation of public procurement does not provide a
precise definition of ‘nonprofit organisation’, but it does describe some of
its characteristics (FAD 2013, 99ff). Nonprofit organisations are distin-
guished by volunteering and charitable work; they carry out tasks for
society on behalf of public authorities, and their profit, if any, is used for
their charitable work. Nonprofit organisations will often, but not neces-
sarily, be organised as foundations (FAD 2006, 87; see also FAD 2013,
99ff).
Denmark implemented the EU Directive through a so-called
Executive Order; in other words, a set of rules that expands and sup-
plements an act (Udbudsportalen 2014a; Udbudsrådet 2012). The first
Executive Order that implemented the EU Directive on public pro-
curement came into effect on July 1, 1993 (BEK nr 415 af 22/06/1993),
while the Executive Order in force in 2015 was implemented in 2011
(BEK nr 712 af 15/06/2011). Moreover, public procurements in
Denmark are regulated by the Procurement Act (Danish: Tilbudsloven).7
This act comes into effect when the contract value is between 500.000
DKR and the threshold amounts as defined at the EU level. This means
that Denmark—like Norway—has expanded the scope of public pro-
curement regulations compared to the minimum requirements defined in
the EU Directive. Until 2013, non-priority services, including health and
3 Education and Elderly Care in Denmark, Norway … 85
social services, were encompassed by the Procurement Act, but this is no
longer the case.8
Regarding possible exceptions to the EU Directive, the argument
based on the so-called ‘in-house case law’ is emphasised in Danish policy
documents. For example, the Konkurrencestyrelsen (2010, 2) stated that
‘the tasks carried out by self-owning institutions can be characterised as
services executed in-house, and are therefore not subject to public pro-
curement regulations’ (our translation). Here, ‘tasks’ refer to a situation
where a self-owning institution provides a welfare service (e.g.,
institution-based elderly care) on behalf of a municipality and the fol-
lowing two criteria are fulfilled (Udbudsportalen 2015, our translation):
• The criterion of contracting entity: The institution mainly carries out
tasks for the municipality. If the institution carries out tasks for others,
it must be of marginal extent only.
• The criterion of control: The municipality exercises control over the
institution, which is similar to the control it exercises over its own
departments. This may imply control over budget matters, commercial
investments, strategies, etc.
In Sweden, the EU Directive on public procurement was implemented in
national legislation in 1995.9 Konkurrensverket, which is the inspection
authority, stresses that following Swedish regulations on public pro-
curements ensures that EU regulations are fulfilled as well
(Konkurrensverket 2014). The relevant Swedish legislation builds mainly
on the EU Directive 2004/18/EG. Regarding possible exceptions to the
rules on public procurements, Swedish authorities, as with the Danish,
refer to the in-house case law—the criterion of contracting entity and the
criterion of control—and legal practice from the Court of Justice of the
European Union (see Udbudsrådet 2012, 18; The Swedish Riksdag
2012).
Looking at the threshold amounts that determine whether a public
procurement is the subject of national legislation, the thresholds are
similar in Denmark and Norway but somewhat lower in Sweden
(Udbudsrådet 2012, Fig. 2.1). The national threshold amounts defined
86 S.B. Segaard and J. Saglie
in the national regulations of all three Scandinavian countries are lower
than the threshold amount defined in the EU Directive.
Finally, it should be noted that an exception to the rules on public
procurements for nonprofit actors parallel to the one in place in Norway
does not exist in either Sweden or Denmark (Kronbøl 2015). Moreover,
only Norwegian national legislation includes regulations on service
concessions (Udbudsrådet 2012, 19–20). However, it is possible for
Danish and Swedish authorities (e.g., in a municipality) to sign a con-
tract with a nonprofit service provider without following the complete
regulations for public procurements. The reason for this is the in-house
case law (see Udbudsrådet 2012, 18; Konkurrencestyrelsen 2010; The
Swedish Riksdag 2012).
The Importance of the EU Public Procurement
Directive
Public welfare services are mainly a municipal task in Norway, Denmark
and Sweden, and the municipalities have to some extent the power to
decide how the services should be organised—with consequences for the
welfare mix. Local autonomy and the principle of subsidiarity are tra-
ditionally appreciated in Scandinavian local government (Rose 2005, 57–
60). However, the municipalities do not act in a vacuum, and the EU
Public Procurement Directive affects local as well as national policy-
making. The fact that municipalities have a certain amount of latitude is
nevertheless important to stress.
The EU Directive itself does not exclude any of the three ideal models
of government specified in Table 3.1: neither the direct, indirect or
disconnected government model for organisation and interaction
between public authorities and private service providers. One reason for
this is that the Directive is primarily concerned with procedural princi-
ples for how contracts should be awarded and on what grounds.
However, the descriptions of the different procedures for public pro-
curement (Article 1, 11 (a)–(d)) gives the contracting authority the
opportunity to restrict competition at an early stage and invite some, but
not all, potential providers (economic operators) to submit a tender.
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Moreover, it is also specified that the character of the service in question
may weigh in favour of dialogue or negotiations with selected potential
providers. In this kind of dialogue or negotiation, we consider it to be
possible to influence the allocation of discretionary power, which is a key
element of the government models in Table 3.1. To what extent dia-
logue or negotiations are relevant is an empirical question in each case.
Finally, the Directive allows exceptions to the rules on public procure-
ments and defines cases in which the Directive does not go into effect. If
a public authority chooses to make use of the exceptions to the rules or
organise its production of welfare services in a way that is outside the
scope of the Directive, then that authority has a great opportunity to
influence the welfare mix. In other words, we will emphasise that the
common European policy for public procurements does not prevent
different ways of organising welfare services in EU member states.
The national welfare mix is thus also a question of political choice, will
and cultural traditions, and the EU Directive makes it possible to take
these aspects into account. The openness to diversity is reflected in the
national policies and legal framework for private providers in
Scandinavia, as well as in the fact that the three countries to some degree
use their freedom of action differently. In general, their national regu-
lations are more restrictive than what the EU Directive requires; for
instance, by setting lower threshold amounts for when open calls for
tenders are required.
As mentioned above, after the implementation of new rules on public
procurement, the Norwegian exception for nonprofit providers is no
longer in force. We should nevertheless bear in mind that not only is a
revised Directive on public procurement being implemented, but a new
EU Directive on the award of concession contracts is being implemented
as well (Directive 2014/23/EU).10 According to the European
Commission, it will be possible to exclude some forms of welfare services
from the full application of this Directive, such as when public service
production is organised though concession contracts (European
Commission 2014). The Directive states:
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[i]t is appropriate to exclude from the full application of this Directive
only those services which have a limited cross-border dimension, such as
certain social, health, or educational services. Those services are provided
within a particular context that varies widely amongst Member States, due
to different cultural traditions. (Directive 2014/23/EU, (53) page 10)
Furthermore, the new Directive on the award of concession contracts
(Article 17) states that a concession that fulfils what we have previously
described as the two criteria of the in-house case law (the criterion of
contracting entity and the criterion of control) falls outside the scope of
the Directive (see also paragraph 3.2 in SEC (2011) 1169 final).
Moreover, the Directive allows EU member states to use discretion in the
welfare mix:
Given the importance of the cultural context and the sensitivity of those
services, Member States should be given wide discretion to organize the
choice of the service providers in the way they consider most appropriate.
(Directive 2014/23/EU, (54) page 10)
The Norwegian authorities have raised the issue of the conditions for
nonprofit actors—and the possibility of maintaining the exception to the
rule for nonprofit actors—after the implementation of the revised
Directive on public procurement. However, this appears to have been
done without establishing whether alternative solutions for service pro-
duction exist. The new Directive on concession contracts, the oppor-
tunity to set aside the regulations defined in the Directive, and common
practice in Denmark and Sweden indicate that such alternatives do
indeed exist. It appears that each individual country will still be able to
use discretion in organising the welfare mix it considers the most
appropriate, in light of its own cultural context.11 These national policies
are the subject of the following sections.
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National Policies on School and Elderly Care12
Nonpublic Producers of Primary and Lower
Secondary Education, 13
In this section, we summarise the national private school policies of the
three Scandinavian countries, drawing on the analytical government
models from Table 3.1: direct, indirect and disconnected government.
Based on detailed analysis of national policy documents such as legisla-
tion, instructions, and guidelines (see Segaard 2015), we aim to identify
some central similarities and differences in the distribution and coordi-
nation of ‘contracts’ in primary and lower secondary education in
Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
The public sector traditionally plays the leading role in education in
Norway, Denmark and Sweden. A common feature is that the great
majority of children in primary and lower secondary education attend a
municipal school. There are, however, some variations between the three
countries regarding the distribution of children between public and
private schools. According to Eurostat (2012, 33), 95.6 percent of
Norwegian school children attend a public school, whereas the corre-
sponding figures for Denmark and Sweden are 86.5 and 89.4 percent,
respectively. Norway thus has a lower share of children in private schools
than in either Denmark or Sweden.
The problem with these figures is that official statistics often do not
distinguish between different categories of private schools, such as
between for-profit and nonprofit schools. As we shall see, this distinction
is crucial when education policies in the three countries are compared. In
Sweden, private primary and lower secondary schools that receive public
funding can be run on a commercial basis. This is not allowed in Norway
and Denmark. Private schools in Sweden are basically fully financed by
the public sector, and the schools are not allowed to charge school fees.
That is not the case in Denmark and Norway, where private schools are
only partly funded by the state. Danish and Norwegian private schools
may thus charge school fees—and are in fact expected to do so. In both
countries, it is also required that public funding be used exclusively for
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educational purposes. Moreover, in Denmark, private schools are by law
required to be run by nonprofit institutions. It is obviously appealing to
be a for-profit operator in the Swedish primary education system, where
schools are fully financed by the public sector, profits can be paid out to
owners, and the authorities have in practice no right to examine the
operator’s accounts. In other words, Swedish for-profit school owners
operate under much freer conditions in economic terms, but are some-
what more restricted in terms of educational content than in either
Denmark or Norway.
In all three countries, primary and lower secondary schools fall under
the jurisdiction of the municipalities, as the municipalities are obliged to
offer education to all children in this age group. Nevertheless, private
schooling of children in this age group is subject to an approval system at
the national level. A state institution is responsible for approving private
schools (the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, the
Danish Ministry for Children, Education and Gender Equality, and the
Swedish Schools Inspectorate). In primary and lower secondary educa-
tion, nonpublic actors thus apply for the right to run schools, and a
national public-sector body gives (or refuses) them this right. This can be
regarded as a ‘service concession’ according to the EU Public
Procurement Directive. As mentioned above, this means that the pro-
vider is given the right to provide services and runs a real risk in
exploiting this right in practice. The argument is that the provider only
receives a partial payment from the public-sector body, while the rest is
paid by the users, who are free to choose whether they will use this
service. Accordingly, we assume that private schools can be said to be
outside of the scope of the EU Directive on public procurement.14
Contracts for private schools with public funding are awarded on the
basis of a national authorisation system in all three countries, which
ensures that the schools adhere to national regulations of the organisation
and educational content. By means of this approval system, we consider
national authorities to exercise indirect government by defining
requirements and conditions for approval. Moreover, this approval can
be revoked if inspections show that the schools have not adhered to these
requirements and conditions. Accordingly, interaction between the
authorities and private service providers is formalised in an agreement,
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with more or less detailed criteria for approval. This indicates the extent
of formality (cf. Table 3.1).
The extent of national control and discretion given to each actor—
both the authorities and the provider—vary substantially between the
three countries. The focus of the regulations also differs. Danish private
schools appear to enjoy more discretion regarding educational content as
well as the values on which they are based. A central element of Danish
school policy is that educational content should correspond to the basic
values of the school, and that potential users must be informed of this.
We suppose that the approval of Danish private schools is to a large
extent performed on their own terms. This is evident because the reg-
ulations emphasise that the schools should be able to define their own
teaching content and methods based on their own basic values and
distinctive characters. In Norway, and perhaps even more in Sweden, the
national authorities set forth detailed standards for education. Private
schools must comply with the standards set for public-sector schools. In
other words, we consider national requirements for the content and
organisation of teaching to be less strict in Denmark than in Norway and
Sweden. Whereas public-sector schools can be perceived as setting a
minimum standard for primary and lower secondary education, in
Denmark, public-sector schools in Sweden and Norway can be viewed as
a template which private schools must follow. The fact that a single act
governs both public and private schools in Sweden illustrates this point.
In Norway and Denmark, private schools that receive public funding are
regulated by a separate act.
In order to obtain a diverse educational system, Danish authorities also
give private schools considerable leeway. Danish private schools can reject
applicants, even if they have room to admit more pupils. In this way, we
believe that a school can cultivate its own distinctive image. The primary
and lower secondary school system as a whole can thus become more
diverse. In contrast, Swedish and Norwegian private schools generally
cannot reject applicants if they have room to admit them. This can be seen
as a way to secure free choice for users. In practice, the democratic right of
users to free choice can thus undermine distinctive alternatives to public
schools and thereby reduce diversity within welfare services that the
authorities in principle aim for. This is because the lack of opportunity to
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reject pupils also curtails the exercise of discretion on the part of the
provider.
Although some differences exist, the users’ right to free choice is a basic
entitlement in Norwegian, Swedish and Danish primary and lower sec-
ondary education. In light of our analytical framework, this means that
the indirect national government is supplemented by a form of discon-
nected government, because the market—the users, through their indi-
vidual choices—takes part in shaping the educational system. However,
the circumstances under which users can make an informed choice vary
between the three countries, at least in terms of national regulations.
Danish legislation and regulations, for instance, dictate that schools have
a duty to inform users. The content of the information, as well as the
channels through which information is conveyed, are fully outlined. Such
regulations are largely absent in corresponding Norwegian and Swedish
regulations.
Our opinion is that this statutory duty to inform users in Denmark
highlights the importance of knowing which options to choose from and
the consequences of each choice. Every choice certainly has conse-
quences, especially with respect to the rights and obligations that pupils
and their parents agree to accept. Denmark also stands out in this area.
Parents of children in Danish private schools are given formal duties and
the responsibility to participate in the running of the schools. A group of
parents at a private school in question (called the ‘circle of parents’) is
given a formal obligation to supervise the school. More generally, this
aspect of what we call collaborative governance is evident in the Danish
system for the supervision of private schools. Not only are the parents
involved, but also the school itself can choose to assume an important
role by means of self-evaluation. This is done on the basis of a template
developed by a school association (a national organisation for private
schools of a specific type, such as religious, German minority or
Waldorf/Steiner education) and approved by the national Board of
Supervision. The inclusion of parents and nonprofit organisations in
supervising the schools is a striking example of how collaborative gov-
ernance entails an aspect of self-regulation within a specific political and
institutional framework at the national level (see Sørensen and Torfing
2008, 10). However, as Thøgersen points out in Chap. 5, there is little
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direct collaboration between nonprofit schools and the municipalities in
which they are located. In other words, indirect government through
collaborative governance seems to be limited to the relationship between
the private service provider and national public authorities (e.g., through
the national system for supervision). The Danish supervision system
contrasts sharply with the Swedish system, where it is difficult to detect
any form of collaborative governance. Swedish supervision is centralised
and carried out by national authorities, and there is little involvement by
users or parents. Users and parents may be involved in the Norwegian
case, but they are not given any formal rights or obligations comparable
to the Danish situation.
To conclude, the basic government model for nonpublic actors within
primary and lower secondary education in all three countries appears to
be indirect government. There are nevertheless substantial variations with
regard to private service providers’ freedom to use their own discretion;
therefore, the influence of such providers also varies widely. There are
also elements of market-based government, where choices made by users
determine the composition of the welfare mix. In Denmark, the
arrangements for the supervision system also display strong elements of
collaborative governance. In this sense, we presume that the government
regime can be described as layered. However, the final authority rests
with the national authorities who establish the national standards for
approval and have the power to revoke this approval.
Nonpublic Producers of Institution-Based Elderly
Care15
In this section, we move on to policies on institution-based elderly care.
Again, based on detailed analysis of national policy documents such as
legislation, instructions, and guidelines and using the models from
Table 3.1, we compare the three countries to show how contracts are
awarded and coordinated in Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
There is a long tradition of public-sector elderly care in Scandinavian
welfare states. The practice of elderly care has changed over time, for
example, with regard to the balance between home-based and
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institution-based care. Likewise, attitudes towards the organisation of
elderly care are gradually changing as well. For-profit providers of elderly
care are no longer a distant possibility, but have become actual practice in
many ‘marketised’ Scandinavian municipalities (Meagher and Szebehely
2012). Elderly care is a municipal responsibility, and each municipality
decides how this task will be organised and carried out. The munici-
palities thus play a decisive role in shaping the welfare mix within elderly
care (Ascoli and Ranci 2007). A nonpublic actor that wants to run a
publicly financed nursing home is largely reliant on choices made by the
municipality. This contrasts with schools, where municipalities have less
influence over the welfare mix.
Unfortunately, comparable data on the welfare mix within elderly care
in Scandinavia are scarce. Nevertheless, Marta Szebehely and Gabrielle
Meagher (2012, 244-245) presented some estimates, and Karl Henrik
Sivesind (2016; Chapter 2 in this book) described the changes in the
welfare mix in Scandinavia based on different kinds of statistical data.16
They all concluded that most care services are still provided by the public
sector, but that there are some significant differences between each
country: The nonprofit sector plays an important role in elderly care in
Denmark and, to a minor extent, in Norway; whereas Sweden stands out
as having a more extensive for-profit sector. In addition, in Sweden (and
Finland), ‘the growth of its share has been faster and large corporations
have a stronger position’, according to Szebehely and Meagher (2012,
242).
Individual municipalities usually enter into a contract with private
service providers, but there are exceptions. In Denmark, a private care
provider can bypass the municipality and obtain the right to provide
institution-based care services through a national approval system for
so-called ‘independent nursing homes’ (Danish: friplejeboliger). Under this
system, a private provider of independent nursing homes acquires the right
to offer a place to persons in need of nursing care. The provider must fulfil
a number of predefined criteria in order to acquire this right. When the
user’s need for care is assessed and warranted by the municipality, he or she
can opt for a place in an independent nursing home. The municipality is
then required to enter into a contract with the private provider.
Accordingly, a Danish municipality cannot single-handedly decide the
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welfare mix within its boundaries. This arrangement resembles what we
find in the school sector: National authorities define the criteria for being
approved as a provider. We therefore state that indirect government also
exists in elderly care—in this case, a service concession contract. On the
basis of in-house case law, Danish municipalities can also enter into
agreements with self-owning institutions, which are outside the scope of
the Procurement Act and the EU Public Procurement Directive. They can
also launch open calls for tenders on institution-based elderly care.
In both Norway and Sweden, the municipalities themselves choose
how institution-based elderly care within their borders will be organised
(Vabo 2012). In Sweden, a municipality can choose between imple-
menting LOV (The Freedom of Choice Act), using open calls for tenders
according to the LOU (Public Procurement Act), or utilising the free-
dom of action provided by the in-house case law; a Swedish municipality
can also choose a combination of these.17 However, Swedish national
guidelines nevertheless encourage the use of LOV.18 In short, this means
that users can freely choose between service providers approved by the
municipality. The municipality must approve all providers that satisfy
the requirements, which are formulated by the municipality itself. The
money then follows the patient.
Norwegian national policy documents encourage open calls for ten-
ders, but leave room for restricted competition between nonprofit pro-
viders. Norwegian municipalities can also implement free user choice,
but this choice is restricted to those providers that have entered into a
contract with the municipality on the basis of a framework agreement or
the ‘money follows the patient’ principle.
National policies on the organisation of elderly care and municipal
freedom of action are just some of the aspects of our models of govern-
ment. Another aspect is each actor’s discretionary power over the content of
cooperation on elderly care. National authorities in all three countries
express views on the requirements and conditions for entering into a
contract. On the one hand, this includes formal procedures based on the
EU Public Procurement Directive and adjacent national legislation. These
are largely similar in the three countries. However, policy documents in
Denmark—to a much greater extent than in the other two countries—
stress that municipalities should find creative solutions. These documents
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emphasise that cooperation between public authorities and private pro-
viders can be organised according to a partnership model, rather than as a
hierarchical customer–provider relationship (Udbudsportalen 2011, 16).
We interpret this as a request for more collaborative governance.
On the other hand, national policies in all three countries also contain
essential goals for elderly care. The emphasis on values such as
self-determination, dignity and respect for the individual user, which
supports the overall aim of active citizenship in welfare services through
empowerment and the free choice of the user, constitutes a basic simi-
larity between the three countries. There is nevertheless considerable
variation when these values are translated into concrete regulations; that
is to say, into ‘tools of government’. The extent of discretionary power
that rests with the provider clearly varies. In Sweden, so-called ‘national
evaluation’ criteria include very detailed indicators, which are used as a
starting point for national supervision of municipal care. National
authorities also recommend that municipalities use these indicators in
their supervision and specification of requirements for private providers.
All three countries have systems for the national supervision of
institution-based care, covering all types of providers—public as well as
private. The purpose is to ensure that care is carried out in accordance
with legislation and other national regulations. This type of national
supervision is supplemented by tasks that are assigned to municipalities
and providers. The providers, for example, are required to have internal
control systems.
The major difference between the countries is the role of the users and
their relatives in supervision. Swedish national guidelines seem to devote
less attention to these user groups as active citizens than do their Danish
and Norwegian counterparts. National authorities in Sweden put much
less emphasis on the institutionalised influence, participation and
empowerment of users (e.g., user boards). Instead, Swedish guidelines
tend to focus on informal day-to-day influence: for example, on the daily
routines in nursing homes. Furthermore, there are no concrete recom-
mendations on providing information to users, even though this topic
has received considerable attention in many of the reports issued by
Swedish national authorities. Only Danish municipalities and providers
have a statutory obligation to inform potential users. Norwegian
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guidelines emphasise user involvement, but little is said about the
information on which this involvement should be based. Norwegian
municipalities are not obliged to provide easy access to relevant infor-
mation in a way comparable to Danish requirements.
Generally speaking, we find that Scandinavian national authorities do
not lay down clear regulations on the organisation of elderly care or the
conditions for private providers. Thus, on the one hand, municipalities
have considerable leeway in determining the welfare mix. On the other
hand, national authorities express quite detailed expectations through
legislation, regulations and supervision. In the case of Norway, Signy
Vabo found that national steering of elderly care has increased over time.
However, this steering focuses on processes instead of content or results.
The increased steering is relatively ‘soft’ and does not interfere in any
major way with municipal priorities (Vabo 2012, 122). This indicates a
relatively large degree of discretion.
In light of the analytical models listed in Table 3.1, we assume several
options to be available for the organisation of public–private collabora-
tion on elderly care in the three countries. First, Danish and Swedish
municipalities can practise direct government on the basis of in-house
case law. Second, municipalities can practise indirect government
through specifications in their call for tenders (all countries) and LOV
announcements (Sweden). Third, Danish users (and Norwegian and
Swedish users, if their municipalities allow it) can also exercise influence
by choosing from among the approved providers.19 In this respect, there
is also an element of market-based organisation in the governing of
elderly care.
In our discussion of the analytical framework, we pointed out that the
use of different models of government within a single policy area can be
described as layered government, meaning that the welfare mix is organ-
ised through several steps. In both Denmark and Sweden (but less so in
Norway), the national authorities encourage municipalities to facilitate
the free choice of users between pre-selected service providers. In this
way, the idea of market-based organisation is combined with elements of
direct or indirect government: The public sector facilitates consumer
empowerment by means of contracts with or the approval of certain
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service providers. However, the organisation of areas of welfare service
may also reflect parallel government regimes. That is to say, we find that
national policy allows welfare mix to be organised in several distinct ways,
implying that private service providers may have more than one alter-
native to become providers of publicly funded welfare services. This is
seen in the Danish case, where private providers of independent nursing
homes can be approved at the national level—bypassing the munici-
palities—and then enter the municipal welfare mix through user choice.
This is also seen in Sweden, where it can be argued that the LOV has
created parallel systems. Furthermore, private providers find yet another
way into the municipal welfare mix in Denmark and Sweden: The
municipality can enter into an agreement with a private provider based
on the criterion of contracting entity and the criterion of control. This
can be described as an extended form of in-house service production.
Here, public authorities can supervise the private providers on equal
terms with municipal providers.
Discussion: A Unified Scandinavian Model?
In this chapter, we have shown how national authorities in Denmark,
Norway and Sweden approach the use of private providers—for-profit as
well as nonprofit—in primary and lower secondary education, and in
institution-based elderly care. All three countries stress elements of active
citizenship, having designated a diverse spectrum of services, adaptations
to the needs of the users, and user participation as central goals for their
publicly financed welfare services. To reach these goals, they have looked
for new ways to organise and direct the provision of welfare services.
Alternatives to the traditional model, where the public sector both
finances and provides the services, have been in demand. This served as
the backdrop for our discussion of the interaction between the public
sector and private welfare providers, especially the use of contracts. As a
tool of government, contracts may reflect a direct, indirect or discon-
nected model of government.
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The EU Public Procurement Directive is relevant in this context
because it limits the latitude for national policymaking. All three coun-
tries have bound themselves to follow the Directive through EU mem-
bership (Denmark and Sweden) or the EEA agreement (Norway).
Although standardisation is the general purpose, the Directive specifies
several tendering procedures and types of contracts that fall outside of its
scope. Accordingly, the Directive allows latitude for national policy-
making. In conclusion, we find that the EU Directive does not itself
decide whether welfare services will be provided through direct, indirect
or disconnected government, nor does it unambiguously standardise the
welfare mix across countries. However, even though the EU allows
national latitude (Nyberg 2013; Directive 2014/23/EU, (53) page 10), it
is clear that this latitude is approached and utilised differently in each
Scandinavian country.
In both Sweden and Denmark, national policy documents define
leeway for public authorities, which goes beyond the most detailed
regulations of the EU Directive as well as national public procurement
rules. This is done by using the in-house argument within elderly care,
and by awarding contracts to approved providers within both schools and
elderly care. Norway also has a system with approved private schools, but
uses neither the in-house argument nor contracts to approved providers
within elderly care. Instead, Norway has practised an exception to the
public procurement regulations, which applies to contracts with non-
profit providers of health and social services (including elderly care).
However, although this nationally defined exception is important, it does
not alter the general impression: Norwegian authorities largely consider
the issue of private welfare providers a question of public procurement.
Accordingly, the EU Directive establishes an important framework for
the welfare service provision.
The overall impression is one of considerable similarity between
Danish, Norwegian and Swedish national policies on the welfare mix,
within both education and elderly care. As we have seen, the share of
welfare services produced by private providers nevertheless varies con-
siderably, and there are some differences that may contribute towards
explaining this variation. The national frameworks for interaction
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between the public payer and the private provider vary substantially,
especially concerning the distribution of discretionary power.
We conclude that all three countries fall under the indirect govern-
ment model of Table 3.1 with regard to the school sector, where public
authorities govern by means of predefined requirements for approving
private schools, as well as by supervision. Private providers are neither
governed directly nor free from any kind of control. Furthermore, there
are elements of market-based organisation in the school sector, because
users have the right to choose their schools. However, this choice is
limited to publicly approved schools. The ‘market’ is thus a
quasi-market, only partially disconnected from public steering.
Unlike the school sector, we find that the national policies for
institution-based elderly care provide neither a unified Scandinavian
model nor a single model within each country. Rather, the case of elderly
care demonstrates that national policies can provide leeway for a com-
bination of different models of government. Public procurement regu-
lations and more or less detailed requirements for the content of the
services are highlighted in policy documents in all three countries, but
this is not the only type of indirect government that national policies
allow. The municipalities themselves can largely choose their own tools
of governance, but there are some differences between the countries.
In Denmark, the opportunity to enter into agreements with providers
shows how public authorities can govern private providers directly, in a
similar way as in-house providers. Furthermore, the Danish and Swedish
cases clearly show how organisational and legal policy tools at the
national level can facilitate disconnected government based on user
choice. Strictly speaking, we regard this as a quasi-market-based organ-
isation, since users can choose between approved institutions (as in the
school sector). An important difference is that the Swedish users get a
voucher—the money follows the care-needing elderly—while the Danish
users can basically choose only between municipal nursing homes or
nursing homes that have an agreement with the municipality. If a Danish
user wants a place in an independent nursing home, the private provider
of that nursing home has the right to refuse. Accordingly, private pro-
viders of independent nursing homes have the same discretionary power
as Danish private schools. This will be discussed below.
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Moreover, the Danish national system for the approval of independent
nursing homes shows how government models within elderly care are not
only layered, but also parallel. Sweden also has a parallel system, but
unlike their Danish counterparts, Swedish municipalities are not at the
mercy of a national approval system. Swedish municipalities decide for
themselves whether to implement the LOV, which implies a local
approval system and user choice.
When we refer to parallel models of government, we mean that private
providers can enter into the welfare mix in different ways, and that the
public sector can use different tools of government. This is not just a
layered system, but a combination of parallel systems with different logics
(such as competition, approval and internal organisation) and different
regulation systems. We believe that parallel government models can be a
key to diversity in welfare services. Through these parallel systems, it
could be possible to encourage and support different purposes and actors
in the production of welfare services. If a single model limits the possi-
bility of promoting a certain welfare mix, a combination of models may
prove more flexible.
We must, however, emphasise that a diverse welfare mix not only
depends on the country’s model of government, but also on the dis-
cretionary power of private actors. To what extent are they free to define
the values and goals for their own welfare service production? If these
values and goals are defined by narrow national standards, a diverse
supply of services will be improbable. Consequently, it may also be
difficult to achieve a central element of active citizenship: the possibility
to choose between a broad range of different services. Phillips and Smith
(2011, 22) maintained that national regulations may be an important
incentive for cooperation with nonprofit organisations. However, non-
profit actors are often motivated by their ideals. They will hardly operate
in a field which is regulated in detail if doing so means compromising
their basic values.
Our account of the national frameworks within education and elderly
care shows that the discretionary power given to private providers varies
considerably. The greatest extent of discretionary power over
non-economic issues is given to Danish service providers. There is no
doubt that Danish national policies stand out by facilitating diversity, as
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they show more openness towards the (non-commercial) values of private
providers. More concretely, Danish private providers are given more
discretion with regard to their service production and its underlying
values. The criteria for approving Danish private schools not only con-
cerns quality and economy, but also whether the schools ensure that their
values are communicated and upheld. Moreover, Danish providers of
private schools and independent nursing homes can use more discretion
in their selection of users; in other words, they can refuse admission. The
differences between the countries are smaller with respect to elderly care,
except that Sweden stands out with a more detailed control regime that
indirectly restricts the discretionary power of the providers and encour-
ages a for-profit perspective in the welfare mix. This is also the case
within primary and lower secondary education,, where Swedish private
owners—unlike their Danish and Norwegian counterparts—are allowed
to make profits. With regard to payoff discretion, Swedish providers thus
hold a unique position. The for-profit aspect is a more general trait of the
Swedish welfare mix.
Concluding Remarks: The Role of Politics
There are thus both similarities and differences between the Scandinavian
countries when it comes to national regulation of private providers
within education and elderly care. Even though it may be debated
whether the differences or similarities are the most conspicuous, there are
certainly some distinctions and nuances that separate the models of
welfare government in the three countries. Our analyses and discussion
indicate that variations in these models may explain some—but not all—
of the differences in the welfare mix. However, this leaves us with the
question of why these government models differ. Politics may be an
underlying factor that explains either the differences in the governance of
welfare production or the differences in the actual welfare mix—or both.
One question is whether the party composition of national govern-
ments has affected national policies. This is clearly of importance in light
of the changes that have taken place in Sweden. Reforms were initiated
by the centre-right Bildt government (1991–1994), and further reforms,
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such as the User Choice Act, were implemented by the centre-right
Reinfeldt government (2006–2014). Sweden is perhaps the foremost
example of the impact of politics on the welfare mix—and the political
will to change. During the 1990s, ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘competition’
were the leading slogans of Swedish politics. This led to several reforms,
including in education and elderly care. Accordingly, Sweden went from
being a welfare state where the public sector provided almost all welfare
services, to a welfare society where the role of for-profit providers
increased and the users themselves obtained the opportunity to affect the
welfare mix through their choice of providers.
The impact of changing governments can also be seen in Norway: The
centre-right Bondevik II government (2001–2005) made it easier to
establish nonpublic schools which were neither religious nor pedagogical
alternatives. This change was reversed by the centre-left Stoltenberg II
government (2005–2013), while this policy once again was partly lib-
eralised by the right-wing Solberg government (2013–). However, there
is still no distribution of profits from state-funding in schools and the
rigid requirements for approval have been maintained.
Although party politics matter, they cannot explain policy differences
between Scandinavian countries. For example, the Norwegian Solberg
government has not allowed owners to make profits from nonpublic
schools. On the contrary, during the 2013 Norwegian election cam-
paign, all parties described the Swedish situation as undesirable. The
Norwegian Left accused the Right of wanting to introduce the Swedish
policies in Norway, whereas the Norwegian Right emphasised the dif-
ferences between themselves and their Swedish counterparts. Moreover,
the Swedish policy shift is not just a matter of changing governments.
Hicks (2015), for example, emphasised continuity between the social
democratic and centre-right governments with regard to school policy:
The reforms that led to an increasing for-profit sector were to a large
extent accepted by the social democrats.
The Danish case also illustrates how party politics can be of limited
importance. Since 2001, right-wing parties have been in government
most of the time (2001–2011 and 2015–). However, there has been no
major marketisation reform. The Danish case thus highlights the
importance of national historical traditions. The country has a
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long-standing tradition of independent nonprofit schools, which influ-
ences the current political discourse. This tradition dates back to the
middle of the 1800s, building on the work and philosophy of N.F.S
Grundtvig. Today, there is a wide ideological range of nonprofit alter-
natives in Denmark—from left-wing alternative movements to
Christians and liberals. Each of these groups has political allies, and this
leads to cross-party consensus on the importance of the nonprofit sector.
Although the nonprofit sector is much smaller in Norway than in
Denmark, elements of this situation are found in Norway as well. In the
Norwegian case, the pivotal position of the Christian People’s Party and
the Liberal Party appears to be important. These parties have tradi-
tionally been sceptical of the marketisation of education and elderly care;
their priority has been to protect nonprofit institutions from the effects of
marketisation. In Sweden, in contrast, such barriers to the development
of for-profit alternatives appear to be absent.
In short, there is a strong element of path dependency which limits the
options that have been discussed and thereby also alternative develop-
mental trajectories. This observation is in accordance with the predom-
inant literature on welfare states, in which one main argument has been
that ‘history and politics matter’ (Arts and Gelissen 2010, 570). The
historical development—described by Sivesind in Chapter 2—can to
some extent explain the policies today. Where nonprofit alternatives were
weak initially, the discourse on alternatives, user choice, etc., now tends
to focus on state versus market—as we have seen in Sweden. When a
nonprofit sector of some size exists, it tends to mobilise its political
supporters and thereby displace the left–right discourse, as we have seen
in Denmark.
Notes
1. We use the term ‘collaborative governance’ as synonymous with related
concepts, such as ‘governance network’.
2. Article 1 in Directive 2004/18/EC.
3. Article 2 in Directive 2004/18/EC.
4. A fourth category is design contests, but it is not relevant for primary
education and institution-based elderly care (Article 1(11)(e)).
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5. In Article 1(4), a service concession is described as ‘a contract of the
same type as a public service contract except for the fact that the con-
sideration for the provision of services consists either solely in the right
to exploit the service or in this right together with payment’.
6. The act and regulations in force as per 2014 is the act from 1999 (LOV-
1999-07-16-69) and the regulations (FOR-2006-04-07-402) that came
into force in January 2007 (FAD 2013:9).
7. LBK nr 1410 af 07/12/2007 with changes made through LOV nr 618
af 14/06/2011 § 2 and LOV nr 1234 af 18/12/2012 § 1.
8. According to changes made through the law, LOV nr 1234 af
18/12/2012 § 1, ‘the contracting authorities no longer have… a duty to
follow the regulation of the Procurement Act for announcement of the
Annex II B-services independent of the contract value. However, the
contracting authorities are still committed to follow some of the regu-
lations in the EU Directive if the contract value is higher than the
threshold amounts defined for EU tenders’ (Udbudsportalen 2014b, our
translation). For more information, please see Konkurrence-og
Forbrugerstyrelsen (2013).
9. Sweden implemented the EU Directive for the first time through a 1995
revision of the 1992 Public Procurement Act (Swedish: Lag om offentlig
upphandling–LOU) (see SFS 1995:704, SFS 1992, 1528). The act in
force per 2014 is Lag om offentlig upphandling (SFS 2007, 1091) from
2008. Some amendments to the act have later been made, which cor-
respond to changes made in Denmark and Norway.
10. The European Commission explains the main differences between a
concession and a public contract, and the reasons for having separate
legislation, in this way (European Commission 2014, 3): ‘Concessions
have specific features compared to public contracts which justify a
special and more flexible set of rules for their award. Concessions are
typically high-value, complex and long-term contracts which require
appropriate flexibility during the award procedure to ensure the best
possible outcome. Specific legislation for concessions helps distinguish
between the rules applicable to concessions and the more detailed ones
applicable to public contracts and therefore makes them simpler to use’.
11. In the MEMO 14/19 (page 3), the European Commission concludes
that ‘[n]o public authorities in each Member State retain the possibility
to define and enforce public service obligations and to organise the
provision of services of general interest. By imposing public service
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obligations, public authorities remain free to define the characteristics of
the service to be provided, including any conditions regarding the
quality of the service, in order to pursue their public policy objectives’.
12. This section is based on our detailed analyses of the national policies on
schools and elderly care in Norway, Denmark and Sweden (Segaard 2015).
13. The field of private schools is regulated by national legislation, e.g.
Friskoleloven in Denmark (LBK nr 917 af 13/08/2014), Skollag in
Sweden (SFS 2010: 800), and Privatskoleloven in Norway
(Utdanningsdirektoratet (2014), as well as several supplementary policy
documents (regulations, instructions, guidelines, etc.) Please see Segaard
(2015) for further references to such policy documents.
14. Even though Swedish private schools are basically fully financed, the
school owner bears the economic risk. This is because the funding
depends on the number of pupils, not what it actually costs to run the
school. The school owner is given the right to run a school when it is
approved, but it is not guaranteed that the school will attract a sufficient
number of pupils.
15. The field of private institution-based elderly care is regulated by national
legislation and regulations: in Sweden, e.g. Lag om offentlig upphandling
(LOU 2007:1091) and Lag om valfrihetssystem (LOV 2008:962); in
Norway, e.g. Helsetilsynsloven (LOV-1984-03-30-15), Helse- og
omsorgstjenesteloven (LOV-2011-06-24-30), Forskrift for sykehjem og
boform for heldøgns omsorg og pleie (FOR-1988-11-14-932) and
Internkontrollforskriften (FOR-1996-12-06-1127); and in Denmark, e.g.
Friplejeboligloven (LBK nr 897 af 17/08/2011) and Serviceloven (LBK nr
1023 af 23/09/2014), as well as several supplementary policy documents
(instructions, guidelines etc.). Please see Segaard (2015) for further
references to such policy documents.
16. For details, please also see Szebehely (2011), Thøgersen (2013) and
Statistics Norway (2015).
17. A national system for registration of social service providers in general
and providers of institution-based elderly care in particular exists in
Sweden, but it is not comparable to the Danish national authorisation
system.
18. Unlike the municipalities, Swedish counties are required to implement
LOV (Upphandlingsmyndigheten 2015).
19. Unlike the Swedish case, Danish users are not given a voucher which
could be used to choose any provider.
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4
Towards a More Diversified Supply
of Welfare Services? Marketisation




Scandinavian countries are often believed to share a similar type of
welfare state, one that is often referred to as the social democratic welfare
model (Esping-Andersen 1990) or simply the Scandinavian model
(Einhorn and Logue 2010). This type of welfare state is highly developed
and covers an extensive range of social needs. Another common feature is
that laws regulating social policy are universal in nature and target all
citizens rather than specific groups (Anttonen 2002; Beland et al. 2014;
Bergman and Strøm 2011; Burau and Vabo 2011). Accordingly, the
model places a strong emphasis on equality in the sense that all citizens
should be treated the same, regardless of where they live or their level of
income (Kamp and Hvid 2012).
One of the dominant features of the development of the welfare state
in Scandinavia in recent years can be summarised by the concept of
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marketisation (Pierre 1995; Salamon 1993). This entails the establish-
ment of a mix of different types of providers (public, nonprofit and
for-profit) within welfare sectors, such as schools and elderly care (Ascoli
and Ranci 2002; Blomqvist 2004; Feltenius and Wide 2015). Although
this development has been similar across the Scandinavian countries,
there are several differences in the sector that is our focus here; namely,
nursing homes within the elderly care system.
The most evident difference is that a mix of different providers of
nursing homes is more common at the local level in Sweden than it is in
Denmark and Norway. In addition, Sweden has a larger share of
for-profit providers and a more modest share of nonprofit providers than
either Denmark or Norway (Dahler-Larsen 2015; Dølvik et al. 2015;
Hartman 2011; Sivesind 2016).
The logic behind the establishment of this welfare mix is mainly to be
found in the concept of new public management (NPM). There are
many interpretations of what this concept actually stands for, but one key
variable is governing through market-based mechanisms (Boston 2011;
Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Ferlie 1996; Hood 1991; Pollitt 1995).
Accordingly, the citizen is considered to be a customer in a market of
different welfare providers. Allowing citizens to choose a certain provider
over another in fields such as education, social services and health is
believed to improve the quality of the welfare provision. This implies the
exercise of ‘active citizenship’ through ‘choice’ of provider, whereby users
can obtain services with a preferred profile. These concepts were pre-
sented in the first chapter of this book and will be further elaborated in
Trætteberg’s chapter, which compares consequences of different types of
governance for the welfare service users’ ability to control their own lives.
In order to establish alternatives among which citizens can choose, one
might expect the growth of different profiles of nursing homes reflecting
different types of providers.1 It has also been argued that privatisation
allows for a more diversified supply of services than what public providers
can offer (Ascoli and Ranci 2002; Weisbrod 1988). For instance, it is
believed that nonprofit providers have a greater capacity to offer inno-
vative and specialised services (Mariani and Cavenago 2013; Osborne
1998; Osborne 2010; Salamon and Abramson 1982).
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The argument that privatisation creates a more diversified supply of
services is not universally accepted. In other types of care for the elderly
—for example, home care services—it has been argued that there has
been a ‘decrease of choice despite the rhetoric of freedom of choice’ (Dahl
and Rasmussen 2012, 41). The cause of this paradox can be found in
procedures of codification of care, which are a prerequisite for con-
tracting out services. Codification of care refers to the specification of the
amount of time devoted to, as well as the coding of, the performance of
various tasks (Dahl and Rasmussen 2012, 41). In sum, this development
implies greater local government steering, which leaves less room for the
differentiation of services necessary to create different profiles of care.
Whether local government steering has in fact diminished, or whether
the opposite is true, remains an open question, because very little is
known about the local governing of nursing homes within the context of
marketisation. Previous studies, at least in Sweden, have focused mainly
on national laws directed at marketisation and elderly care (Erlandsson
et al. 2013; Szebehely 2011). Considerably less attention has been
devoted to the question of how municipalities handle their relationships
with different types of welfare providers and what consequences this has
for the profiling of welfare services. The work presented here seeks to
address this topic.
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to compare and explain
similarities and differences in the service provision of nursing homes
managed by different types of providers (public, for-profit and nonprofit)
in six municipalities in Scandinavia. The primary focus of the compar-
isons is different types of providers. However, we will also explore dif-
ferences between Scandinavian countries. The following research
questions guided the study: Are there any differences between public and
private (nonprofit or for-profit) providers with regard to developing a
distinct profile of services? Are there any differences between the
Scandinavian countries in this respect? To what extent can similarities
and differences be explained by local governments’ use of governing
instruments? What are those instruments, and are they applied differently
to public and private providers of care for the elderly? What is the
rationale behind the use, or non-use, of those instruments?
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The argument of this chapter is that, contrary to what might be
expected, there are no major differences between nursing homes managed
by different types of providers. The similarity exhibited by different
providers is a result of the fact that local authorities retain control of
financing and regulation. In general, the regulations are detailed and
make no distinctions between providers. This is evident from our
empirical study of six Scandinavian municipalities. In these municipali-
ties, interviews were conducted with politicians, administrators, man-
agers and personnel at nursing homes. In some of the nursing homes,
interviews were also conducted with residents. In addition, written
documentation from nursing homes and public authorities (e.g., policy
documents and evaluations) was examined.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section two, the theoretical
framework of NPM is developed and a brief description of the research
design is presented. In the third section, a brief discussion of care for the
elderly in Scandinavian countries is presented. Sections four through six
present the main empirical findings for Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
In each section, the nursing homes and their activities are introduced,
along with a presentation of the governing strategies performed by the
municipalities. In the seventh section, we compare different types of
welfare providers and draw conclusions regarding the service profiles of
nursing homes and how such facilities are governed. In the final section
of the chapter, the most significant findings are summarised and
important questions for further research are discussed.
Creating a Market for Elderly Care
Marketisation and New Public Management (NPM)
Facing numerous challenges from the late-1970s onwards, welfare states
have responded in many ways. One of these responses, particularly evi-
dent during the 1990s, is welfare retrenchment i.e. cutbacks in welfare
spending (Pierson 1994; Lindbom 2001). Another response has been to
reorganise the welfare state using the market as a model i.e. marketisation
(Petersen and Hjelmar 2013; Pierre 1995; Salamon 1993). A theoretical
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account of this development is represented in the concept of New Public
Management (NPM) (Boston 2011; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Ferlie
1996; Hood 1991; Pollitt 1995).
NPM is an umbrella concept that covers different features of the
organisation of the public sector based on the model of the market.
These features include explicit standards and measures of performance,
greater emphasis on output controls, disaggregation of units in the public
sector, a private-sector management style and a shift to greater compe-
tition in the public sector. The emphasis on competition implies a greater
role for contracts and tendering procedures (Hood 1991).
‘Contracting’ means that the delivery of services is delegated to private
providers, while public authorities are responsible for regulation and
financing. The public authority’s choice of provider is the result of a
tendering process in which different actors compete with each other on
price or quality (Elinder and Jordahl 2013; Stolt and Winblad 2009).
However, it is seldom the case that public authorities contract out all
services within a given welfare field. A more common approach is deliv-
ering some part or parts of a particular service themselves while con-
tracting out other parts. The result is a welfare mix of different providers,
both public and private, which can be either for-profit or nonprofit.
The Welfare Mix and Its Rationale
The logic behind the establishment of this kind of welfare mix is that it
allows for a more diversified supply of services in fields such as education,
health and social welfare (Ascoli and Ranci 2002; Blomqvist and
Rothstein 2000; Weisbrod 1988). Allowing for a more diversified supply
is supposed to encourage the development of a broader catalogue of
services compared to what public providers can offer on their own. It is
believed that public service providers generally target the average citizen.
The same is true for private, for-profit providers, who target the popu-
lation that belongs to the largest segment of the market (Traetteberg and
Sivesind 2015). However, this argument does not apply to nonprofit
service providers. Quite the contrary, it has been argued that nonprofit
providers have a greater capacity to offer innovative and specialised
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services (Mariani and Cavenago 2013; Osborne 1998; Osborne 2010;
Salamon and Abramson 1982; Salamon 1987).
According to Lester M. Salamon, nonprofit service providers have
several strengths, including a significant degree of flexibility in their
operations. This results from the proximity of their governing boards to
the field of action. Another major strength is the ability of nonprofit
providers to offer greater diversity regarding the content of services. This
is possible due to their small scale of operations, which allows them to
tailor services to specific needs (Salamon 1987; Weisbrod 1977).
User Choice
One of the chief merits of a welfare mix is that citizens, who are referred
to as ‘customers’, have alternatives from which to choose. Le Grand
discussed the possibility of competition without choice and choice
without competition (Le Grand 2007, 45). However, according to him,
it is only when user choice is coupled with provider competition that the
ends of a marketised welfare system are fully achieved. Le Grand con-
siders this to be a case of governmental steering through ‘the invisible
hand’. Among the ends achieved by this type of steering are greater user
autonomy, higher service quality and greater efficiency (Le Grand
2007).
Quality can be referred to in terms of both ‘input’ and ‘output’. Input
can be measured in relation to various parameters; for example, staff
qualifications and expertise, class sizes in schools and the physical con-
dition of buildings. The other aspect of quality, output, can be measured
in terms of the results achieved by medical treatment or school atten-
dance. Efficiency of welfare provision refers to achieving the highest
quality and quantity from a given level of resources (Le Grand 2007).
However, it is important to note that the desired ends of ‘choice’ and
‘marketisation’ are not solely a matter of quality and efficiency. Another
important end is the empowerment of citizens by making it possible for
them to choose ‘exit’ in order to give them influence in welfare provision.
Before marketisation, citizens could influence the provision of welfare
foremost through ‘voice’, i.e. by expressing their opinions to decision-
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makers, either as individuals or as a collective body (Blomqvist and
Rothstein 2000; Hirschman 1970).
Governing Through Contracts
Although customer choice is an important mechanism for achieving the
aims of marketised welfare (i.e. improved quality and efficiency), it is far
from the only one. Contracting out welfare services is a process regulated
by national law and, in the field of elderly care, implemented by
municipalities. A central feature of this process is that the municipalities
stipulate the criteria that service providers must follow. This type of
steering by municipalities is referred to as management by contract or
governing through contracts (Almqvist 2001; Kamp and Hvid 2012, 40;
Vabø 2007, 53; Walsh 1995).
The idea behind governing through contracts is that it makes it possible
for public authorities to measure performance, which is a precondition for
efficient service provision. In order to measure performance, the contract
must be somewhat specific concerning the goals to be achieved (Vabø
2007, 54). However, it has been pointed out in the literature that writing
contracts for services is a difficult task because it is hard to identify
objective standards. This is especially true in the field of care, due to the
fact that it concerns the well-being of the elderly. Drawing conclusions
concerning deterioration and improvement in quality as well as efficiency
is a complicated matter (Almqvist 2001; Erlinder and Jordahl 2013;
Walsh 1995, 52–53). One solution to the problem is to focus more on the
methods that providers should use. However, this solution represents a
deviation from the ideal, which is that the purchaser sets the targets and
providers compete over how to achieve them using their best and most
effective solutions (Almqvist 2001).
The ability to measure performance also requires establishing and
implementing procedures for audits and inspections. This is considered
to be particularly important in environments that provide services like
care, where the providers usually have more information than the pur-
chasers. Inspections can be carried out in many ways; for example, by
responding to public complaints, conducting unannounced visits and
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examining random samples of work (Walsh 1995). The performance of
these tasks requires a new kind of competence and administration at the
level of the purchasing authority. It has been argued that the need for this
type of administration eclipses some of the efficiency gains achieved by
contracting out.
Decreasing Choice—A Paradox
From the discussion above, it follows that there are different mechanisms
for reaching overall goals through the use of marketisation. These
mechanisms have been referred to in terms of user choice and governing
through contracts. Whether the mechanisms are compatible or not has
been a topic of lively discussion. One issue that has received a significant
amount of attention is the idea that marketisation actually creates a
market of different providers with their own special profiles. It has been
argued that customers actually have less choice and receive fewer indi-
vidualised services than before—a condition that has been referred to as
the ‘decrease of choice despite the rhetoric of freedom of choice’ (Dahl
and Rasmussen 2012, 41).
To understand this argument, we will return to the practice of gov-
erning through contracts, which requires the codification of care. Without
this, it would be difficult or nearly impossible to both write and evaluate
contracts. By codification of care, we mean the specification of the time
devoted to and the coding of the performance of various tasks. Completing
such codified tasks is facilitated by the use of modern technology in home
care services; for example, personal digital assistants. The overall result of
this process, according to Hanne Dahl and Bente Rasmussen, is a growing
standardisation of care (Dahl and Rasmussen 2012).
Standardisation of care represents a paradox in relation to arguments
concerning the ‘welfare mix’ and ‘customer choice’. This paradox has
been clearly described by Dahl and Rasmussen, who argued that, con-
trary to what one would expect of marketised welfare, ‘customers have
less choice and receive fewer individualised services than they did in the
old model where they were allotted time rather than tasks’ (Dahl and
Rasmussen 2012, 41). In the old model, the professionals, i.e. care
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workers, had a stronger position and a greater degree of flexibility in
carrying out their tasks. It is argued that this environment gave the
elderly more choices and thus more individualised service (Dahl 2009;
Dahl and Rasmussen 2012, 41).
Based on the theoretical argument articulated by Dahl and Rasmussen,
one might expect there to be no differences between public and private
nursing homes due to the growing standardisation of the services carried
out. However, their argument is built primarily on research related to
home care services in Denmark. Whether this argument is also relevant
in the context of nursing homes is an open question. It may be that
governing in this particular activity is softer, thus leaving providers with
greater room for providing a variety of services.
The Empirical Study—A Brief Note
In order to discuss the validity of the theoretical account of marketisation
and expectations with regard to the profile of welfare services, an
empirical study has been conducted. The study covers different types of
welfare providers (public, nonprofit and for-profit) and their relations
with municipal administrations in six municipalities: two in Sweden
(Sollentuna and Östersund), two in Norway (Asker and Steinkjer) and
two in Denmark (Faaborg-Midtfyn and Herning). In Sweden, two
public and two for-profit nursing homes were scrutinised in greater
detail. In Norway, two public, one for-profit and one nonprofit were
investigated. In Denmark, the research focused on two public and two
nonprofit nursing homes. The empirical investigation was carried out in
2013–2014 and followed a similar scheme in all countries. Considering
the limited number of cases investigated in each country, the study is
obviously only explorative but it nevertheless provides a point of
departure for further research.
The empirical study consisted primarily of interviews with civil ser-
vants in the municipal administrations, politicians responsible for elderly
care policy, and site managers at the nursing homes.2 A total of 20
interviews were conducted in Sweden, 19 (with 29 people) in Denmark
and 26 (with 44 people) in Norway. The interviews were performed by
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different members of the research group. Each member was an expert on
his or her country. A more elaborate presentation of how the empirical
investigation was conducted can be found in the first chapter of this book
and in the appendix covering the data collection and methods.
Managers at the municipal administrative unit responsible for care of
the elderly are referred to as ‘head managers of the administration’.
Managers at the nursing homes are referred to as ‘site managers’; it is also
evident from the references in the text whether the unit is public,
nonprofit or for-profit. Finally, interviews conducted with local politi-
cians responsible for care of the elderly are simply referred to as
‘politicians’.
In addition to the interviews, a variety of written documents were
examined, including policy plans for care of the elderly, surveys, infor-
mational brochures about the nursing homes and party documents. This
material was used to prepare for the interviews, as well as to triangulate
information obtained from them. In the next section, the results of the
investigation will be presented. We begin with a brief introduction of
both the organisation of elderly care in Scandinavian countries and the
municipalities chosen for this study.
Organisation of Elderly Care
Responsibility of the Municipality
In Scandinavian countries, care for the elderly is the responsibility of
municipalities. In performing this task, municipalities are restricted by
national laws only to a limited extent, because the relevant laws are
‘framework laws’ without detailed regulation. This is in accordance with
the Scandinavian tradition of strong municipal self-rule (Gustafsson
1999, 52; Loughlin et al. 2011, 11). Municipal responsibility for care of
the elderly includes both a financial and regulatory responsibility. It is the
municipalities that interpret national laws and work out local guidelines
for needs assessments. Thus, the decision to grant an elderly person home
care services or a place at a nursing home is made by a care administrator
following local guidelines for needs assessment.
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The overall balance between home care services and nursing homes for
the elderly is also a matter for the municipality to decide. In recent decades,
in all three countries, municipalities have started to give priority to home
care services rather than offering elderly people a place at a nursing home
(Hermansen and Gautun 2011; Hjemmehjælpskommisionen 2013).
A natural consequence of this strategy is that the threshold to secure a place
in a nursing home has risen (Gjevjon and Romøren 2010). In 2005, about
80% of those living in Norwegian nursing homes suffered from dementia
(Haugen and Engedal 2005). Nursing home users, therefore, are in rela-
tively poor health and make up only a fraction of the elderly who receive
municipal services.
Development of a Welfare Mix
In all three countries, municipalities also have the authority to decide
whether care for the elderly should be marketised. The municipality can
decide that all services should be performed in-house or by a mix of
public, for-profit and nonprofit actors. Denmark deviates in this respect
because a national law from 2007 makes it possible for both nonprofit
and for-profit actors to establish nursing homes irrespective of the wishes
of the municipality (LBK 897)—so-called ‘independent’ nursing homes.3
Most of the independent nursing homes that have been created since the
law came into effect are run on a nonprofit basis (Rambøll 2012, 15).
The most rapid development towards marketisation has taken place in
Sweden’s 290 municipalities (Jordahl and Öhrvall 2013). In 1999, 54
municipalities had private providers of nursing homes. This figure had
risen to about 93 by 2016 (Socialstyrelsen 2004, 2017).4 These are
mainly for-profit companies because nonprofit organisations play a very
limited role in Sweden (Erlandsson et al. 2013; Stolt and Winblad 2009).
In Denmark, nonprofit providers play a more important role than
their for-profit counterparts, although the overall development of the
privatisation of nursing homes has been modest (Bertelsen and Rostgaard
2013). The development of privatisation has also been modest in
Norway, although most non-municipally operated nursing homes are
run by for-profit care companies. According to figures from 2010, about
4 Towards a more diversified supply of welfare … 127
70 Norwegian nursing homes are managed by civil society organisations,
such as foundations or voluntary organisations (Vabø et al. 2013).
In sum, it is evident from this section that the organisation of care for
the elderly is similar in Scandinavian countries. It is the municipalities
that have the overall responsibility for this task and can decide the type of
welfare provider. In the next three sections, the results of the empirical
investigation will be presented for each of the three countries. Each
section begins with a presentation of the nursing homes that were
investigated. This is followed by a deeper examination of the issue of how
municipalities govern nursing homes for the elderly.
Sweden
Nursing Homes and Their Profiles
In both Swedish municipalities, the welfare mix consists of public and
for-profit providers. In Östersund, most of the nursing homes are
operated by the municipality’s provider. The situation is the opposite in
Sollentuna, which has only a few public nursing homes. These are run by
Sollentuna Omsorg (SOLOM AB), which is owned by the municipality.
In both municipalities, private providers consist of nationwide,
for-profit companies such as Vardaga, Attendo, Förenade Care and Aleris.
In addition, there are smaller for-profit companies in both municipalities;
for example, Vårdstyrkan AB and Strukturrutan. In Östersund, con-
tracting out has been deliberately organised in a way that facilitates the
participation of smaller companies.
Two nursing homes per municipality were scrutinised in detail: one
private (in both municipalities, one of the homes owned by a nationwide
company) and one public. The four nursing homes were similar in terms
of the number of beds and clients. They were also similar with regard to
the physical and mental (dementia) diagnoses of the clients. To deter-
mine whether there were differences among the nursing homes, inter-
views were conducted with site managers, politicians and administrators.
In addition, relevant documents were examined; for example, informa-
tional brochures, websites and annual reports.
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From the interviews, it appears that there is no clear profile among the
investigated nursing homes. Instead, special competencies among the
staff or the implementation of particular projects were mentioned. For
instance, at one of the private homes, one nurse is a ‘Silvia-nurse’, a title
one earns by attending a special training programme that emphasises care
for elderly persons with dementia (Interview, site manager, private,
2014-02-05). Another example, from the other private nursing home, is
a project involving putting pets in the care facility in order to promote
well-being among the elderly (Interview, site manager, private,
2014-04-14).
Particular projects like these can also be found at the public nursing
homes. For instance, cooperation with civil society was mentioned in the
interviews. The local branch of the Red Cross visits nursing homes and
offers activities for the elderly such as ‘sing-alongs’ or reading aloud
(Interview, site manager, public, 2014-04-14). However, none of these
projects are undertaken with the aim of giving the nursing home a
distinct profile. In one of the public nursing homes, the site manager
explained that the elderly are often in poor physical and/or mental health
and are thus not vigorous enough to participate in different activities:
‘You don’t move here because you are interested in gardening or any-
thing else’ (Interview, site manager, public, 2014-02-14).
This statement reveals something important about the situation at
nursing homes in Sweden today. Elderly persons are given places at
nursing homes only when they are seriously ill and cannot manage on
their own without assistance from home care providers. One manager
claimed that once you move into a nursing home, it is probably the last
place you will live in your life. This fact needs to be considered when
discussing ‘choice’ and a ‘diversified supply of services’.
Rather than referring to differences, site managers at nursing homes
emphasise similarities. One of the similarities is working with a munic-
ipal programme about basic values within elderly care. This programme
is the municipality’s interpretation of the national basic values outlined
in the Social Services Act. At each nursing home, regardless of provider,
there is a member of staff who is responsible for implementation. In
Östersund, the basic values have been interpreted as guarantees for the
elderly. First, each elderly person is guaranteed a contact person
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responsible for ensuring that communication among the resident, rela-
tives and staff functions satisfactorily. Second, an individual implemen-
tation plan must be drawn up, with information about how and when
care is to be performed. Third, care must be provided at a time upon
which the parties agree (Östersunds kommun 2014).
The individual implementation plan (i.e. care plan) is a central feature
of care at all nursing homes.5 Its purpose is to ensure that care is planned
on the basis of the particular needs of the individual. Upon arrival, the
elderly and their relatives meet with the nursing home staff. The staff
provide information about daily routines and what to expect in terms of
activities. The elderly and their relatives explain their expectations of the
nursing home. The elderly resident is asked questions, such as ‘What
food do you like to eat for breakfast?’ ‘What clothes do you prefer?’ ‘Do
you have different preferences on weekdays as opposed to weekends?’ All
the information is recorded in an implementation plan that is then
accessible to the staff at the nursing home (Interview, site manager,
public, 2014-04-14).
The aim of this procedure of drawing up individual plans is to provide
an opportunity for the elderly to influence the care they receive and how
it is performed. At one of the private nursing homes, the manager
explained that this procedure represents an important development over
time, in which the focus of user influence has shifted from ‘users as a
collective’ to ‘users as individuals’ (Interview, site manager, private,
2014-04-14).
Given the similarities among the nursing homes we investigated, it is
not surprising that elderly residents and/or their relatives rate the quality
of care as equivalent. In Sollentuna, a quality survey was carried out in
2012. It measured a range of variables such as safety, social interaction,
self-determination and integrity. An index comprised of all variables
revealed only negligible differences between the two nursing homes we
studied. The private home had a slightly better score (Sollentuna kom-
mun 2012). In Östersund, however, the public provider received a
slightly better score in a survey from 2013.
On a question concerning overall satisfaction, the public nursing
home received an average value of 8.8 out of 10 (response rate, 63%)
(Östersunds kommun 2013-06-13), while the private home received a
130 D. Feltenius
value of 6.5 (response rate, 50%) (Östersunds kommun 2013-09-16).
According to statements made in the survey’s open-answer section, one
possible explanation for this difference is that the private nursing home is
located in an old building, while the municipal nursing home is located
in a relatively new building.
Governing of Nursing Homes
It is evident from the interviews that the similarities among the nursing
homes can primarily be explained by the way the municipality steers
elderly care. While national guidelines and laws also play an important
role in determining the services provided, the focus here is on municipal
(local) governance of nursing homes. One governing instrument are
long-term plans for elderly care. For instance, in 2006, the Östersund
council adopted a plan with multiple goals, including accessibility,
influence, culture and competence among staff (Östersunds kommun
2006). Sollentuna has a similar policy document containing key areas
identified as subjects of special attention. Among them are elderly peo-
ple’s influence and independence, safety and active lifestyle (Vård-och
omsorgsnämnden 2013).
Another type of governing instrument, or perhaps more of an
underlying precondition, is the procedure for choosing a nursing home.
Municipal care administrators decide whether an elderly person qualifies
for a place at a nursing home. If so, he or she has the right to express a
preference for a particular facility. However, this preference is not always
easy to accommodate, because there are a limited number of rooms
available at each nursing home. When a room becomes available, it is
reported to the municipal administration, which passes the information
on to the elderly person. Since people who are waiting for a space in a
nursing home are generally in poor health, they typically accept the room
that is offered, regardless of whether it is their first-choice (Interview,
head manager, administration, 2013-12-13). That the system operates
this way also impacts the incentives that providers of nursing homes have
for developing different profiles. Since elderly persons are placed at a
particular nursing home, the homes do not need to ‘attract customers on
4 Towards a more diversified supply of welfare … 131
a market’. In reality, the market is very limited (if not non-existent), since
the ability of an elderly person to make an active choice is very restricted
for both medical and capacity reasons.
Another type of instrument are contracts between the municipality
and the nursing homes. In the case of contracting out, a contract is
signed with the provider that submits the winning bid. In Östersund, the
contract is awarded to the provider who can manage the nursing home in
accordance with criteria specified in a tendering document at the lowest
price. Sollentuna applies a different model, in which the sum received for
operating the nursing home is fixed. The provider who can offer the best
quality at the sum offered gets the contract.
The contract contains the criteria from the tendering documents as
well as additional criteria, which makes it an important steering docu-
ment for the municipality. For instance, it may include criteria about
staff competence, safety, nutrition or influence for the elderly resident. If,
during the tendering process, the providers promised to deliver other
measures of quality—for example, staff with particular competences—
then this is also included in the contract. Although public providers do
not participate in the tendering process, their operations are also regu-
lated in a contract of this type.
In Sollentuna, governing through contracts applies both to private and
public nursing home providers. The public provider gets no special
treatment. One head manager of the municipal administration said that
every provider should be treated the same, regardless of whether they are
private or public. This is motivated on the grounds that elderly care is
offered in a competitive market. In reality, there are some differences due
to the fact that contracts are written at different times. Nonetheless, the
overall ambition of the municipal administration is to treat all providers
the same (Interview, head manager, administration, 2013-12-13).
The head of elderly care administration in Sollentuna holds the view
that the use of the contract implies rather hard steering of nursing homes.
The municipality has many conditional requirements, which are inclu-
ded in all contracts, which suggests that services are largely the same,
regardless of provider. In addition, this has implications for the possi-
bility of choice for the elderly. Simply put, there is not much to choose
from because there is little difference among nursing homes (Interview,
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head manager, administration, 2013-12-13). Politicians share this view.
Therefore, one ambition for the future is that the conditional require-
ments focus more on what is to be done and less on how it should be
done (Interview, conservative politician, 2013-12-11).
Managers of nursing homes in Sollentuna stress the importance of
local guidelines, national guidelines and laws, and contracts with the
municipality. The contract is seen as rather detailed, including, for
example, guidelines for meals and the maintenance of the facilities. There
are even instructions about financial responsibility if washing machines
break down (Interview, site manager, public, 2014-02-14; site manager,
private, 2014-04-14).
The situation is similar in Östersund. Every provider, regardless of
whether they are private or public, must follow a number of quality
criteria. These criteria are listed as conditional requirements in the
contract with the nursing home provider. The implementation of the
criteria ensures that the services provided at the nursing home are similar.
Private nursing homes also have to follow an additional quality pro-
gramme formulated by the company. Despite the fact that the operation
of the private nursing home is governed from many different directions,
the manager believes that there is some freedom to decide how to deliver
the requested service (Interview, site manager, private 2014-04-14). At
public nursing homes, the existence of quality criteria is mentioned
alongside the budget provided for their operation (Interview, site man-
ager, public, 2014-04-14).
In both municipalities, public administrators closely monitor nursing
homes to ensure that they abide by their contracts. In Östersund, one of
the politicians mentioned that the contracts and their criteria are not
worth much if the homes are not monitored to ensure compliance
(Interview, social democratic politician, 2014-04-07). Therefore, a spe-
cial division within the administration conducts an annual follow-up of
the nursing homes. It is conducted using a point system in which dif-
ferent scores require the home to undertake specific types of action. The
procedure is carried out at both public and private nursing homes;
everyone is treated the same (Interview, head manager, administration,
2014-04-07).
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In Sollentuna, the monitoring of nursing homes takes place prior to
the renewal of a contract. If the provider does not fulfil the criteria first
agreed upon, then the contract may not be extended. This is not an
empty threat because it has actually occurred. Instead of renewing a
contract, a facility can be taken over by a municipal company (Interview,
head manager, administration, 2013-12-13). A representative from the
opposition party holds the view that this type of monitoring is insuffi-
cient, and that there is a need for more regular inspections both early on
and in the middle of a contract period (Interview, social democratic
politician, 2014-01-15).
In terms of future developments, the head manager of the elderly care
administration in Östersund argues that one important task involves
closely evaluating and scrutinising the criteria used. There might be some
criteria that unnecessarily constrain operations (Interview, head manager,
administration, 2014-04-07). Politicians have different views about the
need to loosen up the governing of nursing homes in order to allow for
greater variation in service supply. The politician representing the Centre
Party wanted to see greater variation in the future, while the represen-
tative of the Social Democratic Party was more interested in a different
goal. This representative argued that the purpose of having a mix of
welfare providers is to be able to compare. How much does it cost to
engage in an activity with a certain level of quality? What does a private
operator cost in relation to a public operator? (Interview, social demo-
cratic politician, 2014-04-07).
The argument above illustrates the fact that politicians might support
contracting out for different reasons. It is not necessarily about
empowering the elderly and giving them a range of welfare providers with
different profiles to choose from. Another motive might be formulated in
terms of benchmarking, i.e. helping the municipality establish some
point of reference about the cost of the elderly care provision.
In sum, evidence from the Swedish case suggests that there are no
major differences between providers with regard to the services provided.
This is explained by the fact that municipalities exercise hard rather than
soft governing of nursing homes. Even though public providers do not
participate in the tendering process, they are subject to the same steering
as private providers. The rationale for this is that all providers should be
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treated the same by the municipal administration. In the next section, we
use the same research questions to analyse the case of Norway.
Norway
Nursing Homes and Their Profiles
In the Norwegian case (the municipalities of Asker and Steinkjer), the
welfare mix consists of public, for-profit and nonprofit nursing homes.
Representatives from both for-profit and nonprofit nursing homes claim
that they are distinct from their public counterparts. The for-profit
nursing home refers to a particular ‘service concept’ that the company
developed in its hotel management operations and subsequently intro-
duced to nursing homes. The company has lauded its concept in its
communication with both users and the municipality (Interview, site
manager, for-profit, 2013-11-11).
Interestingly, neither users, staff or the municipality identified service
as a special trait of this nursing home. Moreover, in the latest user survey,
the for-profit nursing home had the lowest score on all service measures.
When specifically asked what is uniquely special about the nursing home,
the staff did not mention the service concept, which casts doubt on its
importance. The elderly residents experience their nursing home through
their interactions with care providers. If these providers are unaware of a
concept, it cannot be seen as a defining trait of the home.
The nonprofit nursing home in this study has a diaconal approach to
its operations; thus, according to the site manager, Christian values are a
subject that is discussed when prospective staff are interviewed
(Interview, site manager, nonprofit, 2014-01-27). Nevertheless, the
municipality and elderly residents do not think that the diaconal
approach influences care in important, substantive ways. As the
administrative head at the municipality claimed, ‘No, I don’t think they
have more visits from the priest and “stuff like that” than the other
nursing homes’ (Interview, head manager, administration, 2014-02-20).
In both municipalities, the interviewees from the municipal admin-
istration stressed that there are no differences between public and
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nonpublic nursing homes, and that no differences are indeed desired. All
citizens have the same right to services, and the municipality allocates
citizens to providers. Accordingly, from the point of view of the
municipality, it is not possible to defend any difference in the content of
the service provided. An elderly person can say that he or she prefers to
live at a particular nursing home; but, in reality, capacity limitations will
force him or her to take the first available slot. When an elderly person’s
health has deteriorated to the point of earning placement in a nursing
home, then it is not usually possible to wait for a place in a preferred
home to open up. Representatives of elderly residents of nursing homes
stated that when someone prefers a particular home, the most important
reasons for this preference are geography and proximity to a former home
or where their relatives currently live. Some also mentioned general
perceptions that a particular home has a reputation for offering
high-quality service, but such perceptions are based on the anecdotal
experiences of friends and families. Substantive differences among the
nursing homes are not given as a prominent explanation.
In Asker, the municipality contracted the for-profit provider through a
public tender in order to reap benefits from the tender itself. The tender
provides a benchmark for how nursing homes should be run, something
that the municipality can subsequently use in its steering of municipal
nursing homes. The political and administrative leaders in the munici-
pality as well as the head of the municipal nursing home alleges that the
for-profit nursing home serves as a benchmark for public institutions. In
addition, the municipality prefers to see some innovation in the form of
differences in the administration and organisation of the private nursing
home. However, elderly residents do not experience these differences as
substantive differences in care.
In Steinkjer, the municipality does not want the nonprofit nursing
home to be different from its public counterpart. On the contrary, the
municipality wants it to operate largely the same as public nursing
homes. In this sense, public nursing homes act as benchmarks for the
nonprofit home. The municipality has a geographically dispersed pop-
ulation, and the geographic dimension trumps the issue of the type of
welfare provider. At the same time, the interviewed actors were aware of
the fact that the nonprofit nursing home is not part of the public
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hierarchy, and they were committed to ensuring that the municipality
did not treat it as inferior.
The only tool for systematically comparing the nursing homes in the
municipalities on objective quality indicators is the user survey carried
out annually in Asker and twice a year in Steinkjer. Given the poor
health of the residents, there were a number of methodological challenges
involved in conducting the surveys. Nonetheless, the results consistently
showed that there are no systematic differences between nonpublic and
public nursing homes. The variation in results that did occur was not due
to variation in the type of provider—i.e. public or private.
Governing of Nursing Homes
To understand the limited difference between public and nonpublic
nursing homes, it is necessary to examine how the municipalities carry
out local governance. National laws and regulations are the same for all
providers, but differences across municipalities reveal the opportunities
that municipalities have to influence the institutions for which they are
responsible. Municipalities might exploit the opportunity available for
local adaptation in order to allow for differences among various actors in
the welfare mix. However, as discussed above, the interviews show that
municipalities do not want differences.
The contracts that the municipalities have with private nursing homes
govern their regulation. The nature of the contracts in Asker, which has a
for-profit provider, and Steinkjer, which has a nonprofit, are different.
Turning first to Asker, the contract is detailed with respect to a number
of aspects of care to be provided. In the view of the head of the nursing
home, ‘I think that we are not completely private. The municipality sets
the standard and is responsible for the care’ (Interview, site manager,
for-profit, 2013-11-13). This comment illustrates the fact that both
parties find public control and intervention in the provision of services to
be natural. However, the contractual relationship between the munici-
pality and the for-profit home means that it is not natural for the
municipality to intervene in the daily operations of the nursing home.
With regard to the public nursing home, it has a frame budget and, in its
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experience, a certain amount of leeway for developing a particular profile.
For example, one public nursing home has special expertise on severe
dementia. The development of this profile was the result of an initiative
at the nursing home itself. In this way, both public and for-profit nursing
homes have some leeway to carve out profiles, but the resulting differ-
ences stem from factors other than the type of provider.
The contractual relationship between Steinkjer and its nonprofit home
is different. The contract is less detailed in terms of content of care, but it
does include a number of passages that force the provider to adapt to
municipal standards and, crucially, entitles the municipality to intervene
on a detailed level in the operation of the nursing home. The munici-
pality could have opted for a hands-off approach; but in reality, the
municipality is interested in detailed issues that go beyond care-related
matters. For example, the municipality is involved in the number of
people working in the administration of the nursing home as well as the
wages of managers at the institution. The head manager of the municipal
administration described a close relationship with a continuous discus-
sion about detailed aspects of care. She concluded:
The feedback [from the nonprofit nursing home] is that they think it is all
right that we exercise oversight over the professional standards of care and
that we are concerned that the product we pay for maintains a high
standard, in the best interest of the citizens of Steinkjer. And they want to
deliver a product that makes us willing to continue to use them. I have not
experienced any conflict about this. (Interview, head manager, adminis-
tration, 2014-02-20)
In spite of the fact that the for-profit nursing home has a more detailed
contract, it seems as if it has more room to manoeuvre than its nonprofit
counterpart. The contract of the for-profit facility shields it from certain
forms of intervention by the municipality in matters that are not regulated
in the contract. For example, while a cut in public spending on nursing
homes would not affect the for-profit nursing home during the contract
period, the nonprofit nursing home would be affected in the same way as
the municipal ones. The larger the share of nursing home places located in
for-profit nursing homes, the more severe the cuts on public institutions.
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The municipal nursing homes in both municipalities are integrated into
the municipal structure. This means that, formally, municipal politicians
and administration can intervene in the institutions at any time. In reality,
this occurs on issues such as the structure of care places. As the adminis-
trative head of Asker, which has the for-profit provider, explained:
When I speak about dimensioning, it concerns the number of short-term
and long-term places. It is important that this is dimensioned correctly
[…] With municipal provision, I can make the change like this [snaps her
fingers], immediately, but I cannot do that if it is on a contract. Then it is
a longer process. (Interview, head manager, administration, 2013-11-19)
What this comment illustrates is that it is easier to force changes on
municipal nursing homes than non-municipal ones. When it comes to
issues relating to the content of care, however, things are different.
Professionals at the nursing homes make decisions on these matters. For
example, public homes for elderly care have tested alternative schedules
for work shifts and the use of dogs to stimulate residents, all without
consulting municipal authorities in advance. The central point is that the
tools that municipalities use to govern nursing homes are different
depending on whether the home is public or private, but the effect is
more a matter of administrative differences than the content of care.
Within each municipality, each of the nursing homes reported the
same indicators to municipal authorities in order to facilitate compar-
isons among them. Some of these indicators include staff sick leave,
financial matters, changes in the educational composition of the staff, and
other issues regulated in the contracts. The user surveys administered by
the municipalities are the most important instrument for comparing the
nursing homes. The surveys are the same for all homes, and they receive
considerable attention from politicians and the municipal administration.
Any nursing home, public or nonpublic, whose results are unsatisfactory
is summoned to a meeting in order to explain the results and draw up
plans for improving them. Since the survey is the same for all nursing
homes, it provides an incentive for all of them to work on the areas raised
in the surveys, because they know that these are the issues on which they
will be measured and evaluated.
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In Steinkjer, the governance model of elderly care is well established
and no changes are imminent. This is a large, rural municipality, and
ongoing debate about whether to centralise or maintain a broad range of
services in all communities within the municipality has occurred as a
result. Steinkjer’s nonprofit nursing home is located on the outskirts of
the municipality, and might therefore be vulnerable. Despite this, it has
considerable political support, and both strategic plans and interviewees
we spoke with agreed that major changes are unlikely.
In Asker, the municipality is currently preparing a new tender and its
for-profit company must compete to retain its contract. According to
both political and administrative leaders in the municipality,the price is
not likely to be an evaluation criterion in the tender. According to the
head of elderly care in the municipality:
I do not think there is as much to gain from competition as there was
earlier. The municipality has worked a lot on efficiency and closed the gap
on average expenses compared to a few years ago. That is my experience,
and that is why it is interesting to compete on quality, to see if the private
sector can do it for the same price, but with better quality (Interview, head
manager, administration, 2013-11-19).
Such a shift in strategy on the part of the municipality would invite
private providers to offer additional areas that can be included in the
contract. It also reveals an ambition on the part of the municipality to
find private providers that deviate more from public nursing homes in
their operations. However, the municipality has no plans to change the
way it steers in order to obtain differentiation.
In conclusion, the evidence from Norway implies that there are no
important differences in the content of care due to a nursing home being
public or private. The explanation for this is partly that there is little
room to deviate from the municipal standard within the municipal
governance regime. A municipality can either use a detailed contract to
impose its standard—as is the case for Asker’s for-profit nursing home—
or it can intervene more directly in the operation of a nursing home, as in
the nonprofit case in Steinkjer. The greater the number of quality
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indicators, like user surveys, that the municipalities use, the stronger the
convergence in how nursing homes operate.
Denmark
Nursing Homes and Their Profiles
Four nursing homes in two municipalities (Faaborg-Midtfyn and
Herning) were examined—two public and two nonprofit. Both
nonprofit nursing homes have a Christian profile and belong to the large
nonprofit organisation, Danske Diakonhjem, which runs about 50
nursing homes in Denmark (www.danskediakonhjem.dk). Both of these
homes have contracts with their local municipalities.
In the Faaborg-Midtfyn municipality, the municipal website makes no
distinction between the nonprofit nursing home and the public nursing
homes. This is in contrast to the situation in Herning, where a clear
distinction is made between different types of nursing homes on the
municipality’s website. Moreover, the situation in Herning is different
from the situation in Faaborg-Midtfyn, as the former includes two
independent nursing homes. Both of these homes were established as a
consequence of a municipal decision to cancel contracts with nonprofit
nursing homes. The independent nursing homes were not closely
examined in the empirical analysis presented here, but they played an
important role in the interviews that were conducted with municipal
actors. In addition, a single interview was conducted with the manager of
one of the independent care homes in order to attain an overall under-
standing of their special status.
All four nursing homes have the same general principles for care,
which focus on adapting care services as much as possible to accom-
modate personal needs and resources. The homes also strive to make the
facilities homelike, and thus to involve the elderly in the daily life of the
nursing home as much as possible. For instance, they have kitchens that
allow elderly residents to participate in cooking activities. Not all nursing
homes in the investigated municipalities have kitchens, but the ones
selected for this study do in order to ensure that they all shared similar
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characteristics. The four homes are also of similar size. Three of the four
are situated in small towns, and one is located in an urban area. In each
of the nursing homes, interviews were conducted with managers,
employees and representatives of user boards, primarily relatives of
elderly persons living at the homes. None of the municipalities in the
study administers user surveys on a regular basis, and no comparable
surveys were available.
From the interviews, it is evident that there are no major differences
between public and nonprofit providers with regard to the content of
care. In all four nursing homes, great emphasis is placed on imple-
menting homelike principles of care, as was mentioned above. However,
the implementation of these principles is limited by the physical and
mental condition of the elderly, as well as by the limited resources of the
nursing homes (Interviews, employees, municipal nursing home,
2014-03-06). The weak condition of the elderly at the nursing homes is
also important to keep in mind when considering the scope for freedom
of choice. Although there is freedom of choice, it can in practice be
limited by room availability combined with the urgency of care.
Some of the relatives in the interviews claimed that they were not able
to wait for a vacant room at their first-choice home; therefore, they
accepted the first available room. According to nursing home managers,
while residents seldom move to a different facility, it does sometimes
happen when an elderly person did not originally get their first-choice
(Interview, manager, municipal nursing home, 2014-01-10). The
interviews also reveal that the most important factor for choosing a
nursing home is related more to geographical location and less to other
characteristics of the homes:
I think geography is the main reason. I wish I could say that it is because
of us, but it is not. Of course people from the area want to stay here,
because it is here that they have their social circles and their children.
(Interview, manager, nonprofit nursing home, 2014-02-20)
Among the relatives we interviewed, it is also evident that the distinctive
Christian profile is not the main reason why people choose nonprofit
nursing homes. Again, geography and good reputation are mentioned as
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the main reasons (Interviews, user boards, nonprofit nursing home,
2014-03-12). However, according to some of the interviewees, kitchen
facilities and a nursing home’s principles for care also played a role in
selection.
All nursing homes in the study hold an introductory meeting when a
new resident arrives at the home. At this meeting, a care plan is drawn
up, which includes information about personal needs and preferences.
Another feature shared by all of the homes is that each elderly resident
has a contact person who is responsible for maintaining contact between
the resident, the staff and the relatives. These procedures do not vary
across the different types of providers.
However, due to the Christian profile of the nonprofit nursing homes,
there are some differences regarding specific activities for the elderly. This
includes, for instance, services and other types of activities with religious
elements (Interviews, employees, nonprofit nursing homes, 2014-03-01,
2014-03-12).
The managers of the nonprofit care homes also have other types of
privileges by virtue of the fact that they run nonprofit facilities. These
privileges are primarily related to the larger degree of freedom they
experience as nonprofit actors. Although they must live up to municipal
quality standards, they have more freedom in the overall running of the
nursing home. A short journey from idea to implementation is one of the
main strengths mentioned. In one of the nursing homes, the manager
was considering buying some sheep for the green areas around the home,
and he valued the possibility of being able to do so without having to ask
anyone (Interview, manager, nonprofit nursing home, 2014-02-20).
However, these kinds of differences are much more evident at the level of
the manager than among employees and relatives, who do not experience
any significant differences apart from Christian values.
Governing of Nursing Homes
From the interviews, it is evident that the municipal implementation of
national framework legislation promotes similarities among different
types of nursing homes with regard to the content of care. In addition to
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these quality standards, the interviews also revealed a strong norm for
equality in services: All elderly residents should have the right to the same
service standards (Interview, manager, nonprofit, 2014-02-12).
Since 1998, all municipalities have been legally required to formulate
quality standards in the field of elderly care. These standards set the
framework for the municipal governing of nursing homes. The standards
cover both personal and practical care by, for instance, specifying the
types of cleaning and other practical help included in and excluded from
municipal service, as well as the types of personal care provided and
exempted by the municipality (Faaborg-Midtfyn Municipality 2012;
Herning Municipality 2008).
Monitoring of nursing homes takes place through regular inspections.
For instance, the quality standards in Faaborg-Midtfyn state that
unscheduled inspections are conducted once a year at all nursing homes
in the municipality. These inspections include discussions with elderly
residents, employees and managers regarding the quality of the care
provided (Faaborg-Midtfyn Municipality 2012). Municipalities have
contracts with nonprofit nursing homes, and these are used to apply the
quality standards across different types of providers. The independent
nursing homes are also obliged to provide services in accordance with
municipal decisions in the field (LBK 897).
In the municipalities examined here, there is a high degree of satis-
faction with collaboration with nonprofit nursing homes. In
Faaborg-Midtfyn, the head of the nonprofit nursing home is invited to
the same leadership seminars that heads of public care homes attend. In
Herning, the municipality has more informal relations with the nonprofit
nursing homes; but, according to the head of the elderly care adminis-
tration, relations are very positive. For instance, they are offered the same
courses as public nursing homes:
If we have something special to offer – for instance, a seminar on dementia
– the nonprofit nursing homes are also invited. They are not kept outside
– not at all. (Interview, head manager, administration, 2013-12-18).
The manager of the nonprofit nursing home in this study reaffirmed
the positive relationship with the municipality (Interview, site manager,
nonprofit, 2014-02-12).
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Although the independent nursing homes have not been investigated
in detail in this study, they are mentioned repeatedly in interviews with
the municipal actors. There are some differences between the indepen-
dent nursing homes and other types. The independent homes are run on
a freer basis, and the ability of local authorities to steer them is very
limited (For a further discussion, see Chap. 3). This is evident in the case
of Herning. The municipality decided to cancel its contract with two
nonprofit nursing homes as part of a larger restructuring, which also
included the establishment of new nursing homes in other parts of the
municipality. Rather than close, the nonprofit nursing homes decided to
continue delivering their services as independent nursing homes. As a
result, the municipalities still shoulder the financial costs of these homes,
but have no direct influence on them, apart from enforcing quality
standards. This is also reflected in an interview with the manager of one
of the nonprofit nursing homes, who has a high degree of freedom in the
running of the facility (Interview, site manager, independent nursing
home 2014-03-03).
While there is general support for the principle of freedom of choice,
the establishment of independent nursing homes is considered prob-
lematic by municipal actors because of the financial pressures they create.
Nonetheless, good relations are still maintained between the munici-
palities and the independent nursing homes, according to the head
manager of the elderly care administration (Interview, head manager,
administration, 2013-12-18; Interview, site manager, independent
nursing home, 2014-03-03).
Thus, in Denmark, municipalities have the ability to directly steer
nursing homes through contracts when they are traditional nonprofit
nursing homes. Municipalities always have the right to cancel a contract
if, for example, the service provision is not satisfactory or the munici-
pality wants to restructure the field of providers. However, the ability of
the municipality to steer nursing homes was significantly reduced with
the introduction of the option to operate independent nursing homes in
2007. Today, nonprofit nursing homes can change their status to
independent nursing homes if their municipal contract is cancelled. The
municipal steering possibilities are very limited when it comes to inde-
pendent nursing homes.
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Evidence from the Danish case shows that there are no major differ-
ences between public and nonprofit nursing homes when it comes to the
specific content of care.6 This is due to statutory municipal quality
standards, which are applied to both public and nonprofit providers.
Municipalities can directly steer nursing homes through the use of
contracts with traditional nonprofit facilities, which municipalities always
have the right to cancel. However, their steering powers have been sig-
nificantly limited as a result of the relatively new possibility of estab-
lishing independent nursing homes. On the whole, the differences
between public and nonprofit providers are mainly value-based.
However, nonprofit leaders also experience a larger degree of freedom to
make local decisions at their nursing homes.
Welfare Providers from Different Sectors—A
Comparison
Based on the results of the empirical investigation, it is evident that the
welfare mix of different providers within the field of elderly care has not
resulted in greater variety in the content of care. Whether nursing homes
are run by public, nonprofit or for-profit organisations, the services they
provide are generally the same. This conclusion can be drawn based on
interviews with site managers about the content of care and the existence
of distinct profiles for their operations. The empirical findings are also
supported by the fact that surveys and interviews with relatives and
nursing home residents do not point to any major differences among
types of nursing homes. However, several minor differences can be noted;
for example, a religious profile or the existence of specially trained staff to
care for residents suffering from dementia. Nevertheless, differences like
these do not seem to have any major impact on the types of services
provided.
In all three countries, similarities cannot be explained in any signifi-
cant way by regulation through national law. For instance, in Sweden,the
national law creates a framework that gives the municipalities a great deal
of power to make decisions on their own. Following a Scandinavian
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tradition of strong municipal self-rule, the situation is similar in
Denmark and Norway. Rather, similarities can be explained by a high
degree of local steering that takes several forms.
One of them, which can be regarded as an important underlying
condition, is that there are only a limited number of rooms at each
nursing home and a queuing system is thus administered by the
municipality. This creates a problem for implementing a system of free
choice in practice, as there might not be a room available at the chosen
nursing home. One can, of course, wait for a room to become available,
but considering the physical condition of the elderly, this is not as easy as
it sounds.
Another form of steering is the use of quality indicators that are spelled
out in contracts between the municipal administration and the nursing
home. According to different categories of respondents who were inter-
viewed, the contracts are very detailed, leaving site managers with limited
room to manoeuvre regarding the content of the services provided.
Quality indicators and contracts are used by municipal administrations
regardless of whether nursing homes are run by public or private
providers.
Another important tool for municipal steering is the evaluation of
nursing homes. Such evaluations assess whether nursing homes are
performing their work in accordance with quality indicators. If they are
not, contracts can be terminated by the local administration. One part of
municipal evaluations is the user survey. These surveys are sent to those
receiving care as well as their relatives, and they ask questions about the
overall performance of the nursing homes. The surveys can also influence
the decision of the municipal administration to extend or terminate its
contract with the provider. Another component of the evaluation process
is inspection (i.e. site visits), which can be both announced and
unannounced.
In sum, the level of administrative governance of nursing homes
exercised by municipalities is ‘high’ regardless of the welfare provider.
Denmark represents an exception to this overall pattern insofar as
nonprofit providers can apply for status as ‘independent nursing homes’.
The broader implications of these research findings are considered below.
4 Towards a more diversified supply of welfare … 147
Conclusions
Scandinavian welfare states are currently being reorganised with the
market as a model. The pace at which this development is occurring
differs among the countries, with Sweden experiencing the most
far-reaching changes. There are different rationales driving the develop-
ment towards marketisation. One of the most common reasons is that
the establishment of a market with different providers allows citizens to
choose the ‘best’ alternative in terms of quality. By letting citizens
choose, the government is steering the quality of welfare provision
through the use of an ‘invisible hand’. Simply put, only those welfare
providers who can offer services with a sufficient level of quality to attract
customers are able to survive in the long run. However, improving
quality is not the only motive; another motive is the desire to strengthen
user autonomy and enable citizens to choose among a variety of options
depending on their own desires and needs.
If citizens are to have alternatives to choose from, then there obviously
must be differences among service providers. Hence, it should matter
whether the providers are public or private (nonprofit or for-profit). To
make this possible, one might expect that there would be less local
government steering of service providers. Whether this is actually the case
is an empirical question, and little is known about the content and degree
of local government steering. It is also possible that there are other
reasons behind the development towards marketisation in the welfare
field considered here, namely, nursing homes for the elderly.
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter was to describe and analyse
local government steering and how it affects the profile of nursing homes
in six municipalities in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The results of
the empirical investigation show that the welfare mix within nursing
homes for the elderly has not, to any great extent, resulted in distinct
profiles of service provision. The explanation is found in the existence of
a high degree of steering by municipalities at the local level, as has been
discussed in the previous section.
These findings suggest that the discourse on ‘active citizenship’ and
‘choice’ discussed in the first chapter of this book is relevant to consider
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here only to a limited extent. Clearly, the rationale behind the devel-
opment towards marketisation of nursing homes for the elderly is not
foremost about creating a market in which citizens can choose among
different alternatives.
Another interpretation of the underlying rationale is that it is about
making it possible for the municipal administration to ‘benchmark’. By
contracting out, the municipality’s administration gets a more compre-
hensive understanding of the costs of running a nursing home. This
information can then be used to improve the efficiency of the services
performed by the public provider. Following this alternative rationale,
there is no need to allow for greater variation among service providers. It
is foremost a question of facilities providing a particular service, one that
is defined in advance by the municipal administration in the most effi-
cient way.
Another interpretation of our findings is that the similarity in welfare
provision across providers is an expression of a central principle of the
Scandinavian welfare model—i.e. equality of welfare provision.
According to this principle, every citizen is entitled to receive the same
welfare content, regardless of place of residence or social stratum. Seen
from this perspective, it comes as no surprise that quality indicators and
contracts governing nursing homes for the elderly are the same with
regard to content of care, regardless of whether the provider is public,
for-profit or nonprofit. Simply put, they are important tools for ensuring
the preservation of the principle of equality of welfare provision, even in
the context of marketisation.
Although this study provides limited evidence of variation in the
content of service provision, there is some evidence that things are about
to change. In Denmark, nursing homes can apply for the status of ‘in-
dependent nursing home’. In Sweden, the Freedom of Choice Act
(LOV) has mainly been applied to home care services. However, the act
can also be applied to nursing homes, and this has actually happened in
some municipalities, which implies that a different routine of contracting
out is being implemented. The consequences of these relatively new
legislative acts must be investigated more closely. In the long run, in
these two countries, we might see a development towards less local
government steering and more distinct profiles among nursing homes.
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Another topic for further research is the content of contracts and their
development. A nursing home is often contracted out for a limited time
period. At the end of that period, a new process is initiated in which
municipal administrators reformulate old contracts and give them new
content. In this process, one would expect that an element of policy
learning would take place, i.e. participants would learn through past
experiences of the implementation of policy. Whether this learning
suggests that more or less detailed regulation is desirable remains to be
seen. In several of the interviews, today’s detailed regulations were openly
questioned by both politicians and civil servants on the grounds that they
are counterproductive because they fail to promote efficient solutions.
An additional question for further research concerns the role played by
nonprofit organisations in a marketised welfare environment. There is a
commonly held belief that nonprofit providers are better able to tailor
their services to the particular needs of the elderly, i.e. they can offer a
more distinct profile of services. However, the empirical investigation
presented here provides little evidence that this is actually taking place. It
would be interesting to determine how governance carried out by
administrators in municipalities actually restricts how nonprofit providers
conduct their operations. What is the potential for services provided by
nonprofit providers and how is this potential restricted by local gov-
ernment steering?
As evident from this chapter, the Scandinavian model shows signs of
divergence in light of the different speeds at which marketisation has
taken place in the different countries. In addition, there are signs of
divergence with respect to the role played by nonprofit providers, from
their marginal role in Sweden to their more pronounced role in Denmark
and Norway. However, this particular difference has been evident for a
long time and has little to do with recent developments.
Although there are differences among Sweden, Norway and Denmark,
it is still relevant to speak of a Scandinavian model within the field of care
for the elderly. The main argument for this is that one of its chief
characteristics, equality of welfare provision, is still very much alive at the
local level. It is this particular value, expressed by some of the civil
servants in the interviews, which constitutes one explanation as to why
local governing of different welfare providers is very much the same,
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regardless of whether the provider is a municipal actor or a private one.
There are also similar routines for elderly care; for example, implemen-
tation plans for each nursing home resident are developed in dialogue
with the elderly person and his or her relatives. Besides this, the
cornerstones of the Scandinavian model still exist—i.e. publicly financed
care for the elderly, accessible to all citizens who need it.
Notes
1. In this chapter, the use of phrases such as ‘content of service provision’
refers to the content of care at nursing homes. In turn, content of care
refers to various aspects of the activities taking place at the nursing homes;
for example, medical care, cultural activities and physical activities such as
walks.
2. In some countries, interviews have also been conducted with employees
and elderly people living at the nursing homes or their relatives.
3. For a more elaborated definition of an ‘independent nursing home’, see
Chap. 3 by Segaard and Saglie.
4. The figure for 2016 was calculated from statistics presented by the
National Board of Health and Welfare (2017). In these statistics, there are
municipalities with only a limited number of beds, one or two, which are
run by a private operator. This may indicate that beds are purchased by
another municipality, which, in turn, has decided to contract out their
services. Hence, municipalities with less than five beds, run by a private
operator, have not been included in the total number of 93 municipalities.
5. This is in accordance with a national regulation issued by the National
Board of Health and Welfare (SOFS 2014:5). The regulation applies to
all providers of elderly care regardless of being public or private.
6. For a similar conclusion regarding the Danish case, see Hjelmar et al. 2016.
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5
Local Governing of Schools
in Scandinavia—Between State,
Market and Civil Society
Malene Thøgersen
Introduction
The education of future citizens is a fundamental welfare task, and
therefore the school system plays a central role in relevant political
debates (Arnesen and Lundahl 2006). In social democratic welfare states
like the Scandinavian countries, the public sector is responsible for both
financing and regulation in the field of education. The Scandinavian
countries are also characterised by a high degree of decentralisation, with
a large volume of welfare tasks carried out by the municipalities,
including the responsibility for primary and lower secondary schools,
which are the focus here (Kersting and Vetter 2003, 23; Baldersheim and
Rose 2010; Nyhlén 2013, 158). However, municipalities are not the
only providers of these schools. Nonprofit schools have a long history in
the Scandinavian context. Moreover, increasing marketisation trends
have affected the field. This trend has gone furthest in Sweden, where
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for-profit providers today run schools side by side with public and
nonprofit providers. Finally, across the Scandinavian countries, an
increasing focus on freedom of choice has changed the conditions for
local steering as well as citizens’ opportunities to actively choose between
different types of services, which can be seen as one important aspect of
active citizenship (Chap. 1 in this book). Hence, the field of primary and
lower secondary schools in Scandinavia is a complex mix of long his-
torical traditions and recent trends from New Public Management
(NPM) and market-based steering (Hood 1991; Donahue and Nye
2002). In other words, local governing in the field of schools takes place
within a mix of tools and logics from both state, market and civil society.
This chapter will compare the field of primary and lower secondary
schools in Sweden, Norway and Denmark and investigate the conse-
quences of different national contexts for local governing in the field with
a focus on different types of providers. The introductory chapters of this
book leave no doubt that both the welfare mix and national legislation in
the field of schools differ among the Scandinavian countries in spite of
their belonging to the same welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). The
differences between the Scandinavian countries are evident in the various
shares of welfare provided by private actors, as described by Sivesind in
Chap. 2. In Chap. 3, Segaard and Saglie described the national legal
framework for private providers, underlining important differences—and
similarities—between the countries when it comes to the private provi-
sion of primary and lower secondary schools.
In this chapter, the focus shifts to the local level, where national
policies are implemented. The overall aim is to investigate the conse-
quences of different national contexts for the local governing of schools in
Sweden, Norway and Denmark by comparing both countries and dif-
ferent institutional sectors.
The empirical focus will partly be on the municipal level, with a focus
on how national legislation is interpreted and implemented, and partly
on the school level in order to investigate how national and municipal
governing and steering are experienced and dealt with in practice. The
analysis will focus on the following research questions:
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• How do municipalities implement national legislation, and which
steering tools and types of regulation do they use?
• What are the consequences of national legislation and local steering
and regulation for the schools?
• Do regulation and legislation promote or inhibit the development of a
distinct profile of private schools compared with public schools? Are
there any differences between the Scandinavian countries in this regard?
As is evident from these questions, the study is largely exploratory and
has a strong empirical focus. All questions are addressed with a focus on
comparisons across the Scandinavian countries and across different
institutional sectors. The theoretical inspiration for the study is rooted in
the literature on NPM, public steering and government–nonprofit
relations. The empirical analysis will be based on data from case studies
in two Swedish, two Danish and three Norwegian municipalities.
In the first part of this chapter, the theoretical background for the
study will be presented. Afterwards, the characteristics of the welfare mix
in the field of schools in the Scandinavian countries will be provided,
including a view into the distinct development of alternatives to public
schools. After a short presentation of data and methods, the empirical
analysis will go deeper into the field of primary and lower secondary
schools across the three countries, addressing the research questions
above. This chapter concludes with a discussion of similarities and dif-
ferences across countries and types of providers, including possible rea-
sons for and consequences of these differences for future welfare
provision in the field.
Public Steering and Relations between
Government and Nonpublic Services
In the literature, much attention has been paid to various types of the
welfare mix across countries (Gidron et al. 1992; Seeleib-Kaiser 2008;
Alber 2010; Henriksen et al. 2012). However, relations between local
governments and different types of local welfare providers in specific
welfare fields are less well described empirically. In particular, there is a
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lack of attention on the role played by nonprofit organisations in local
welfare provision (Pestoff 2009, 229). The concept of the welfare mix,
which refers to new types of involvement by both for-profit and
nonprofit actors in the welfare provision (Evers and Wintersberger 1990;
Powell 2007; Anheier 2009; Dølvik et al. 2015) is therefore the
underlying reason for investigating differences and similarities in the local
governing of primary and lower secondary schools in Scandinavian
countries. However, perspectives on public steering and government–
nonprofit relations will provide the theoretical background for the
empirical analysis.
During the 1990s and 2000s, ideas and tools inspired by New Public
Management (NPM) influenced steering of the public sector across
countries and welfare regimes. However, one of the challenges with
NPM and its focus on the market, freedom of choice and competition,
turned out in many cases to be increasing fragmentation of the organi-
sation and the steering of the public sector. The subsequent need for
coordination and collaboration led to an increased focus on ‘collaborative
governance’ in the literature on public management. It has been argued
that there has been a shift from NPM towards collaborative governance,
characterised by less control and based on the assumption that less
control will pay off in terms of better performance (Donahue and
Zeckhauser 2011, 32).
However, others have argued that empirical evidence for this trend is
lacking and that rule-based and regulatory systems, which are also a part
of NPM, are still dominant (Phillips and Smith 2011, 28). According to
Phillips and Smith, there is a cross-country tendency towards more
accountability and transparency, which typically requires more regula-
tion. Hence, the focus on regulation has persisted in spite of a similar
trend towards more collaboration across sectors, resulting in a dual
pressure on the relationship not only between government and service
providers—e.g. third sector organisations (Phillips and Smith 2011, 23),
but also between government and for-profit actors who are increasingly
involved in the service provision. In relation to the involvement of
for-profit actors, the consequence is the tendency that more market
creates a need for more regulation and thereby more state involvement
(Petersen and Hjelmar 2013, 6; Dølvik et al. 2015, 106).
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The trends from NPM have been implemented in different ways
across the three Scandinavian countries. A possible explanation for this
can be found in the concept of institutional layering. The basic argument
behind this concept is that although new tools and logics are incorpo-
rated into the agenda, they are often implemented on top of existing
steering structures and historical traditions, resulting in large differences
across countries and welfare fields (Thelen 2003). The impact of insti-
tutional legacies can, therefore, be seen as one possible explanation of the
fact that the Scandinavian countries have implemented a more moderate
version of NPM than countries with liberal welfare regimes (Politt and
Bouckaert 2011, 64).
However, the impact of different institutional legacies can also be an
important explanatory factor for the differing roles played by nonprofit
providers across the Scandinavian countries. As it is argued in
neo-institutional perspectives on nonprofit–government relationships,
nonprofit organisations are largely a product of the institutional envi-
ronment surrounding them (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006, 235).
In Scandinavian countries, there has been a long tradition of close
collaboration between sectors, in spite of the government dominating
welfare systems (Henriksen and Bundesen 2004). Traditional theories of
nonprofit government relations—e.g. the literature on government,
market and voluntary failures (the three-failures theory) which focus on
how each sector compensates for each other’s weaknesses—have not left
much room for this kind of close collaborative relationship between the
sectors (Steinberg 2006). However, increasing complexity in modern
welfare states has prompted collaboration between sectors across coun-
tries and welfare regimes. Recent literature even suggests that govern-
ment–nonprofit cooperation today is necessary to obtain effectiveness
(Salamon and Toepler 2015).
The literature on public governance distinguishes between different
ideas or ideal types of governance. A common distinction is between
hierarchy, market and network (Jørgensen and Vrangbæk 2004;
Meuleman 2008; Greve and Ejersbo 2013, 16). The three types of
governance are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to find elements
from all three types at the same time, although one of the types will often
dominate (Jørgensen and Vrangbæk 2004, 83).
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In hierarchical steering, rules and authority are the central elements. In
market-based steering, order is to some extent left to market forces—for
instance, through freedom of choice. Finally, in network-based steering,
order is made through interaction and dialogue between interdependent
actors in the system (Jørgensen and Vrangbæk 2004, 12).
The three ideal types can be reflected in municipal steering strategies.
In a study of local governing of Swedish schools, Nyhlén (2013) iden-
tified three different types of local steering strategies in the relationship
between municipalities and schools in a system with freedom of choice:
control, competition and collaboration. Control-based steering strategies
imply that the municipality takes initiatives to control the schools.
Competitive steering strategies are at play when the municipality’s aware-
ness of competition is reflected in its steering. For instance, the
municipality may seek to profile the public schools to prevent too big a
flow of pupils to private schools—e.g. through marketing initiatives.
Finally, collaborative steering strategies imply that the municipality
actively seeks collaboration with the schools. According to Nyhlén,
steering strategies vary across municipalities, and the different models
affect the characteristics of the relationship between municipalities and
schools (Nyhlén 2013, 157).
The three types of steering strategies identified by Nyhlén serve as a
framework for the empirical analysis in this chapter (Table 5.1).
However, it is important to note that control, collaboration and
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competition are seen as analytical categories, not as an explicit choice of
strategy made by the municipalities. The aim of using these categories is
to structure the analysis and provide room for structured comparisons
across countries and types of providers. Within each of the three ana-
lytical categories, the analysis will focus on concrete elements of steering
but also the degree of steering: The extent to which elements of control,
competition and collaboration are evident in the local governance of
primary and lower secondary schools.
The Welfare Mix and Characteristics
of the Field of Schools in Scandinavia
In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the public sector accounts for the vast
majority of primary and lower secondary schools, but private providers
also play a role. However, there are interestingly different trajectories
between the countries when it comes to the scope and type of private
provision.
In Denmark, primary and lower secondary schools are either public or
run by nonprofit providers, and there is a strong historical tradition of
nonprofit schools. This tradition is rooted in the constitution, under-
lining compulsory education but not compulsory school attendance.
Regarding choice, all children belong to a public district school and
have the right to attend this school, but it is possible to choose a
nonprofit school or another public school within or outside the
municipality, when available (Law on Public Schools, LBK 665). During
recent years, there has been an increase in the number of nonprofit
schools, from 460 in 2000 to 526 in 2011. Nonprofit schools also
represent an increasing share of the total number of pupils; in 2011, their
share was 15% (Thøgersen 2015).
Nonprofit schools in Denmark are subsidised by the state. The level of
funding has been reduced during recent years, corresponding to 71% of
the average expenses per pupil in public schools in 2015.1 However,
municipalities pay the state for each pupil in nonprofit schools,2 and
they therefore still constitute expenditures for the municipalities.
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Nonprofit schools must charge the parents to receive public funding but
are free to decide the level of parental payment.
Compared to many other types of nonprofit welfare providers in
Denmark, nonprofit schools have some special privileges: Parents have
the right to establish a new school and acquire public funding as long as
the school fulfils national legal requirements. Moreover, nonprofit
schools do not operate through a contract with the municipality, and
they have a high degree of freedom when it comes to the content and
structure of teaching and the running of the school in general. As an
example, nonprofit schools have the right to decide which pupils they
accept, and they are not obliged to do national tests or offer final exams.
The school boards have the responsibility for both the finances and all
other issues associated with the operation of the schools (Law of
Independent and Private Schools, LBK 917).
In contrast, public schools are highly regulated at both the national
and local level, and municipalities have full responsibility for public
schools (Bogason 2001). The degree of national regulation has increased
during recent years—for instance, through the implementation of
national tests. However, municipalities still have many steering options
(Law on Public Schools, LBK 665).
In Norway, there is also compulsory education and no compulsory
school attendance. Like in Denmark, primary and lower secondary schools
are run by municipalities or nonprofit providers. In the 2013–2014 school
year, there were 195 nonprofit schools in Norway. This represents a
doubling of the number since 2002–2003. However, most of the
schools are quite small. In the same period, the share of pupils in nonprofit
schools had only risen from slightly less than 2% to about 3%
(Utdanningsdirektoratet 2014, 16). Consequently, nonprofit schools are
still a marginal supplier compared to public schools.
To establish a nonprofit school, one must apply to a national direc-
torate. For an application to be approved the school must fulfil certain
criteria; among others, it must represent a ‘recognised’ alternative to
public school—typically by being based on certain pedagogies, religious
faiths or international dimensions. The municipality where the potential
school is located is invited to give its opinion on its establishment, but
the national directorate makes the final decision.
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After their establishment, nonprofit schools are only regulated by
national rules and regulations. Like in Denmark, the school boards have
responsibility and authority over all major aspects of the operation of the
schools, including budgets, hiring and other strategic decisions.
However, Norwegian nonprofit schools are obliged to have objective
criteria for selecting pupils and cannot reject certain pupils. By com-
parison, public schools are integrated into the municipality and are thus
subject to municipal policies and regulations.
Nonprofit schools receive 85% of the funding level of municipal
schools. The schools can thus charge the parents for the remaining 15%,
but no more (Seegaard 2015, 40). The nonprofit schools get their
funding directly from the state, and this money is deducted from the
transfers that municipalities receive from the state. Thus, municipalities
indirectly pay nonprofit schools for their pupils. Each municipality can
decide if it wants to have user choice among the public schools. In all
cases, the pupils are entitled to attend their local public school, but
parents can choose a nonprofit alternative when available.
Sweden is similar to Denmark when it comes to the share of pupils
attending private schools. Thirteen percent of the total number of pupils
attended private (nonprofit or for-profit) schools in 2011. However,
Sweden stands out from the two other countries because of a law that
permits the transfer of profits to owners of primary school services with
public funding. In 2013, the number of private schools was 792, which
means that 16% of the schools were run by a private provider (nonprofit
or for-profit). This number represents an increase compared to the sit-
uation in 2009 (Skolverket 2014). Across a longer time span, the increase
has been even more considerable: At the end of the 1970s, less than 1%
of the children of school age attended private schools (Lindström and
Wijkström 1995, 20). Today, the majority of private authorities are joint
stock companies, while nonprofit organisations play a limited role
(Skolverket 2014).
Developments towards a ‘welfare mix’ in the Swedish primary and
lower secondary school system began in the early 1990s. Before then,
private actors mainly operated in a marginal part of the system—
boarding schools. These schools were allowed by the government since
they could provide an alternative, which the public schools could not.
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In 1992, the non-socialist government had the opinion that parents
should be able to choose between different types of providers. To make
this possible, it was decided that municipalities had to pay private pro-
viders of schools at least 85% of the average cost per pupil attending a
public school (Prop. 1991/92: 25). According to newer legislation,
municipalities must treat public and private schools equally, i.e. private
schools must obtain the same amount of money per pupil as public
schools (Prop. 2008/09: 171).
A prerequisite for obtaining public funding for a private school is
permission by the central state authority, the Swedish Schools
Inspectorate. In the beginning, municipalities had little influence on this
decision by central authorities. At present, municipalities have more
influence but no formal veto on the final decision (Jarl and Rönnberg
2010, 81).
In spite of the differences between the three Scandinavian countries, a
common feature is that approval for the establishment of private schools
is a national task, but the standards and requirements that should be
fulfilled to obtain this approval vary between the countries. Local gov-
ernments do not have a formal say on the number of private schools in
the municipalities, which highly affects steering possibilities in the field.
Freedom of choice is another common feature across the Scandinavian
countries. In Denmark, parents have always had the right to choose
private schools instead of public schools; and in 2002, freedom of choice
among public schools was implemented. In Sweden, user choice was
implemented through ‘Friskolereformen’ in 1992, which also made it
possible to include for-profit actors in the provision of for-profit schools.
In Norway, the possibility of choosing between different public schools
varies between municipalities. However, if a nonprofit school is available,
it is always possible to choose this school instead of a public school.
An important difference is that a common national law regulates all
types of primary and lower secondary schools in Sweden, regardless of the
type of provider. In contrast, nonprofit schools have their own law in
both Denmark and Norway (Seegaard 2015, 94). This fact might be one
of the reasons why conditions for different types of providers vary less in
Sweden than in Denmark and Norway. For instance, private schools in
Norway and Denmark are obliged to charge parental payment to get
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financial support from the state. In Sweden, all types of primary and
lower secondary schools are provided free of charge for the users.
However, there are also some differences between Denmark and Norway,
as private schools have a higher degree of freedom regarding their cur-
riculum and admissions in Denmark than in either Norway or Sweden
(Segaard and Saglie, Chap. 3).
Altogether, in spite of their belonging to the same welfare regime, the
three Scandinavian countries vary in a number of ways when it comes to
the field of schools—regarding both the welfare mix and the national
regulation the field. The following sections will take an empirical and
analytical look into how these differences and similarities between
countries and providers are reflected in the local governing of schools,
with specific focus on elements of control, competition and
collaboration.
The Case Study Design
The analysis will be based on case studies at the municipal level in
Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Seven municipalities were selected for
the case studies, and similar data gathering strategies and interview guides
were used across countries and municipalities. The empirical data consist
of qualitative interviews at both the municipal and school level, com-
bined with written documents. A more detailed description of the
selection of municipalities and schools is provided in the appendix to
Chap. 1 in this book, including an overview of selected municipalities,
schools and interviewees.
In each municipality, at least two schools were selected: One
municipal and one private (nonprofit or for-profit). The case study
design allowed for comparisons between different types of providers in
the same local communities, thus controlling for many contextual fac-
tors. The analytical dimensions in this chapter will be structured, qual-
itative comparisons (Sivesind 2007) of data from interviews with actors
in similar positions between countries and institutional sectors: public,
nonprofit and for-profit schools.
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Local Steering Trends in the Field of Schools
The following analysis will focus on local steering and types of regula-
tions at play in the case municipalities in the field of primary and lower
secondary schools. The analysis will be structured by the three analytical
categories: control, competition and collaboration (Nyhlén 2013), cor-
responding to the three ideal types of governance: hierarchy, market and
network (Jørgensen and Vrangbæk 2004; Meulenman 2008). The focus
in the analysis will primarily be at the municipal level. However, expe-
riences and practices at the school level will also be included.
Elements of Control
When it comes to elements of control in the local governing of schools,
there are large differences across the different types of providers in the
study. In all three countries, municipalities have very few steering pos-
sibilities when it comes to the number of private schools they contain.
Private schools can be established as long as they live up to the national
standards.
In the Danish case, some of the interviewees at the municipal level
considered this lack of control problematic:
They [the nonprofit schools] have become a natural part of the school
system. However, they do give rise to challenges related to steering and
planning. (Administrative leader, DK, 8.10.2013)
In contrast to many other welfare areas, there are no contracts between
municipalities and nonprofit schools; which is, for instance, the case for
nonprofit daycare. Moreover, there are very few restrictions in terms of
inspections, which can either be conducted by the schools themselves or
by an inspector chosen by the schools (LBK 917). The limited control is
also evident in cases where a pupil is expelled from a nonprofit school
and it is up to the municipality to find a suitable alternative. Finally, it
can be a challenge in relation to efficient planning as, for example, when a
nonprofit school is established as a consequence of the closing of a
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municipal school, and the municipality thereby does not achieve any cost
reduction (Interview, administrative leader, DK, 18.12.2013).
In contrast to nonprofit schools, municipalities have a lot more control
of public schools. Although national legislation sets the overall frame-
work, there is still room for municipal steering and control.
Responsibility for the inspection of public schools rests at the national
level. However, municipalities typically make their own quality reports to
document and follow the performance of the public schools (Interviews,
administrative leaders, DK, 8.10.2013, 18.12.2013). Municipalities also
have financial control of public schools and are free to decide both the
number of schools and the limits of school districts. However, the
freedom of choice also limits the degree of municipal control over public
schools. Many parents use their freedom of choice, and there is a high
degree of volatility between the schools. In one of the case municipalities,
56% of the pupils attend their district school, while the rest attend either
a nonprofit school or another public school (Faaborg-Midtfyn kommune
2012). In some cases, this volatility can make it difficult to sustain
schools in less populated areas:
I find it problematic in relation to service in less populated areas, I really do.
Both in the field of schools and in the field of daycare. If many pupils – or
in some cases just a few – choose another school, they remove the basis for a
school or a daycare institution. (Political chair of committee, DK,
4.10.2013)
At a more detailed level, municipalities have the option to promote and
prioritise specific initiatives at the schools: An option that is used in both
case municipalities. In Norway, the municipalities also experience that
the possibility of establishing nonprofit schools can challenge efficient
planning. For instance, it is difficult for the municipalities to save costs
through the closing of small schools if parents choose to establish a
nonprofit school instead:
In the long run we have to look at the school structure in the munici-
pality; it is a question of how small we can become […] It is not like we
necessarily have to close a school, but we can think differently about our
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operation. But then the Montessori phenomenon is awaiting and can take
over, and that becomes an expensive experience. Having two nonpublic
schools in the municipality. (Administrative leader, N, 12.02.2014)
In this particular municipality, Løten in Norway, the nonprofit school has
45 pupils living within the municipality, while the rest come from
neighbouring municipalities. According to the administrative leader, these
45 pupils could easily be integrated in the municipal school with few extra
costs. In Steinkjer, one of the other Norwegian case municipalities, the
municipal government decided to merge two public schools and has
afterwards fought the establishment of a new Montessori school on the
outskirts of the municipality. In this case, the Norwegian national
directorate has so far accepted pleas from the municipality to prevent the
school from being established. This will often be the case if the munici-
pality can plausibly argue that a private school will weaken the basis for the
public school. However, the municipality does not formally have a veto.
The public schools, by comparison, are entirely integrated within the
municipality. Limited only by national regulations, the municipalities
can run their schools as they wish. This includes decisions about school
districts as well as the extent of user choice among public schools. Of the
selected municipalities, Løten has no user choice, while parents in
Steinkjer and Asker are able to choose between schools. In addition, the
municipalities can decide the priorities of the schools. As an example, in
Asker, the municipality has defined 15 detailed measures that the schools
need to report on, in addition to both compulsory national tests and tests
implemented by the municipality. Taken together, these targets and tests
leave little room for local priorities at the schools.
Also in Sweden, municipalities have fewer steering possibilities and less
control of private schools (nonprofit or for-profit) than public schools.
However, the differences in the degree of control between different types
of providers are less evident than in Denmark and Norway. One of the
reasons for this is that all types of schools in Sweden are regulated by the
same law. Highest in the regulation hierarchy is the Education Act, a law
regulating the foundations for the Swedish education system. This act is
followed by curricula adopted at the central level, which regulate the
content of education in more detail. One of the requirements for
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obtaining permission for establishing a school is that it fulfil all the
requirements of the law and curricula. In addition to central steering
through national law and curricula, evaluations are performed by a central
state authority, i.e. the Swedish Schools Inspectorate. This authority has
the most far-reaching mandate since they can shut down a school because
of an inspection. This goes for all schools regardless of provider.
Municipalities are heads of the primary and lower secondary schools, a
task that implies a financial responsibility. The municipality calculates
the price per pupil in a public school, and private schools then receive a
corresponding compensation. In the municipalities investigated, meet-
ings occur between the administration and private schools concerning the
exact figure. However, these meetings do not concern the budget at each
school nor how the money is used for different activities. This is an
important difference compared to meetings held with the public schools,
covering additional aspects. For instance, there is dialogue concerning
areas for improvement at a particular school:
What is good at the school, what is less well and which areas of develop-
ment should be prioritised and how. (Administrative leader, S, 9.4.2015)
It could be asked whether the financial responsibility of the municipality
for private schools actually constitutes a steering tool. According to one
of the politicians interviewed, the national act is very clear on this issue—
compensation should be the same for all types of schools, and therefore
there is not really that much to discuss (Interview, social democratic
politician, S, 9.4.2014).
Besides financial responsibility, municipalities have their own guide-
lines targeting schools. In Östersund, these guidelines include a mandate
that all pupils leaving primary school should be qualified to apply to a
secondary school, that the municipality should have a variety of pro-
grammes, and that staff should have a teaching licence and access to
further education (Östersunds kommun 2013). Similar guidelines exist
in Sollentuna, such as equal treatment of schools regardless of whether
the provider is private or public, that no pupil should be a victim of
bullying, and that a higher share of pupils should have their first choice of
school approved (Sollentuna kommun 2008).
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Formally, the guidelines only apply to public schools. However, in
Sollentuna, private schools have voluntarily chosen to adopt them. In
Östersund, the head administrator simply stated that there are no formal
local guidelines from the municipality that apply to private providers
(Interview, administrative leader, S, 9.4.2015).
In each of the municipalities, schools are also being governed through
local evaluations. However, the target groups vary between municipali-
ties. In Östersund, evaluations performed by the local administration
only cover public schools and their fulfilment of learning requirements
according to central regulation. Additionally, evaluations are made about
what the schools are good at and how better activities can be developed.
Part of this work is based on questionnaires sent out to both pupils and
parents (Interview, administrative leader, S, 9.4.2014).
In Sollentuna, evaluations performed by the municipal administration
targets all schools regardless of provider. One example of this is a
questionnaire sent out to parents concerning the quality of the school.
The result of the evaluation is displayed through the municipality’s own
website, making it possible for citizens to compare different schools
(Interview, conservative politician, 13.12.2013; social democratic
politician, S, 16.12.2013).
Summing up the Swedish case, private schools have the option to
choose whether to follow municipal guidelines or not. Whether public
evaluations only cover public schools or all schools also varies between
the case municipalities. However, municipalities still have less control
over private schools than public schools, specifically when it comes to
financial control and local school priorities. Another important point
from the Swedish case is that there are no differences in the degree of
steering across different types of private providers. Hence, both for-profit
and nonprofit providers are subject to the same regulations.
Experiences at the School Level—Elements
of Control
The differences across providers in relation to elements and the degree of
municipal control are also reflected in the schools’ experiences and
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perceptions. The quote below from a nonprofit school leader in
Denmark shows that this high level of self-determination and potential to
create a school based on specific values, distinct from public schools, is
valued. It is even underlined that it would be appropriate if nonprofit
schools were obliged to develop a distinct profile:
I find the freedom fantastic. I really do. And I do not understand that you
do not want to make other types of demands. For instance, when we have
the privilege of receiving financial support from the state, I think we ought
to have a pedagogical profile where we do something different. (School
leader, nonprofit school, DK, 5.2.2014)
In Norway, nonprofit schools are obliged to have a distinct profile, but
the nonprofit schools still value the low level of control that sometimes
frustrates the municipalities. As one school leader explained:
My experience is that we have a lot of freedom, absolutely. Of course, we
must follow the law, but besides that I think we pretty much have free-
dom when running the school […] we are sort of our own little munic-
ipality, you know. Therefore, it is somewhat different; we do not have a
school director to report to. (School leader, nonprofit school, N,
12.02.2014)
At the same time, this freedom exists within certain confines. According
to national law, the schools must document how they are different from
public schools. In the case above, the school has a Christian foundation.
This framework narrows the amount of freedom in daily operations. As
an example, the school only hires Christian, heterosexual employees.
This demonstrates their level of freedom since a public school could
never have such a policy.
Also in Sweden, private school leaders experience a high degree of
freedom. The perception is that steering primarily comes from the
national level and to a lesser extent from the municipality. One of the
school leaders at a private school in Östersund concluded that there is no
steering taking place, other than the money received from the munici-
pality. Instead, the perception is that the school is almost entirely being
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governed from the central level through laws and regulations (Interview,
school leader, for-profit school, S, 4.4.2014).
The perceptions above, across countries, stand in sharp contrast to the
view held by school leaders at public schools. In Denmark, Norway and
Sweden, the perception is that the level of steering and control from both
the national and local level has increased over recent decades. A school
leader of a public school in Norway described this development:
This has changed a lot since I began. When I became school leader, there
were two and a half people [in the municipal administration] who worked
with school issues, and we had no school manager. Then, everything was
left to us and at the same time, we received little support. Now, we are in a
situation where I personally find that too many people work to support us,
because how it works is that they make a list of how things should be, but
then they do not have to do anything about it, if you see what I mean?
(School leader, public school, N, 21.11.2013)
A school leader in one of the Danish case municipalities described how
too much steering regarding local issues at the school can be problematic,
because it leaves the school with less influence over daily life—for
instance, regarding the completion of practical tasks at the schools.
Earlier, such tasks had been completed by the school itself, but now it
was a municipal task:
Pedagogical leadership also includes the physical environment, and now
we can see that they let the place be run down. We had a very nice new
wooden terrace, but now it is full of water and leaves. Something that you
would never accept at home without doing something about it, but all I
can do is call and call […] It is bad pedagogy towards the children. Why
should they clean up then? (School leader, public school, DK, 9.1.2014).
Also in Sweden, a public school leader described how municipal steering
implies detailed financial regulations on how to spend the budget for
different parts of the operation of the school, leaving the schools with
limited possibilities for local decisions (Interview, school leader, public
school, S, 4.4.2014).
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Summing up—Elements of Control
The results of the analysis of elements of control in the local governing of
primary and lower secondary schools are summarised in Table 5.2.
It is evident in the table that municipalities across Scandinavian
countries have few steering possibilities when it comes to private provi-
ders, regarding both financial and quality control. This is particularly
evident in the Danish and Norwegian cases. The limited degree of control
goes furthest in Denmark, where it is up to nonprofit schools to decide
which pupils to accept. In Sweden, the degree of control is also relatively
low, but the differences between providers are limited by common
national regulation of all types of schools. This also implies that there are
no differences in the municipal steering of nonprofit and for-profit
schools. All schools have the same level of financial resources and have to
live up to the same curriculum. Moreover, the municipal control of pri-
vate schools in Sweden varies between the case municipalities because of
different procedures regarding guidelines and evaluations.
Table 5.2 Elements of control in the local governing of schools





No municipal financial control




Financial control through municipal budgets






No municipal financial control




Financial control through municipal budgets






Limited financial control through municipal
budgets, but no financial supervision




Financial control and quality control through
guidelines and surveys.
High
* Some variation between the municipalities investigated
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In contrast, municipalities exercise a rather high level of control when
it comes to public schools, with respect to both financial control and
quality control. Although national legislation sets the overall framework,
there is still room for municipal steering and control, which takes place in
all three Scandinavian countries. Moreover, the experience has been that
the degree of regulation and control has increased during recent years,
from both the national and local level.
Elements of Competition
Given the freedom of choice between different types of schools, elements
of competition are an inevitable part of the municipal steering of primary
and lower secondary schools in Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
In Denmark, local party programmes in both municipalities reveal
relatively broad support for freedom of choice and various types of
welfare providers. In spite of this and the general respect for the historical
role of nonprofit schools, there has been a lot of focus on quality
development in public schools to prevent parents from deselecting public
schools and to make public schools as attractive as possible:
There is no resistance towards nonprofit schools, but of course politicians
wish to make public schools as attractive as possible to prevent a dese-
lection of public schools. (Administrative leader, DK, 18.12.2014)
The focus on public schools is also evident in local party programmes; in
most of them, nonprofit schools are hardly mentioned, even in
Faaborg-Midtfyn where almost one-third of the pupils attend nonprofit
schools. Both political and administrative leaders underline that
nonprofit schools are seldom discussed politically. As an exception to this
general picture, there was a proposal on one theme day on ‘how to
prevent people from choosing nonprofit schools’. The proposal was not
accepted, and the day ended by focusing on how to profile public schools
(Faaborg-Midtfyn Kommune 2012; Political chair of committee, DK,
4.10.2013). However, the example shows that some politicians find it
problematic that so many parents choose nonprofit schools. The attitude
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towards nonprofit schools varies between political parties. According to
an administrative leader, the classical political divide between left-wing
and right-wing parties can also be identified in the field of schools. The
Liberal and Conservative parties are generally more in favour of nonprofit
schools and freedom of choice than left-wing parties (Interview,
administrative leader, DK, 8.10.2013). However, across interviewees at
the municipal level, there was some scepticism about the special privi-
leges of nonprofit schools. Many interviewees had the opinion that when
nonprofit schools opt for a free status, they cannot expect the same
privileges as public schools. Moreover, some of the interviewees perceived
unequal competition because nonprofit schools are allowed to refuse
pupils, resulting in the risk of an unequal society with A- and B-schools
(Interview, administrative leader, DK, 8.10.2013).
Also in Norway, nonprofit schools receive very limited attention in
local party programmes. Primary and lower secondary schools are one of
the core tasks of the municipalities, and therefore all programmes have
policies for public schools. However, in all municipalities, only a
minority of the parties mention the nonprofits. According to the inter-
viewees at the municipal level, the only time the city councils debates
about nonprofit schools is when the municipality is asked to voice its
view on the establishment of a new school. One of the founders of the
nonprofit school in Steinkjer experienced a negative attitude from the
municipality when the school was in the process of being established 10
years ago:
When we came up with the idea of establishing something in direct
competition with the public providers, then the attitudes changed. That
was a big surprise really […] There was so much opposition to this.
(Founder, nonprofit school, N, 13.02.2014)
It is evident from this statement that the founders experienced intense
opposition to the establishment of their nonprofit school. Today, how-
ever, the school has been functioning for 10 years and, due to its limited
size, its existence has not prompted the municipality or the public
schools to change their behaviour. The following statement from an
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administrative leader in Steinkjer illustrates how the municipality sees
nonprofit schools:
We think they are a good supplement. I absolutely think there is nothing
negative about it. It is most important that the children learn and do well
at the Montessori school. That is the most important: the individual child.
It is no point for me that all shall attend the public school. I just want it
[the public school] to be good enough, so that no one wants to leave it.
That is what I want. I think it is great that we have such a school, with
regard to happy living. We might attract some [new residents] because we
have an alternative to the public school. (Administrative leader, N,
20.02.2014)
This quote shows that municipalities want to offer high standards in
order not to lose pupils. At the same time, the leader recognises that the
nonprofit school offers something different, which can be attractive for
some citizens.
As in Denmark, municipalities in Sweden cannot influence the degree
of privatisation within education. If a private provider chooses to
establish a school, they are free to do so, as long as the central authority
grants their application. Nevertheless, the Swedish case municipalities
cope with this new context of marketisation in different ways. These
differences may reflect different degrees of political support for privati-
sation evident in the two municipalities.
In Östersund, the majority is foremost represented by the Social
Democratic Party, and as such, the municipality has a negative attitude
towards private providers within education. Every time the question of
the establishment of a private school has been discussed in the committee
of education, the Social Democratic Party has been against it. The chair
of the committee declared in an interview that were his party to decide,
only one alternative would be evident—the public one (Interview, social
democratic politician, S, 9.4.2014). However, municipalities cannot stop
the establishment of private schools, as long as they are approved by
national authorities. The non-socialist parties in the committee hold the
opposite view. According to a member of the committee representing the
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Liberal Party, there should be more private providers and alternatives to
choose from (Interview, liberal politician, S, 9.4.2014).
In Sollentuna, a municipality governed by non-socialist parties, the
majority is clearly in favour of freedom of choice, while the opposition
parties are more reluctant. The chair of the committee for education,
representing the Moderates (Conservative Party), stated that the majority
of members within the committee welcome new providers of schools to
Sollentuna. The most important goal for them is that schools within the
municipality have good quality regardless of provider (Interview, con-
servative politician, S, 13.12.2013).
The opposition parties are more hesitant about privatisation.
A member of the committee, representing the Social Democratic Party,
remarked that their position depends on the situation in each district of
the municipality. If a new private school would pose a threat to an
existing public one, then the party would vote ‘no’ (Interview, social
democratic politician, S, 16.12.2013).
Different attitudes towards the welfare mix in Östersund and
Sollentuna might have consequences for the practice of freedom of
choice. In Sollentuna, the system of freedom of choice is promoted more
clearly than in Östersund through a special website. During January and
February each year, every parent makes a choice of school, regardless of
the type of provider, on the municipality’s website. Connected to this site
are surveys which allow parents and pupils to compare different alter-
natives regardless of provider.
In Östersund, there are no similarities to the system practiced in
Sollentuna. Instead, pupils automatically receive a place at the public
school closest to their home (i.e. the proximity principle). If pupils and
their parents prefer a private alternative, they must make a direct
application to that particular school. In March each year, the private
schools inform the municipality of how many and which pupils they
have accepted. This makes it possible for the municipal administration to
adjust their figures for the number of pupils in public schools.
In sum, Sollentuna actively promotes the system of freedom of choice,
while Östersund practises a more traditional model in which pupils are
placed at schools according to the principle of proximity. An interpre-
tation of this difference is that Sollentuna acts as a facilitator of freedom
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of choice, making it easier for their citizens to compare, and then choose
an appropriate school. The method practiced in Östersund, on the other
hand, indicates that the municipality perceives itself as one type of
provider on a competitive market, rather than as a facilitator of freedom
of choice.
Experiences at the School Level—Elements
of Competition
When it comes to experiences at the schools regarding elements of
competition, the study shows some differences between the Scandinavian
countries. In both Denmark and Sweden, the perception of the schools is
that there is a competitive situation between them, particularly in areas
with many schools within a limited geographical area.
In the Danish case, nonprofit schools see the primary focus of their
municipalities to be on public schools, while very little attention is paid
to them, even in Faaborg-Midtfyn, a municipality with a very high share
of pupils in nonprofit schools:
Politically, we do not have first priority here in the municipality. (Board
member, nonprofit school, DK, 12.2.2014)
No, we would be lying, if we said so. It is evident that public schools are
given greater priority. (Board member, nonprofit school, DK, 12.2.2014)
Yes, and especially here in the local community, we attract the same pupils
as the public school. It is not very popular in the municipality that we
attract so many pupils. (Board member, nonprofit school, DK, 12.2.2014)
The interviews clearly indicate that the nonprofit schools would like to be
a more valued part of the school system in the municipality, and that the
competitive situation is one of the reasons why municipalities pay very
little attention to nonprofit schools. The interviews also show that
nonprofit schools are very focused on being a high-quality alternative to
the public schools.
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Also in Sweden, all school leaders are well aware of the competition
taking place between units. This is particularly evident at those schools
that have or have had problems with attracting or keeping pupils. At one
of the private schools in Sollentuna, the school leader believed that
proximity was the most important factor when choosing a school.
However, reputation was another important factor, with a negative or
positive impact on the number of applicants (Interview, school leader,
for-profit school, 3.4.2014). At one of the private schools in Östersund,
pupils come from all parts of town. According to the school leader
interviewed, this is due to the reputation of the school:
People know the good environment, the good teachers, who work here
and the results of it. (School leader, for-profit school, S, 4.4.2014)
Because of this reputation, there is no need to advertise for the school and
its activities. At one of the public schools in the same town, there has
been an outflow of pupils to private alternatives. To better understand
this development, the school carried out a survey about the parents’
motives for changing the school for their child. Many of the parents
responded that they did not believe the public school was good enough
for their child due to insufficient quality. The public school responded by
not only improving quality, but also by improving communication about
pedagogical activities taking place and the ideas behind them (Interview,
school leader, public school, S, 4.4.2014). These examples show that the
competitive situation can influence priorities locally at the schools.
The Norwegian case stands out from the other Scandinavian countries
when it comes to the schools’ perception of and experiences with com-
petition. Neither the nonprofit nor the public schools perceived the other
schools as competitors. For the public schools, the nonprofit schools are
not big enough to pose a threat, as they cannot attract sufficient numbers
of pupils to challenge the public schools. The nonprofit schools do not
have the same natural pool of pupils who attend the school because they
live close by, but they still do not experience competition—for instance
as stated by this school leader of the Waldorf School:
5 Local Governing of Schools in Scandinavia … 183
I do not see our school as in a competition because we constitute a niche.
We use an entirely different curriculum, we are an alternative, and for me
that is motivation enough. Because I think we have a right to exist, since
we are an alternative that I have experienced through many years has been
important for many people. And I see no reason why we should not in the
future continue to be important for many people. Not all, but for many,
in sum over time, there are many people who have experienced crucial
positive development by being able to choose something different from
the public school. Not because the public school has been bad, but
because this school has been suitable for them. (School leader, nonprofit
school, N, 10.12.2013)
According to this claim, the degree of competition is perceived to be low
because the nonprofit school represents a niche that attracts other types
of pupils. This example shows that a high level of distinctiveness between
providers might limit the level of competition.
Summing up—Elements of Competition
The results of the analysis of elements and degree of competition are
summarised in Table 5.3.
Parents’ option to choose between different types of schools will often
lead to a certain level of competition. As the table shows, elements of
competition in the field of schools are evident in both Denmark and
Sweden. In Denmark, the municipalities actively seek to promote public
schools to prevent deselection. The competitive situation is also experi-
enced by the schools—in particular in one of the case municipalities,
Table 5.3 Elements of competition in the local governing of schools
Elements of competition Degree of
competition
Denmark Municipal strategy for promoting public schools Medium
Norway Nonprofit schools do not challenge public schools,
but cater to different segments
Low
Sweden Schools experience competition regardless of
municipality and type of provider. The role of the
municipal administration in this competition differs
Medium
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where the geographical distance between the schools was limited. Also in
Sweden, both municipalities and schools are aware of the competitive
situation. However, the municipalities deal with the situation in different
ways. While one of the municipalities actively promotes freedom of
choice, the other municipality has a more passive approach. Interestingly,
the degree of competition is far lower in Norway, where the perception at
both levels is that nonprofit schools do not pose a threat to public
schools, because of both their limited size and their distinctiveness.
Elements of Collaboration
Across the Scandinavian countries, the analysis shows that the degree of
collaboration between municipalities and private schools is very limited,
while there is more collaboration when it comes to public schools.
However, there are some differences between the countries, regarding
both the content and level of collaboration.
In the Danish case, elements of collaboration between municipalities
and nonprofit schools are very limited in both municipalities, according
to the administrative leaders. Due to state funding of the schools, there
are no financial relations between nonprofit schools and the municipal-
ities, and none of the municipalities have formal meetings with repre-
sentatives from nonprofit schools (Interviews, administrative leaders,
DK, 8.10.2013, 18.12.2013). The limited degree of collaboration is
closely related to lack of steering possibilities and control in relation to
nonprofit schools. Their possibilities for influencing the schools are very
limited, which, from a municipal point of view, might minimise the
motivation for collaboration. Specifically, at a time when limited finan-
cial resources are available:
When a municipality has to plan efficient services in all fields – including
schools – and we really need to do that in these years – it is a big challenge
that one-third of the pupils are attending schools where we do not have
any influence at all. (Administrative leader, DK, 8.10.2013)
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In contrast, there is a much higher degree of collaboration between
municipalities and public schools—for instance, through formal leader
meetings. One of the municipalities even has a common school council,
where school boards from all schools in the municipalities are repre-
sented. According to the administrative leaders, the municipalities strive
to involve the schools in important decisions—for instance, in the
restructuring of school districts, the closing of schools, etc. (Interviews,
administrative leaders, DK, 8.10.2013, 18.12.2013).
In Norway, collaboration between municipalities and nonprofit
schools is also limited, apart from practical issues associated with the
transportation of pupils as well as on decisions regarding extra resources
to pupils with special needs. These pupils are assessed by municipal
professionals, who decide whether special attention or extra resources
should be provided. When the professionals make such a decision, the
pupils are entitled to these resources at their schools and the municipality
must pay, regardless of whether it is a public or nonprofit school.
This latter point can make it difficult for municipalities to plan their
costs. One administrative leader talked about this issue and concluded
that nonpublic schools are ‘a hassle and annoyance’ (Interview, admin-
istrative leader, N, 12.02.2014). These steering challenges can be one
explanation for the limited degree of collaboration.
However, some politicians actively embrace the nonprofit schools. The
Conservative Party in Asker stated that it will ‘develop cooperation with
the nonprofits’. Challenged about how they would do this, their repre-
sentative admitted that the tasks of the municipality are to ‘make the
operating conditions good enough so the schools want to continue. Yes,
what we say is that we want to be positive towards the schools’
(Interview, conservative politician, N, 22.10.2013). The inability of the
politician to mention substantive steps the municipality could take to
‘develop cooperation with nonprofits’ illustrates the limited potential for
collaboration between nonprofit schools and municipalities in Norway.
The nonprofit schools provide schooling to a marginal fraction of citi-
zens, and most interaction between the schools and the municipality is
demanded and regulated by law.
However, one formal bond is that all nonprofit schools—according to
the law—must have a school board responsible for their operation; and a
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representative from the municipality must be on the school board. This
representative does not hold a vote but is entitled to meet and speak at all
meetings. This representative is normally a politician involved in the
school sector. This policy functions differently between the schools
depending on the interest and efforts of individual politicians. The
schools, therefore, report that some representatives are hardly ever seen at
board meetings, while others make constructive contributions to the
discussions.
Overall, there is little voluntary cooperation between nonprofit schools
and the municipality. According to the analysis, this limited degree of
collaboration can be explained by the lack of obvious areas for collabo-
ration as well as the steering challenges experienced by the municipal
actors. In contrast, collaboration between municipalities and public
schools is more developed and includes both formal networks and
meetings between school leaders and municipal administrators.
In Sweden, collaboration between municipalities and private schools is
more common than in Denmark and Norway, although its level and
content vary between the two case municipalities. In one of the
municipalities, Sollentuna, private schools are included in several aspects.
Three of the most striking examples of this have already been mentioned:
First, the inclusion of private schools on a special website where citizens
can make their own choice of school. Second, private schools have
chosen to adopt local guidelines, which is a sort of collaboration with the
municipality. Third, all schools in Sollentuna participate in a quality
survey—targeting both parents and pupils—carried out by the
municipality.
An additional element is the quality project Våga visa! (Dare to show!),
which covers all schools. The project consists of school visits performed by
teachers or other pedagogical leaders from neighbouring municipalities.
Through these visits, attention is paid to how schools are working with
different parts of national regulation such as learning, grading, norms and
values, and pupils’ influence. The information obtained from these visits
is documented in a report summarising the strengths and weaknesses of
the school (Interview, conservative politician, S, 13.12.2013).
Collaborations such as these do not exist in Östersund, but coopera-
tion between public and private schools is not entirely absent.
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According to the Education Act, all pupils should be ensured access to
school nurses and counsellors. In Östersund, private schools do not
provide for this on their own, since they have been granted access to the
public system. This is an important form of collaboration between pri-
vate and public schools which does not exist in Sollentuna (Interview,
school leader, nonprofit school, S, 8.4.2014).
In both municipalities, there is dialogue between the administration
and the schools; for instance, on budget issues. This dialogue takes place
in regard to all types of schools, but seems to be more comprehensive
between the municipal administration and public schools. For example,
in Sollentuna, all school leaders from public schools meet within a
working group referred to as Rektorsgruppen to discuss joint efforts
(Interview, school leader, S, 16.1.2014). A similar dialogue takes place
between the administration and the public schools in Östersund. This
indicates that the collaborative ties—also in the Swedish case—are
stronger when it comes to public schools.
Experiences at the School Level—Elements
of Collaboration
Also at the school level, the picture from the analysis above is clear. In all
three countries, public school leaders perceive a higher degree of col-
laboration than private school leaders.
In the Danish case, nonprofit schools feel that a collaborative attitude
on the part of the municipalities is limited. For instance, nonprofit
schools do not have equal opportunities for attending municipal semi-
nars, and relevant information, such as information about changes in bus
timetables, does not always reach them (Interview, school leader,
nonprofit school, DK, 9.1.2014). On the other hand, one of the public
schools has the opinion that nonprofit schools receive too many of the
same opportunities as public schools, since they do not have the same
obligations (Interview, school leader, public school, DK, 9.1.2014).
A similar picture can be seen in Norway, where nonprofit schools feel
ignored by the municipalities. They are in many instances not cooper-
atively included. Sometimes this is natural, since they operate on
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different terms, but all of the nonprofit schools would have preferred
closer ties to the municipality (Interview, school leader, nonprofit school,
N, 24.4.2014).
In Sweden, there are different views on the extent to which collabo-
ration takes place with the municipal administration. In Östersund, a
meeting with the administration is held twice a year. During these
meetings, a discussion takes place on issues such as financial compen-
sation and collaboration on health care for pupils (Interviews, school
leaders, for-profit, S, 4.4.2014; nonprofit, S, 4.8.2014). In Sollentuna,
similar meetings take place between the private school and the admin-
istration. Additionally, collaboration includes other types of activities,
such as surveys and quality projects like Våga visa! (Interview, school
leader, for-profit, S, 3.4.2014). Private schools in Sweden experience a
more collaborative attitude from the municipalities than nonprofit
schools in Denmark and Norway.
In all three countries, municipalities appear to have a more collabora-
tive attitude when it comes to public schools. School leaders of public
schools believe that they are a more integrated part of the municipality
than leaders of private schools. However, in the Danish case, the extent to
which public schools actually feel involved and heard in decisions made by
the municipalities, varies. In one of the municipalities, the public school
perceives a limited degree of responsiveness, while there is a higher degree
of satisfaction in the other municipality (Interviews, school leaders, DK,
9.1.2014, 14.3.2014; board members, DK, 26.2.2014, 30.4.2014).
Summing up—Elements of Collaboration
The results of the analysis of elements and degree of collaboration in the
local governing of primary and lower secondary schools are summarised
in Table 5.4.
As the table shows, the overall result of the analysis is that collabo-
ration between municipalities and private schools is limited in all three
countries. In Denmark, there are no formal meetings and limited con-
tact, while in Norway there are few meeting points. Sweden stands out
from the other countries by having some degree of collaboration between
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municipalities and private schools. However, the content and degree of
collaboration vary between the case municipalities. A number of factors
can explain the limited degree of collaboration: For instance, the limited
formal bonds and limited municipal opportunities for controlling and
influencing the field of private schools. The competitive situation in
some of the countries as well as financial pressures are also possible
explanations. On the other hand, municipalities have more formal bonds
to public schools. They are an integrated part of the municipal admin-
istration and therefore naturally collaborate more with the municipalities
through formal meetings and networks.
The Field of Schools—Between Control,
Choice and Room for Distinctiveness
What are the similarities and differences across countries and types of
providers when it comes to municipal steering and regulation in the field
of schools? What are the consequences for the schools? And finally, does
Table 5.4 Elements of collaboration in local governing of schools





No formal meetings and limited contact Low
Public
schools




Few meeting points Low
Public
schools




Formal meetings, common guidelines*, common





Formal meetings and networks Medium
* Some variation between municipalities investigated
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the legislation and regulations promote or inhibit distinctive profiles at
the schools?
The answer to these questions will provide the basis for a discussion of
possible implications for future welfare provision in the field of schools in
Scandinavia. Although the results of the case studies not necessarily can
be generalised to all municipalities and schools in the three countries, the
strength of the analysis is the in-depth character of the data, making it
possible to identify mechanisms between the regulatory frameworks and
the actions and experiences at the local level.
The overall picture from the analysis is that there are profound dif-
ferences in the local governing of primary and lower secondary schools
across private and public providers in the case municipalities. Moreover,
national legislation is to a large extent reflected in the local governing of
and attitudes towards different types of schools.
When it comes to elements related to control, there are similar trends
across the Scandinavian countries. In general, administrative supervision
in private schools is limited compared to public schools. Because of the
national approval of private schools, municipalities have less direct
control over them and limited steering possibilities, across all three
countries. This goes furthest in Denmark and Norway, where munici-
palities have neither financial control nor quality control when it comes
to nonprofit schools. It is up to national authorities to make sure that
public support is used for educational purposes. In Sweden, municipal-
ities have limited control through municipal budgets, but no control over
the economy of private schools. They do have some potential control
through different types of guidelines. However, it is voluntary for schools
to join the common guidelines. Therefore, the extent of quality control
varies between the Swedish municipalities.
These differences leave varying room for distinctiveness between the
countries. The room for distinctiveness is particularly large in Denmark
and Norway but less so in Sweden, where the same law regulates all
schools. The municipal role in the national approval process also varies.
In both Norway and Sweden, municipalities are heard when a private
actor wishes to establish a school in the municipality, yet they have no
veto power. In Denmark, it is an entirely national process.
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The limited degree of control is to some extent reflected in sceptical
attitudes towards nonprofit schools from the municipal point of view.
Again, this holds particularly true for Denmark and Norway. In spite of
overall support for nonprofit schools, there is frustration regarding the
steering challenges experienced. This is less evident in the Swedish case,
where attitudes towards private schools are more a result of ideological
positions than practical steering challenges. These ideological positions
are also evident in Denmark, but to a lower extent than in Sweden,
probably because of the opportunities for for-profit providers in Sweden
and the long historical tradition of nonprofit providers in Denmark.
When it comes to elements of competition, there are some overall
differences between the three countries. First, freedom of choice between
all schools is defended by national legislation in both Denmark and
Sweden. In Norway, opportunities for choice between public schools are
largely a municipal decision, while it has always been possible to choose
between public schools and nonprofit schools. Therefore, it is also pos-
sible to have competition in municipalities that—as in one of the case
municipalities—have not implemented freedom of choice.
However, in the Norwegian case, the argument is that public and
nonprofit schools attract different segments of the population and that
there is, therefore, a low degree of competition and no municipal
attempts to attract more pupils to public schools in the case munici-
palities. In contrast, there are clear signs of political interest in promoting
public schools in both case municipalities in Denmark. In spite of general
support for nonprofit schools, preventing the deselection of public
schools is a primary ambition. In Sweden, municipalities are also aware of
the competitive situation. However, the two case municipalities reacted
in very different ways: One of the municipalities reacted by promoting
transparency for parents in their choice of schools, while the other
promoted public schools, similar to the Danish case municipalities.
Across the three Scandinavian countries, elements of collaboration are
much more widespread in the relationship between municipalities and
public schools than nonprofit schools. This is not surprising as public
schools are a part of the municipal structure. There are, however, some
differences across countries. The tendency is that collaboration between
private schools and municipalities is closer in Sweden than in Norway
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and Denmark, where collaboration is very limited in the cases studied.
However, also in Sweden, there is large variation across the case
municipalities. In one of the municipalities, collaboration is limited to
formal meetings, while there is more collaboration in the other munic-
ipality—for instance, through common guidelines and common surveys.
The case studies also show that the trends identified at the municipal
level are to a large extent reflected at the school level. In all three
countries, private providers perceive a large degree of freedom regarding
the running of the schools, and this freedom is highly valued. In contrast,
public schools experience a high and increasing degree of control,
especially from the national level, but—particularly in Denmark—at the
local level as well, although this varies between the case municipalities.
Regarding elements of competition, this is clearly experienced at the
school level in both Denmark and Sweden. Whether the schools just
accept the situation as it is or take specific actions to attract new pupils
varies. In the Norwegian case municipalities, neither the schools nor the
municipalities perceive nonprofit schools as competitors. However, this
might be different in other local communities where private schools make
particular public schools redundant.
Finally, regarding collaboration, perceptions are very similar to per-
ceptions at the municipal level: Collaborative relations are more wide-
spread when it comes to public schools than private schools. Nonprofit
schools in both Denmark and Norway would like to have closer relations
with their municipalities than is currently the case. In contrast, private
schools in Sweden do have formal meetings with the municipality; and in
one of the municipalities, private schools have voluntarily chosen to
participate in more collaborative activities.
Altogether, the analysis shows important similarities between the three
countries: Among the most important of these is the fact that the degree
of municipal control is much lower when it comes to private schools than
public schools. Another common trend is that there is a higher degree of
collaboration between municipalities and public schools than nonprofit
schools. However, there are also important differences, indicating that
variation in national legislation, as described in detail in Chap. 3, is to a
large extent reflected in actions and attitudes at the local level, in terms of
both the municipal level and school level.
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First, sector distinctiveness varies between the countries. Sweden is the
most marketised of the three Scandinavian countries given its opportu-
nities for for-profit providers to establish schools. At the same time,
Sweden has the largest degree of control and regulation over private
schools, supporting the theoretical assumption that more market creates
more regulation (Dølvik et al. 2015, 106). Second, the analysis shows a
larger focus on equal services in Sweden than in Denmark and Norway,
where nonprofit schools are often based on specific principles or values.
In Norway, distinctiveness is even a criterion for establishing a nonprofit
school. This leaves private schools in Sweden with less room for dis-
tinctiveness than in Norway and Denmark, which makes it more difficult
for citizens to make an active choice between services with distinctive
profiles. In relation to this, it is interesting that there are no significant
differences between for-profit and nonprofit providers in Sweden when it
comes to the local governing of schools.
Possible reasons for the identified differences across the Scandinavian
countries can be found in different historical legacies. Both in Norway
and Denmark, there has been a long historical tradition of nonprofit
schools (Ibsen and Habermann 2006; Thuen and Tveit 2013). This
historical tendency towards autonomy has remained very strong in spite
of overall trends towards more regulation. In Sweden, the vast majority
of primary and lower secondary schools has been under government
control for many decades (Lundström and Wijkström 1995, 20); and
until the 1990s, private schools only played a minimal role. The his-
torical weight of equality in the Swedish welfare state (Bunar 2010, 56),
together with newer trends of market principles, have been dominating
the field of schools in Sweden, leaving less room for distinctiveness.
Altogether, the local governing of schools in Scandinavia does not
show any clear signs of collaborative steering relations—at least not in the
sense of dialogue and learning relations, which are some of the central
characteristics of collaborative governance (Donahue and Zeckhauser
2011). Although the national steering of private providers can be char-
acterised as indirect steering, where both the state and private providers
influence the service provision (Segaard and Saglie, Chap. 3), collabo-
rative steering relations at the local level are very limited. In relation to
private schools, there is very limited collaboration, especially in Denmark
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and Norway, but also less control, leaving room for distinctiveness.
When it comes to public schools, the control-based regime seems to be
dominating, but there are elements of involvement and dialogue between
municipalities and public schools.
The results of the analysis show a number of trade-offs worth dis-
cussing in relation to the implications of different types of welfare mix
and local governing of different types of providers. These issues clearly
show that the local governing of schools takes place in a complex mix of
logics and tools from state, market and civil society.
First, there is a trade-off between the autonomy of schools and col-
laboration between schools and municipalities, particularly evident in
Denmark and Norway. On the one hand, private schools value their
independence and potential for developing a distinct profile. On the
other hand, they would like to have more collaboration with the
municipalities and be more accepted as alternative providers. In Sweden,
private schools are to a larger extent integrated into the school system,
but they also have less autonomy. However, there are local variations in
the extent to which private schools are integrated.
Second, there is a related trade-off between equivalent quality and
distinctiveness. Part of the reason why nonprofit schools are not fully
accepted as an integrated part of the school system in Danish and
Norwegian municipalities seems to be the clash between strong norms
for equivalent quality and strong norms for autonomy and distinctive-
ness. In Sweden, another path has been chosen: A heavy focus on
equivalent quality and services, resulting in less room for distinctiveness.
Third, there is a trade-off between autonomy and accountability.
When schools have a high degree of autonomy, tools for accountability
are limited, which is the case in Norway and Denmark. Again, the
situation in Sweden is different, because all schools are subject to the
same law and have to follow the same national curriculum. This creates
better possibilities for accountability, but less room for autonomy
(Gustafsson et al. 2016, 56).
These points are interesting to discuss in relation to the role played by
nonprofit actors in welfare services. The nonprofit sector is often—and
has historically been—seen as a ‘field of experimentation’ and as provi-
ders of distinct, innovative and specialised services (Weisbrod 1977;
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Anheier 2009, 1092; Mariani and Cavanego 2013). However, possibil-
ities for experimentation vary due to the level of control, and control is
often implemented to ensure a legitimate accountability structure (Smith
and Grønbjerg 2006).
The issues above are also relevant for the arguments surrounding the
implementation of freedom of choice. One of the arguments is that
citizens should be able to choose between different types of services
(Petersen and Hjelmar 2013, 6). However, if the level of control is too
high, it is clearly more difficult to have providers with a high degree of
distinctiveness (Gustafsson et al. 2016, 48, 56). This paradox is partic-
ularly evident in the Swedish case: Although Sweden is the most mar-
ketised of the three countries, it is also the country with the least room
for distinctiveness. With such a limited potential for distinctiveness, it
can be debated whether citizens actually have real opportunities for
choice which is a relevant point in the discussion of possibilities for active
citizenship.
The country-specific differences above can be related to the fact that
some of the Swedish private schools are run by for-profit actors, while all
alternatives in Denmark and Norway are nonprofit schools. According to
the classic literature, the non-distributional constraint is likely to create
trust in nonprofit organisations (Hanssmann 1987), which might lead to
lower demands for accountability. However, the high level of autonomy
for nonprofit schools in Denmark and Norway also has to be seen in light
of the long historical tradition of nonprofit organisations in these
countries (Henriksen and Bundesen 2004; Ibsen and Habermann 2006;
Thuen and Tveit 2013).
Altogether, the results of the case studies show that local governing in
the field of primary schools largely reflects national legislation in the field.
Moreover, local governing has clear implications for the local perceptions
and actions of the schools. Finally, it is evident that there are large
differences in the local governing of schools across public and private
providers; to some extent, there are also variations between the three
Scandinavian countries in spite of their other similarities, especially when
it comes to the type of welfare regime. However, the results also suggest
the institutional sector does not alone create the differences between the
different types of providers. The complex interplay between regulation,
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funding and norms in the field are also of crucial importance. Together
with local governing, national legislation has a large impact on the
potential for distinctive services, accountability, equal quality and equal
competition in the field of schools in Scandinavia. The balance between
these elements is central to discuss in the future development of the
welfare state in the three countries. In the concluding chapter, the
importance of institutional legacies and political strategies for regulating
the welfare mix and the distinctiveness of for-profit and nonprofit services
will be further discussed.
Notes
1. www.friskoler.dk
2. In practice, this payment refers to a repayment of the block grant
municipalities receive for each school-seeking child in the municipality
(www.friskoler.dk).
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The preceding chapters in this volume have documented how welfare
services in Scandinavia are changing. An insight gleaned from the
chapters by Sivesind and Segaard and Saglie is how marketisation,
national legislation and regulation are important drivers behind changes
in the welfare mix—the composition of public, for-profit and nonprofit
providers. In this chapter, I am concerned with how the users of services
funded by the public sector are affected by the different providers in the
welfare mix. By taking the perspective of the citizen, I document through
a comparative case study analysis how the institutional sector of the
provider and the use of policy instruments have relevance at the ground
level of services.
A fundamental principle in western understandings of democracy is
that citizens are different in all sorts of ways, and that these differences are
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important for the organisation of society but have no relevance when it
comes to the right of all citizens to have autonomy and control over their
own lives (Olsen 1990, 24). This is a fundamental feature of the
Scandinavian citizenship model, where moving power as close as possible
to the citizen is considered ideal (Hernes 1988; Andersen and Hoff
2001). Expectations of citizens, however, have been continuously
growing over recent decades (Rothstein 1994, 232; Hvinden and
Johansson 2007b).
In the face of the documented changes in governance tools and the
welfare mix, it is vital to identify how Scandinavian users of public,
for-profit and nonprofit providers differentially control their lives when
they use public services. In developed welfare states, citizens have
extensive interactions with welfare providers. Their ability to control
their own lives in these meetings is, therefore, an important part of their
citizenship (Andersen and Rossteutscher 2007). This aspect of service
quality is a high priority in political documents on welfare policy in all
Scandinavian countries (Rostgaard 2015, 4).
The concept of active citizenship can be used to analyse the conse-
quences of welfare policy for individuals or groups in society (Hoskins
2014; Jensen and Pfau-Effinger 2005). The concept goes beyond a tra-
ditional understanding of citizenship that primarily emphasised social
rights and entitlements (Marshall 1950). It emphasises possibilities for
active participation through representative democracy, civil society and
freedom of choice (Hvinden and Johansson 2007a). Analytically, I use
the concept of active citizenship as a way of looking at the opportunities
citizens have to use choice before they become users, empowerment as
users at institutions and participation as users in local policy processes
that frame operations at the institutions. Based on this analytic approach,
the central questions of this chapter are: Do citizens exercise active cit-
izenship differently in public, for-profit and nonprofit service providers?
if so, what can explain it?
In this chapter, active citizenship is examined at institutions at the
local level. Municipalities are instrumental in providing welfare services
to citizens in Scandinavia to the extent that the welfare model has been
said to be based on ‘welfare municipalities’ (Kröger 1997; Kjølsrød
2005). I compare the experiences of users of municipal primary and
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lower secondary school and nursing homes in Norway, Denmark and
Sweden. Through these comparative case studies, I examine the differ-
ences between the three institutional sectors: public, for-profit and
nonprofit. I also compare the consequences of different conditions
regarding the governing structures that were analysed in the preceding
chapters focusing on schools and nursing homes. Therefore, in addition
to the institutional sectors, the cases were selected to make it possible to
compare across countries and service areas. For further information about
the selection of cases, see Chap. 1.
Studies of increased marketisation and changes in the welfare mix have
often focused on efficient provision and economic savings for the public
purse (Domberger and Jensen 1997; Hood and Dixon 2015), or on
different forms of quality such as the number of staff and use of physical
restraints in elderly care (Comondore et al. 2009), and test scores in
schools (Hanushek et al. 2013). Relevant to this study is research that
shows how marketisation and changes in the welfare mix have impacted
the relationship between citizens and the state (Clarke 2006; Clarke et al.
2007), as well as how Scandinavian countries are particularly exposed to
such changes due to their tradition of universal public services (Anttonen
and Meagher 2013; Kröger 1997). Judgments about the consequences of
marketisation vary. Some studies have warned of deteriorating solidarity
between and powerlessness of users when faced with market entrepre-
neurs (Christensen 2012; Eriksen and Weigård 1993). Others have
pointed that the potential users have to achieve more control when they
obtain consumer or customer rights (Rothstein 1998; Kumlin 2004).
The relevance of using an active citizenship approach to study this
issue is accentuated by a report from the Norwegian Centre for Human
Rights, which documents breaches of human rights in Norwegian
nursing homes. The report identified users’ inability to make their voices
heard as one explanation for unsatisfactory action to improve the
citizen-rights situation (Norsk senter for menneskerettigheter 2014).
Given that user power and opportunities for active citizenship are
important for the quality of services, I examine these aspects in light of
the local governance of services and the use of providers from different
institutional sectors. To set the stage for this discussion, the following
section presents and subsequently operationalises the analytic concept of
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active citizenship. The empirical approach used in this chapter overlaps
with that used in the preceding two chapters, but a short reminder is also
included before the analysis is presented.
Active Citizenship
Active citizenship is a contested concept that scholars and policymakers
have used in a number of different ways (Hoskins 2014). Before using
active citizenship as an analytic tool, it is necessary to first establish the
concept in relation to the existing uses of the term, and to show how it is
useful for the analytic purposes of this chapter.
Within the context of local service delivery, the content of publicly
financed services is decided by actors in three different roles: the user and
their next of kin, the staff and leaders at the institutions and the poli-
cymakers and administrators at the municipal level (Daly and Lewis
2000, 287). Users and their next of kin can influence the content of
services in meetings with both staff and managers, as well as with poli-
cymakers and administrators at the municipal level. An analytic approach
based on the capacity users have to exercise an active citizenship role can
deepen understanding of these relations.
I use the concept of active citizenship to analyse services from the
perspective of users (i.e. citizens) and to map how users can control and
influence their lives when using public services. The extent to which
users can influence their own lives is directly related to their potential to
influence services at three different levels. First, if and how they can
choose a provider before they become users. This choice also includes the
option to change providers. Second, if and how they can influence the
institution’s services while they are users. Third, if and how they can
influence the municipality that sets the frames for the service provider.
Based on this tripartite understanding of users’ capacity to control their
lives in relation to service providers, I develop three dimensions of active
citizenship in order to analyse differences in the capacity for active citi-
zenship for users (and their next of kin) of public, for-profit and non-
profit welfare services: choice, empowerment and participation.
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Investigating the experiences users have when interacting with welfare
providers can provide insight into the functioning of the welfare model in
terms of the autonomy of citizens, the division of labour, responsibility
and influence. The concept of active citizenship allows us to evaluate
these features or functions from the users’ point of view (Jensen and
Pfau-Effinger 2005; Boje and Potucek 2011b). Although hailed as a
universal and solidary welfare regime, the Nordic welfare states are also
remarkably individualistic in the sense that different welfare instruments
are consistently based on individual autonomy (Trägårdh 1997, 253).
The welfare programmes are tied to individuals, and through them the
state seeks to give individuals autonomy from alternative structures such
as charities, families and employers (Trägårdh 2008). This perspective on
the state’s role in the welfare society reveals a longstanding tradition of
striving to expand the individuals’ control of their everyday lives, also
when dependent on public transfers or services. When new instruments
are used in the welfare state, individual rights can be expanded with
correspondingly new duties, which is a natural process in societies with a
more skilled and individualistic population both able and willing to enjoy
a growing level of individual autonomy (Andersen 2005, 87).
If growing individual rights and room for influence in the imple-
mentation stage of the political process are observed, this may enhance
the individualistic features of the social democratic model. At the earlier
stages of social democracy, the strategy of granting cash assistance and
not only benefits in kind to single mothers was an example of the belief
that individuals have the right to make decisions concerning their own
lives (Rothstein 1998); thus, the expansion of active citizenship can be
viewed as a continuation and further development of this feature of the
social democratic model. At the same time, equality in service quality is
also an important value in the social democratic model. Whether these
mechanisms are compatible, or whether they pull in opposing directions,
is an empirical question.
The capacity for active citizenship can have wider implications. When
the power of users influences the implementation of policies, the expe-
rience of the citizenry as a whole can change; small, incremental steps
can, over time, change the welfare arrangement, almost as if by stealth
(Hinrichs and Kangas 2003). A growth in the importance of policy
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implementation at the expense of electoral politics is a common finding
in Scandinavian power studies (Andersen 2006, 580). Strong electoral
legitimacy is a cornerstone of Scandinavian democracy, but much of this
legitimacy is determined on the output side where the citizens experience
the results of decisions made by policymakers, and one such important
result is the public welfare services (Rothstein 2009; Gustavsen et al.
2014). What happens on this side of the democratic process is thus also
important to consider.
Currently, citizen involvement in forming welfare services is becoming
a critical issue in international scholarly debates (Boje and Potucek
2011b; Evers and Guillemard 2013a, 24). Evers and Guillemard (2013a)
emphasised how using active citizenship as an analytic tool gives insight
into the ‘responsibility mix’: the division of rights and obligations
between the state, civil society and individual citizens. This division
involves deciding which tasks should be assigned to different actors, and
also provides a basis for normative perceptions about the suitable size of
each institutional sector. In Western Europe, the governments’ redis-
tributive role is increasingly being supplemented by attempts to motivate
citizens, as the states assume the role as orchestrators of last resort. In this
capacity, the states must balance their interest in the individual auton-
omy of citizens, commercial enterprises and other special interests in the
welfare fields, with their economic goals, including social investment
agendas (Evers and Guillemard 2013b). At the same time, variations in
user preferences are arguably also growing as societies become more
diverse (Boje and Potucek 2011a, 13; Phillips and Smith 2011). This
calls for the active involvement of users and citizens in forming the
content of services.
The concept of active citizenship can elucidate these developments
and show how welfare states are dynamic entities in spite of their stability
on many variables (Palier 2007). In using the concept, I recognise that
users can seek to influence both staff at the level of local institutions and
local policymakers. Active citizenship thus maps the landscape of user
control and, in our case, this landscape is limited by borders established
by national and EU laws, regulations and policies. Therefore, analyses
focusing on active citizenship connect the individual experiences of users
with overarching changes in the welfare model.
208 H.S. Trætteberg
Operationalisation of Active Citizenship
Hirschman (1970) identified two main strategies for users to obtain
changes from an organisation: exit and voice. The first strategy involves
either exiting or threatening to exit an organisation. This will give the
organisation an incentive to accommodate the wishes of users and is thus
an empowering instrument for users. This strategy is related to the use of
choice in my framework. The second strategy involves the use of voice by
users who stay in an organisation, and who advocate changes within
them. Here, users do not leave the organisation but try to produce
changes by identifying aspects they believe to be unacceptable. This
relates to my notions of user empowerment and participation, whereby
users voice their interests at the institutional or municipal level,
respectively.
In terms of choice, the central features are whether the option to
choose can enhance the power of citizens as customers, and whether the
available alternatives are distinctive enough to increase variation in the
services offered to citizens. For choice to be an important aspect of power
relations, alternatives must exist that are real options and not just formal
possibilities. The most powerful action taken by a user who is dissatisfied
with a service is to exit an institution altogether (Hirschman 1970). This
is the solution Blomqvist and Rothstein (2008, 18) recommended for
amending the asymmetrical power relationship between users and staff at
the institution and the policymakers’ ultimate lack of control over policy
output. In addition, letting users choose institutions can also increase the
capacity for active citizenship by expanding the scope of public services.
When users can choose between different institutions with their own
distinctive content, the chances of getting services in line with the users’
interests and needs also increases (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006, 224).
Distinctive alternatives are therefore an essential component of choice.
For the citizen, a central prerequisite for exploiting a broader range of
services is knowing what is available. Information is therefore also an
important aspect of choice (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). From a citi-
zen’s perspective, the capacity for active citizenship expands when public
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services are more diverse and cater to minorities and other groups whose
preferences and interests deviate from the majority.
Empowerment is a matter of how users and their next of kin voice
their concerns about what happens at an institution and what changes
they can obtain. This can take place formally or informally (Andersen
2004, 25). Arenas set up by institutions or users (e.g. user boards)
comprise formal mechanisms for voice. Central to these are how they are
included in the overall steering of an institution (Rose 2007).
Circumstances or settings in which users can affect their situations
through day-to-day interactions with staff or other official members of
institutions constitute informal mechanisms for voice. Interaction
between users and providers is a fundamental aspect of services, and in
this sense co-production is a feature of all services (Osborne et al. 2013,
139). Since the study by Parks et al. (1981), the focus on co-production
has dealt with costs for the government and the improvement of service
quality (OECD 2011; Alford 2014, 300). In this study, I am more
concerned with how co-production affects power relations between users
and providers, as well as how users can influence services. When citizens
involve themselves in institutions that are part of their everyday lives,
they become ‘everyday makers’. They may have no ambition to influence
what happens in the large-scale democracy, but when various individuals
take steps to make changes in their close surroundings, it becomes
something ‘democracy cannot afford to dismiss, neither in theory nor in
practice’ (Bang and Sørensen 1999, 336).
Choice and empowerment pertain to active citizenship in the imple-
mentation of public policies. The third dimension, participation,
involves participation in the development of public policies at the local
level. This dimension concerns user involvement in relevant political
settings and how users perceive their level of influence or their political
efficacy (Andersen 2004, 25). When users influence the interpretation of
public policies, they operate within politically defined frames. When they
are able to influence local policymaking, they influence the frames
themselves: The resources held by users when approaching the municipal
level, the arenas set up to facilitate such approaches, and the respon-
siveness of the municipality decides the scope of this influence. The
fundamental issue regarding active citizenship is that the experiences
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made at the institutions have real influence on policymaking. In practical
terms, this is an issue of the advocacy role of institutions and individual
users vis-à-vis the municipal political and administrative level. User
surveys are not part of the advocacy efforts of users, but represent the
only tool for the municipalities to directly collect the views of many users
at the same time and are thus a relevant aspect to consider.
The definition of active citizenship covers what we may refer to as the
basic level or background concept (Goertz 2006; Adcock and Collier
2001). The second level consists of the three dimensions. These
dimensions are ontological in the sense that they constitute the back-
ground concept. Based on these dimensions, I developed indicators than
can be evaluated. These indicators are not necessarily internally corre-
lated, but can be functionally equivalent, which means that the strong
occurrence of one indicator can substitute for the lack of occurrence of
another indicator of the same dimension (Goertz 2006, 15). The qual-
itative data gathering process was designed to capture variations in the
dimensions of active citizenship and to be able to conduct qualitative
comparisons between institutions. The scores on the indicators are
therefore qualitative. What is interesting is the value on one provider’s
indicator as compared to the other providers. Table 6.1 illustrates the
relationship between different levels of the concept.






Choice Promoting a broader range of services where
more users obtain services that cater to their
interests
Formal and real exit opportunities give power
to users
Empowerment Influence through collective representation in
user boards
Influence through individuals’ day-to-day
contacts with staff
Participation Interactions between user representatives and
municipal decision-makers, either directly or
mediated by civil society organisations
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For each dimension, I developed indicators that allow for the obser-
vation of variations as well as comparisons. For the dimension of choice, I
looked at the capacity users have to choose a provider when they initially
become users of a service and to what degree they may exit an institution.
I developed two indicators for this dimension. First, I assessed if the
opportunity to choose and exit providers is important for power rela-
tions. Choice gives power to users if municipal or institutional repre-
sentatives report changing the content of a service in order to avoid user
exits or attract more users. Likewise, users’ perception of exit as a tool for
obtaining changes indicates that they have power as opposed to situations
where there is no exit opportunity. There is a continuum between no exit
opportunity and full exit opportunity. Second, I evaluated whether the
opportunity for choice leads to a wider range of services for citizens. If
users are able to choose alternatives that constitute distinct services from
those offered by public providers, the entire scope of public service
becomes broader. When public services can cover a broader range of
citizen preferences, the capacity for active citizenship is expanded.
Indicators of empowerment focus on two forms of user influence.
First, I mapped how user boards take part in steering and influencing the
activities of institutions. The accessibility of user boards and their level of
influence are central components of this measure. Second, I examined
how users experience the opportunities they have to obtain changes
through day-to-day interactions with other users.
I evaluated participation by looking at arenas where users have access
to decision makers at the municipal level, and I examined how repre-
sentatives and decision makers perceived user influence in these arenas.
I also looked at municipal interest organisations, like councils for the
elderly, which channel the interests of users toward the municipal level.
In some cases, these channels were missing altogether.
The Importance of Individual Characteristics of Staff
and Users
Even if the institutional sector of a provider matters for active citizenship,
it is not the only factor explaining variations in active citizenship. The
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actions of individuals who operate within the frames of institutions make
up the capacity for active citizenship. The capacity for active citizenship
is affected by which sector an institution belongs to because it frames the
decision making of its leaders, staff and users (Thornton et al. 2012).
How individuals choose to use the flexibility that exists within the frames
influences much of the variation between institutions. If nonprofit
institutions generally have more space than public institutions to pro-
mote empowerment, institutional leaders at public institutions can still,
due to their individual abilities, empower users more than leaders of
nonprofit institutions. Accordingly, what this study sets out to reveal are
differences in the potential for active citizenship that exist between the
different types of providers. This potential is sometimes exploited fully,
while at other times we can only speak of latent control of everyday life.
In addition to variations in how leaders and staff at providers exploit
the capacity for active citizenship within their institutional frames, user
characteristics are another factor to consider when evaluating active cit-
izenship (Bang et al. 2000). When it comes to welfare services, one
central characteristic is the health of users. Users of nursing homes have
health problems that make it difficult for many of them to exploit the
capacity for active citizenship. This renders users unable to seek more
active citizenship and makes facilitating more active citizenship less rel-
evant for providers. In the school sector, the parents of students are
primarily the ones who enjoy active citizenship. They are often able and
willing to pursue as much influence as they can obtain.
The latent or potential capacity for active citizenship says something
about how users can influence services. Some users do not wish to be
active citizens, but their interest in good services is nevertheless just as
acute as any other citizen. If the capacity for active citizenship leads to
some citizens being able to obtain better services than others, then this
constitutes a relevant aspect of the analysis. At the same time, oppor-
tunities for user influence can also be important for those who do not
actively use it at any given time. The existence of such channels for
influence is like ‘security valves’ in the system. They may not be in use at
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all times, and they may seem insignificant on a day-to-day basis, but they
can make a huge difference once users feel that things need to change.
Data and Methodology
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on the same material as in
the preceding chapters. I will therefore not repeat all of the details of the
design, which are presented in the appendix to Chap. 1. In each country,
we selected two municipalities (plus a third municipality in Norway
where only schools were studied). In each municipality, one public
institution and one nonpublic institution were compared in both the
school and the nursing home sectors. National experts in each country
carried out the qualitative investigation with a shared field guide as the
basis for data gathering. The primary sources of data were
semi-structured interviews and focus groups. In total, we conducted 35
interviews in Denmark, 21 in Sweden, and 57 in Norway. These data
were triangulated with studies of central documents in the investigated
municipalities and institutions, in addition to local user surveys where
relevant. There is no room for statistical generalisations from these case
studies, but they do highlight some mechanisms that help us understand
conditions that expand the capacity for active citizenship.
Analysis and Findings
For each service area, I analysed the different dimensions of active citi-
zenship—choice, empowerment and participation—across the analytic
dimensions by country and institutional sector. I start by presenting an
analysis of the nursing home sector in the three countries before turning
to an analysis of the school sector in the same three countries.
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Nursing Homes
Choice—Diversity in Services and Exit Opportunities
for Users?
In the Norwegian and Swedish municipalities, the users of nursing
homes do not have user choice because the municipalities allocate citi-
zens to the nursing homes. Users can request certain homes, but due to
excess demand, they must normally take the first slot that opens. The
consequence of this system can be frustrating for users. The daughter of a
user in Norway explains:
I was at the counter at the grocery store when my phone rang. The person
tells me: your mother can have a place [in the nursing home] now, but
you must decide within an hour. You know what I felt, I was so angry.
Am I supposed to turn everything upside down? We had applied many
months before and then we get one hour to change your life, take it, or
leave it. […] Am I supposed to take this decision without talking to her?
(Interview, user representative, municipal nursing home, Norway)
Since 2005, Danes have had user choice between nursing homes in the
same municipality. The poor health of users means that the choice is
mainly exercised by their next of kin. The effectiveness of this right is
limited by the lack of a sufficient number of nursing home places. When
a slot in a nursing home opens up, a user will typically take that slot.
Thus, in spite of the formal user choice opportunity in Denmark, actual
differences between the Scandinavian countries in terms of user choice in
nursing homes are negligible.
Even if users are not free to choose nursing homes, they can make
requests. As much as possible, all municipalities claim to try to accom-
modate user requests. Interviewees from different positions stress geog-
raphy as the most important factor for users. The leader at one of the
Danish diaconal nursing homes sums up the importance of geography:
I believe geography is most important. I wish I could say that it is because
of us, but it is not. People live in this area, and of course, they want to stay
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because here is where they have their social environment and their chil-
dren. When they first are here, they are happy to be here, and their
children are happy. Yet it is mostly geography, no doubt. We can see the
same with ourselves. No matter where we live, we do not want to move to
the other side of the country if we were to move to a nursing home. We
want to be in a well-known, safe environment where we belong.
(Interview, site manager, nonprofit nursing home, Denmark)
Even though some of the studied municipalities have introduced open
tenders, there are no differences between municipalities in terms of how
nursing homes compete to attract users. There is thus no sense of
competition between the different options and no exit opportunity that
could affect power relations. The staff and leaders at the different nursing
homes did not perceive of themselves as providers who attract users in a
market.
The lack of user choice also complicates the opportunities nonpublic
providers have for providing services distinct from those of the public
sector. With the high demand for nursing home slots, municipalities
want all available nursing homes to provide a uniform service so that
deciding which homes to allocate users to is a non-issue. Since the
interviewees specified geographic proximity to their home or their rela-
tives’ homes as the primary factor in requesting a particular nursing
home, it is in their interest that the nursing homes do not represent
different concepts, as they do not want to risk that the closest nursing
home does not provide a service that suits them.
Therefore, when municipalities present information about their
nursing homes, they do not point to substantive differences, since
effectively there are none. In some cases, municipalities do not even
differentiate between public and nonpublic options on their websites.
The administrative leader of one of the municipalities suggested that
citizens do not know which nursing homes are public and which are
nonpublic, a claim which underscores how difficult it is for users to
choose providers based on institutional sectors.
Still, leaders at all the nonprofit nursing homes stressed that they
found their nursing home to be distinct from the public option. All
nonprofit nursing homes in our study were faith-based. Their Christian
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values are demonstrated in how they operate, albeit with respect for
non-Christian residents. Since their users have not specifically chosen
Christian nursing homes, administrators cannot impose their faith on
them. As the leader of one of the Danish nursing homes put it:
It is the diaconal, the spiritual care, that is in focus. A good thing about
spiritual care is that it is not measurable. It is lovely that we have one field
where one cannot measure everything. Because how do you measure that
we have read the Lord’s Prayer today? […] for me the importance of this
has increased over the years as I have experienced that the elderly want
this. They need the space for reflection that spiritual care provides. In
reality, this is mostly about reflection. (Interview, site manager, nonprofit
nursing home, Denmark)
The user representatives at this nursing home share this view, but point
out the conditions for the employees, and not the users, when referring
to the particular diaconal institution. They found that the diaconal
respect for individuals makes the nursing home a good employer, but
they do not find that the diaconal basis of the nursing home affects the
content of the care.
The staff members also recognised the particular aspects of spiritual
care, but qualified them by claiming that represented minor differences:
Well, I do not know what to say, but I do not notice the big difference.
I simply do not. Of course, there is worship in the afternoon. Moreover,
we have the services. I do not know if this is more than in other nursing
homes, but in my daily life, I do not notice any difference. (Interview, staff
member, nonprofit nursing home, Denmark)
The for-profit nursing homes do not have the same inherent alternative
values as the public option. The Norwegian for-profit nursing home still
claims to be distinctive by employing a ‘service concept’ imported from
the hotel business branch of the firm. Interestingly, none of the users,
staff or municipal representatives found that the for-profit nursing home
demonstrated any distinctiveness from public institutions.
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Yet, the importance of institutional sectors for local policymakers is
evident. One of the Swedish municipalities has gone the furthest by
introducing market mechanisms. It uses tenders to allocate contracts, and
within the public structure, it has an autonomous unit that operates like
a provider entity. The Conservative leadership in the municipality allo-
cates contracts to it because they regard having a public option as ‘im-
portant for the user choice’. It is difficult to understand this reasoning as
the users cannot themselves choose institutions, and the municipalities
themselves claim there are no substantive differences. At the same time, it
recognises the potential differences between different institutional sectors.
In addition, by having providers from different institutional sectors, this
municipality has benchmarks that can be useful for assessing the different
providers.
In conclusion, the regulatory regime of nonpublic nursing homes gives
some freedom to operate according to local institutional initiatives. It is,
however, unclear if this room for local initiatives is bigger for nonpublic
than for public institutions. The lack of user choice means that there is
no power based on opportunities users might have to exit a provider.
Empowerment—How Users Can Influence at an Institution
All nursing homes in this study have tried, with or without success, to
establish user boards. In all cases, the formal arenas for user involvement
in nursing homes are based on the participation of relatives. Eighty
percent of nursing home users in Norway suffer from dementia (Haugen
and Engedal 2005), and reports from staff and municipalities suggest the
situation is similar in Denmark and Sweden.
When it comes to the functioning of user boards, there is no sys-
tematic difference between homes belonging to different sectors. The
functioning of user boards is in all cases somewhat up to the users
themselves. As one Norwegian municipal manager puts it:
User board, it is almost dangerous to say, because we had a project, you
may have heard about it, at the municipal nursing home. It was very
218 H.S. Trætteberg
dependent on some vital persons to run it on such an advanced scale as
they expected. When these persons no longer had their loved ones at the
nursing home, the user board, I will not put it explicitly, was transformed
into a friend’s organisation [that encourages volunteer efforts]. (Interview,
administrative leader, municipality, Norway)
The situation today is that the user board mostly coordinates volunteer
activities and does not play an important role in the steering of insti-
tutions, even though they are sometimes consulted.
In Denmark, both nonprofit nursing homes have closed their user
boards due to lack of interest from relatives; the same thing has happened
to both nursing homes in one municipality in Sweden. The lack of user
boards in the municipality does not concern any of the leaders of the
institutions, but they find it somewhat frustrating that there are no
relatives willing to contribute: ‘I understand completely [that people have
busy lives], but we have 52 residents, it should be possible to find 3–4
persons’ (Interview, site manager, municipal nursing home, Sweden).
At the same time, there have been successful attempts to establish user
boards. In the for-profit nursing home in Norway, the leader of the user
board believed that the leader of the institution felt threatened by how
the user board interfered in how the institution was run, implying that
the user board’s influence was real. In this municipality, municipal
guidelines instruct the head of the nursing home to discuss important
plans and changes with the user board before making final decisions.
When initiatives come from user representatives, they normally concern
detailed aspects of care, not the long-term development of the institu-
tions themselves. Likewise, in Denmark, a municipal leader describes the
importance of their user board:
It is a demand that we involve the next of kin and the residents in what
happens, and why should we change something that works? Therefore, we
will keep our user board and we will keep elections for who can be in it.
We have elections almost every time because there are more people
running than we need in the board. We do not have any problems getting
people to participate in the board, and as the representatives from the staff
say: ‘everyone should experience a user-next of kin board.’ Imagine all our
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old users who are immobile and can almost do nothing, and then they
appear [in the board meetings] with pen and pencil. (Interview, site
manager, municipal nursing home, Denmark)
Generally, the interviewees agreed that there were variations over time in
the nursing homes, but the willingness and ability of the user board
members to take an active role explains these variations. Accordingly, it is
difficult to conclude that variations in the functioning of user boards can
be attributed to the institutional sector.
The interviewees cited day-to-day contacts as the most important
route for obtaining changes on behalf of users. Most users in all insti-
tutions were content with the possibility of exerting influence via this
channel. The exception were those who would have liked more services,
such as follow-ups from physiotherapists, which are limited due to cost
issues. This exemplifies how changes with budgetary consequences are
difficult to obtain, while other changes are easier to achieve. Changes in
budgetary frames are decided at the municipal level. To obtain these sorts
of changes, users need to try to participate in arenas which channel their
interests to this level.
Some interviewees among the staff and leadership at nonprofit nursing
homes pointed to increased flexibility outside of the public hierarchy,
which allows more adaptation to user needs. It seems difficult, however,
to infer if this is an effect of ownership or of variation in how nursing
homes exploit their ability to manoeuvre. Users at public institutions
were also happy with the possibilities they had to influence services, as
illustrated by a user at a municipal institution:
I find that both leaders we have here are very open to us in the user-next of
kin board. In addition, I have the impression that they are very open to all
the users and want to do a lot to make sure this is a good place to live.
(Interview, user representative, municipal nursing home, Denmark)
There is no contradiction between collective and individual empower-
ment, but there is the perception that individual empowerment can
compensate for a lack of collective empowerment. One leader of a
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nursing home found that the lack of a user board was no problem
because of individual empowerment:
This is why one does not miss the user board. One has good contact with
them [the relatives] and they come here to visit. The nurse and the
designated contact staff talk to the relatives and ask if they have any
questions. (Interview, site manager, municipal nursing home, Sweden)
On the other hand, we were unable to collect data from users with the
most fragile health. There is, therefore, a risk that their interests are not
as well represented as the interests of those who can articulate themselves
better. It is not possible to affirmatively conclude that providers
belonging to a specific institutional sector have better levels of individual
empowerment.
Participation—How User Experiences are Translated
to the Municipal Level
The dimension of participation is where the biggest differences between
the three countries were observed. In all three countries, local politicians
stressed that they wanted input from users, and they all gave users and
other citizens access to their meetings. The differences observed included
how local policymakers actively invited users to provide their input and
how users sought to directly influence the municipal level.
One thing the Scandinavian countries have in common is municipal
elderly councils or associations that speak on their behalf. One example
from Norway shows how interactions between this type of council and
nonpublic providers can be mutually reinforcing, as the council uses the
professional expertise of the nonprofit nursing home to strengthen their
arguments with the municipality. The leader of the nonprofit nursing
home explains:
They are quite good at approaching us, perhaps because they see that we
think somewhat differently in certain areas, and then they ask. I let them
know if I want to try out something […] and when big issues for the
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council for the elderly arise, it is obvious that we discuss them. What are
the needs? They have many opinions themselves, but sometimes I think
they need some help with some additional arguments. (Interview, site
manager, for-profit nursing home, Norway)
The presence of a nonprofit nursing home thereby empowers the elderly
in the municipality by giving them access to professional opinions that
may challenge the municipal structure.
In Norway, both nonpublic nursing homes are integrated with the
public system when it comes to this issue. The public and nonpublic
nursing homes administer the same user surveys, which thus have the
same potential for leading to changes in all institutional sectors. One of
the municipalities holds annual meetings between user boards and the
relevant committee in the municipal council. Opinions differ between
municipal representatives and users in regards to how constructive these
meetings are. Both the administrative and political leadership were very
clear, as in this statement from the administrative leader:
The dialogue meetings are the basis for the budget process. The CEO of
the municipality has the results as the fundament of the priorities in the
strategic plans. He often uses the input from these dialogue processes
when he suggests future focuses and priorities. That is what can happen,
and it does not happen seldom. (Interview, administrative leader,
municipality, Norway)
Users, on the other hand, were more sceptical:
Afterward, we concluded that [the meeting] had little commitment. The
politicians said something, we said something, but there were no minutes
of the meeting. Moreover, many issues were raised that had no place in the
municipal budget. (Interview, user representatives, municipal nursing
home, Norway)
It seems like users had no information about the consequences of the
meeting and had no way of knowing how their input could make an
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impact. In this sense, they might have more influence than they make
use of or realise.
In Denmark, at both the nonprofit and municipal nursing homes, the
user boards have had an active role in defending the interests of the
nursing homes in relation to the municipality. There are examples from
both forms of nursing homes of incidents where active lobbying from the
user boards has prevented municipal budget cuts. The leader of a
municipal nursing home gives a telling example of the role the user board
can play:
At one point, in 2010, it was suggested by politicians that our kitchen
should close, and that we should get food from Aulum [a central kitchen]
like the other nursing homes. I must say, at that time we had some fine
next of kins. They are the ones we can thank for having our kitchen today.
That is for sure. They were present at the town hall, sent letters to the
editors of newspapers, and called politicians. They were the ones who did
the job. (Interview, site manager, municipal nursing home, Denmark)
This clearly shows how the user board takes responsibility for the nursing
home in its relations with the municipality. Interestingly, the nonprofit
nursing home chose to stand outside of the public structure, but users
still found it natural to lobby the municipal level when they wanted
changes. The leader of the user board gives one example:
I told the leadership at one point: we have to write a letter and send it to
all the members of the city council because I do not think they know what
is going on here […] and that is what we did, and then – I promise –
things started to happen. I spoke on the phone with some of the members
of the council and they did not know what they had said yes to.
(Interview, user representative, nonprofit nursing home, Denmark)
As we can see from these examples, the fight for resources is what
interviewees at the nursing homes pointed to when describing their
external role, and this role is the same for both public and nonprofit
nursing homes. It is up to the nursing homes themselves to be active in
approaching the municipal level, since there are no formal arenas where







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































representatives from the user boards can interact directly with municipal
leaders.
In Sweden, politicians practice an ‘open door’ policy where committee
meetings are open to the public, and citizens are welcome to make
statements to politicians. Politicians report that few citizens use this
opportunity, but they still believe it is a good way of promoting trans-
parency in the municipality. In addition, both municipalities have
politicians dedicated to following up with the different nursing homes
and keeping in touch with the user boards, where these exist.
The more prominent form of citizen involvement in Sweden is
through councils for the elderly that influence local policymaking. They
have no formal ties to users of the nursing homes and do not work
differently with institutions based on their institutional sector. In sum,
Sweden has fewer formal routes for user participation in municipal policy
formulation.
Table 6.2 summarises the findings for active citizenship in the nursing
home sector. The table shows that there are small differences between the
different institutional sectors as well as between countries. For citizens,
their ability to control services did not vary that much across different
institutions in Scandinavia.
Schools
Choice—Diversity in Services and Exit Opportunities
for Users?
All countries have user choice where families are free to select nonpublic
schools. In Sweden, these schools can come from all three institutional
sectors. In Denmark, nonpublic schools that receive public funding must
be self-owned and thus nonprofit. In Norway, nonpublic schools that
receive public funding may not distribute profits or channel funds out of
the schools in any way. All income from the state and user fees must
benefit the students. These regulations entail that practically all non-
public schools in Norway are nonprofit. In all municipalities, families
have a local school where they belong to and have the right to attend.
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To choose to attend a nonpublic school thus represents an active choice
to exit this local alternative. How much the families use this opportunity
varies. In one Danish municipality, only 56% of students attended their
local schools; while in Norwegian municipalities, more than 90% of
students attended their local schools.
In Norway, the main motivation for selecting a nonprofit school are
the special services they offer. For the religion-based nonprofit schools,
the view of this parent is typical: ‘The Christian influence and the values
we have, they get them both at school and at home; the values we have,
they get them at school also’ (Interview, parent, nonprofit school,
Norway). The other schools, which have alternative approaches to
teaching as their basis, point to their holistic approach to each student
and relaxed approach to testing and competition as examples of their
special qualities.
At the same time, there was a large minority of families whose choices
were not determined by the schools’ conceptual framework. Rather, they
actively make a choice away from the public schools. These families
shared a negative experience with the public schools, and approached
nonprofit schools as a last resort. One mother gives a telling example
about her daughter:
She has had some difficulty concentrating throughout her schooling. As
parents, we have seen it, but the school has not taken it seriously and
handled it as we wanted. In the end, the girl practically perished. It was a
matter of surviving. (Interview, parent, nonprofit school, Norway)
In Denmark, which has a bigger share of students in nonprofit schools,
there are many reasons for choosing a specific school. The distinctiveness
of a school is one reason among several, and the importance of this factor
varies substantially. One parent who found the distinctiveness of a school
to be of great importance states:
No, it is not my experience that to go to a nonprofit school is a conscious
decision. Unfortunately, seen from my perspective, I experience that at
least in the grade of my youngest child, that in selecting the school many
think it is a for-profit school [something that does not exist in Denmark].
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At least it is a negative choice, away from the public school. (Interview,
parent, nonprofit school, Denmark)
Disappointment about the lack of conviction on the part of some parents
was shared by teachers who found that there were two kinds of families:
the classical ‘nonprofit family’ that treasures the distinctiveness of non-
profit schools, and the kind of family that seeks an alternative to public
school with little concern for the actual content of the alternative. In
order for this latter group to be pleased with a nonprofit school, deviation
from public schools cannot be too pronounced. The share of students
attending nonprofit schools seems to reflect how much these schools
deviate from the public option.
Nonprofit schools take active measures to defend their distinctiveness.
They vary in terms of their particular type of distinctiveness, but share an
emphasis on the collective, which is an important finding in our case
study schools. In these schools, parents are expected to be involved in
different aspects related to their operation. One headmaster made it a
point to be explicit about this expectation in his first conversation with
potential parents in order to maintain loyalty to the principles of the
school:
I know that I have scared away parents and they have simply said: it is so
much collectivity and participation; it is simply not us. (Interview, site
manager, nonprofit school, Denmark)
In the same way that nonprofit values are important for some of the
families who choose this kind of school, values also underpin the decision
to select municipal schools. Denmark has traditionally had many non-
public schools, which has caused some parents to rally around the public
option. One parent at a municipal school explained: ‘When we moved
here we were aware that there was a nonprofit school here, but in our
family we are by principle against opting against the public school’
(Interview, parent, public school, Denmark). This parent went on to
describe the effect on social integration when students from different
families in the same neighbourhood attend the same local school;
something he contrasted with nonprofit schools, where he found that the
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group of parents were more homogeneous. In sum, the motivation for
choosing a specific school can be based on values in both public and
nonprofit schools.
Interestingly, for-profit schools in Sweden are not perceived as offering
something substantively different when it comes to teaching methodol-
ogy, religion or ideology. Here, when families make their initial decision,
geography is the most important factor. In addition, the administrative
leader in one municipality mentioned other factors that were revealed in
an internal investigation in the municipality. What was surprising was
that the profiles of the nonpublic schools, like a special orientation
toward sports, were hardly mentioned by the parents. Instead, they
mentioned quality, group pressure and opting out of the public option.
Moreover, the lack of distinctiveness between Swedish schools makes
changing between them an available option for families that do not want
something substantively different from their local schools, and this cre-
ates a competitive dynamic. In all Swedish schools, staff members report
that parents use the threat of changing schools when arguing their case.
According to the schools themselves, changing schools is more of a
problem for students than it is for schools, as it does not occur often
enough to affect the schools but can be disruptive for students. Still, the
schools reported that their operation was dependent on attracting stu-
dents, and headmasters in different schools reported that they believed
that competition inspired them to remain competitive: ‘We feel the
competition and that has made us clearer and better’ (Interview, site
manager, public school, Sweden).
A similar effect was seen in Denmark, where competitive pressure is
growing. The number of students in Denmark is set to decrease in
coming years since the total number of children in each generation is
getting smaller. In combination with substantial reforms to public
schools that have increased the number of lessons given per week, a
competitive environment has been created where leaders of both types of
schools must make active choices in order to stay competitive.
A statement by a teacher at a nonprofit school exemplifies this trend:
We tell ourselves that we are a collective and such things, and that is
obviously true, but it is also a business. We need some customers in the
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shop; if not, there is no money to run the collective. So yes, we are in
competition with local municipal schools to attract students. I do not find
that there is any bad blood between the two institutions, but it is
something we have to deal with – e.g., with the new reforms and the new
number of lessons a week, we need to be on par with local public schools.
I strongly doubt that this is needed for nonprofit schools in more densely
populated areas. (Interview, staff member, nonprofit school, Denmark)
In spite of the blunt admission that competition is altering how schools
are run, this teacher concluded that the distinctiveness of the school can
be preserved: ‘That is exactly what we fear, but I doubt it. The big
challenge is to follow the development while at the same time not
becoming too similar. I do not really think so because there are certain
things that make us unique’ (Interview, staff member, nonprofit school,
Denmark).
In Norway, competition between public and nonprofit schools is an
unfamiliar concept. Families choose nonprofit schools primarily because
they give them services better suited to their preferences. Interestingly,
although some parents expressed discontent with public schools, none
used the exit option as a tool for obtaining change at their former public
schools. Moreover, headmasters at the schools did not regard the threat
of exit as a potential instrument for students to obtain changes. One
headmaster at a public school pointed out that they tried to keep their
students and would accommodate them to avoid changes, but that it was
to a certain degree unavoidable. At the same time, more students enter
the school than leave it, as the headmaster observes: ‘It is not always we
get star students, to speak plainly. Often there is ‘something’ when you
change school’ (Interview, site manager, public school, Norway). This
suggests that often it is the weaker, more demanding students who
change schools, especially when the change is between public schools,
since these families do not seek distinctiveness or wish to opt out of
public school. Since these students demand many resources, it might not
be beneficial for schools to attract them in the first place.
Information is pivotal for parents to make an active choice when
choosing schools and making use of the alternatives they have.
Differences in this sense reflect the tradition of school types in the
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different countries. In Denmark, the law requires all nonprofit schools to
publish their values on their websites, but as the preceding quote
demonstrates, parents are sometimes still uninformed about the schools
before they approach them directly. In Norway, there are no such rules,
but nonprofit schools belong to three categories: Christian, Montessori
and Waldorf (Steiner), and most families that consider opting out of
public school have an idea about what they consist of. There is no
information readily available about them though, so one can speculate
that more families would be interested in the nonprofit option if they
knew what they had to offer. In Sweden, schools from different insti-
tutional sectors have less distinctive profiles, so such information is
deemed irrelevant. However, parents actively searching for information
can find quality indicators, such as results from user surveys and test
results from the schools.
A different aspect of choice seems to involve a contradiction between
giving users power through exit opportunities and broadening services. If
there is to be a level of competition that moves power from the insti-
tution to the user, services cannot be too distinctive. If different actors
cater to different students, many families will only find one suitable
institution for themselves. This empowers them as they do find good
options, but it does not give them improved opportunities for asking for
changes from the institutions.
Generally, the opportunity for choice is associated with somewhat
different effects in the three countries. In Norway and Denmark, which
only allow nonprofit schools, choice spurs the development of schools
that are distinct from the public option. In Sweden, there is less variation
between schools across institutional sectors; one can, however, observe
competition between schools, which is also increasingly seen in Denmark
but is absent from Norway.
Empowerment—How Users Can Influence at an Institution
Parents have more influence in schools than users and their relatives have
in nursing homes. This is partly because students and parents are more
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willing to use their latent influence, and partly because of laws giving
parents more influence in schools. All three Scandinavian countries have
laws that govern the composition of user boards in public schools and the
issues about which they must be consulted.
In the selected municipal schools, user boards function as arenas where
representatives for the parents obtain relevant information and provide
input on general issues. Parents typically describe them as places ‘where
we can give input’. The headmasters who also attend these meetings
share this description. When asked to give an example of a case where a
user board has had influence, the headmaster mentioned work done on
IT solutions, but then qualified the statement by adding, ‘It is not
completely true because I had already decided to make these changes.
But it is good to use the parents as support when I argue with the
teachers, even if it is not always a good argument’ (Interview, site
manager, public school, Norway). This latter example illustrates how
collective empowerment can have real, albeit limited, effects. The
Swedish for-profit schools function practically the same way as public
schools in this regard.
Formal arrangements give parents more influence over nonprofit
schools. The law guarantees their representation in the school board, and
in reality, they dominate user boards as the primary stakeholders in the
institutions. In municipal schools, the municipal administration makes
important decisions, such as hiring headmasters, adopting budgets and
planning long-term strategies for the schools. In nonprofit schools, the
board makes these decisions.
Indeed, one parent member of the school board questioned if he had
too much power: ‘That was probably what surprised me the most: that as
a board member you are so much involved. In many ways, it is a great
responsibility. One does not have any other qualifications to be in the
board other than the fact that you are a parent’ (Interview, user repre-
sentative, nonprofit school, Denmark). This overwhelming feeling can
come from overall administrative and economic responsibility, not all of
which impacts teaching directly. At the same time, overarching decisions
regarding values, teaching philosophies and school–parent cooperation
are decided at this level. One example of how administrative decisions
play an important role is the nonprofit school that experienced a cutback
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in public transfers and then decided to increase the number of students
in each class and not raise the fees. The parents themselves took this
decision through to the school board.
A parent who was one of the founders of a nonprofit school illustrates
the importance of parental influence in nonprofit schools. She explains
that parental influence was an important reason why she helped estab-
lished the school:
It is the real opportunity the parents have to have influence on the content
in the school […] We saw that this teaching methodology, and that one
could do this under the auspices of the parents, gives opportunities that
you want as an active parent. To participate in creating something that in
many ways is better then what you had to begin with. (Interview, user
representative, nonprofit school, Norway)
There seems to be universal agreement that the room for influence is
greater in nonprofit schools, both in principle and in reality. One
Swedish public school demonstrates, however, that there is no deter-
minism in this relationship. Here the school board makes the major
decisions. The board consists of staff and parents, but the parents have
the majority of the votes and the chairman. The parents show real
interest in the board, and the headmaster states that the present board
was elected with about 100 votes, a figure that makes up the lion’s share
of parents at the school.
Yet, informal contact between teachers and parents is the more
important form of influence. A reason for this is that in spite of its strong
legal backing, there is still some doubt about how the user board should
function, as one board member explains:
It happens in cases with complaints about teachers, grades or something
else; I am very unsure about what the user board can say about profes-
sional matters. We have no role. We have no competence to speak about
the teaching methodology. However, as a parent, you have the right and
the duty to follow up on the teaching of your child… and the teacher and
all that, but as a user board, I do not know. (Interview, user representative,
public school, Norway)
232 H.S. Trætteberg
Regarding informal contact, there are smaller differences between public
and nonpublic schools. Both have structures in place to allow students’
and parents’ voices to be heard, and there is a shared understanding
among interviewees from different groups that these structures are useful
and available. In the public schools, users and staff do not experience any
lack of user involvement. They stress that personal contact between
teachers and parents is fluid, and that the school is receptive to input from
parents. The relationship between teachers and parents is important, and
personal chemistry is not dependent on one type of institutional sector.
Yet, the flexibility of the structures can be different. Nonprofit schools
are based on an ideology that entails more user input and different
teaching methods than in for-profit and public schools. A teacher at a
nonprofit school explains the difference:
That is the major, decisive difference from the public school. The children
are involved in what goals we have for them and what ambitions we have
for their development. We continuously set goals on three levels: the
professional, the personal, and the social. They are themselves involved, so
the old concept of self-management exudes from our school. (Interview,
staff member, nonprofit school, Denmark)
One part of the explanation for more room for user empowerment, both
individual and collective, at nonprofit schools stems from how these
schools use test scores and measurable indicators in their governance.
These schools generally have a relaxed approach to tests, unlike for-profit
and public schools. A headmaster at a public school explains:
Then comes the PISA-test that tells people: ‘You do not perform well
enough. This is simply too bad’. Then there is even more focus on us not
having enough projects, themes and 1000 other things. We must stick to
the book. Oh, now I am harsh, but sometimes it annoys me that one
governs [the school] this way and thus kills some of the creativity.
(Interview, site manager, public school, Denmark)
With more emphasis on PISA scores and quantifiable goals, there is less
room for influence from parents. From all municipalities, increased
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emphasis on these measures was reported, and the same can be said of
for-profit schools. In this regard, nonprofit schools are in a freer position.
These schools are not part of a bigger structure and thus have fewer limits
to making changes based on user input. On the other hand, one of the
for-profit firms has an ombudsman at the level of the firm. Students and
teachers can report incidents and situations to the ombudsman, who is
tasked with making sure the school follows up appropriately on reports
that the school is not performing according to standards. This gives users
an extra outlet to reach out to if they are unhappy with the school’s
services.
Participation—How User Experiences are Translated
to the Municipal Level
Just as the participatory role of relatives varies between countries in the
nursing home sector, parental participation in the school sector is the
dimension which exhibits the greatest differences between Scandinavian
countries.
In Norway, all municipalities have mechanisms in place for conveying
the opinions of students and their parents to the municipal level. Chief
among them is that in all municipalities a municipal-level body exists
which consists of selected parents from different schools. In one
municipality, the leader of this body is paid by the municipality to enable
her to spend sufficient time to efficiently promote the voice of the par-
ents. Asked whether such leaders are able to influence school policy, one
leader remarks: ‘Yes. That is my experience. I find that they are very
interested in our opinions’. The same message comes from other
municipalities. Debates about issues that are not strictly related to school
policy but concern wider elements of municipal policies for the young
also find a place in this body. In one municipality, an advisory committee
exists for ‘family and child protection’ where representatives of school
parents meet. The parents therefore have the opportunity to influence a
range of municipal policies. Even though no formal power is allocated to
these bodies, politicians, administrative leaders and parents agree that
they exert real influence.
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In addition, a municipal politician is also present at meetings at each
school. This is meant to inform local policymakers about the operations
of different schools, and the law requires it. How this provision functions
varies substantially, as some politicians eagerly participate in school
meetings while others are seldom present. Variations seem to be solely
based on the level of personal enthusiasm of individual politicians.
In Norwegian nonprofit schools, state law requires a local politician to
participate as an observer in their user boards. The interest levels of these
politicians also vary, but in all cases they have less room for formal
influence. Nonprofit schools are controversial in some parts of the
municipalities, among some administrative leaders who find interaction
and competition with nonprofits to be ‘a hassle and an annoyance’ and
among some politicians who hold a more ideological approach. This
partly explains why nonprofit schools are excluded from municipal arenas
with policymaking influence, even when these include wider perspectives
than just school policies. Nonprofit schools see this as a negative since
they feel unrecognised and unheard. As one mother says: ‘It is an
underlying factor that we are an outsider in the municipality. I think that
feels very negative for the teachers. It takes so long to get accepted’
(Interview, user representative, public school, Norway).
Like in Norway, the external role of collective user bodies in Danish
public and nonprofit schools is the opposite of its internal role.
Municipal schools are more active in their relationship with municipal-
ities. They provide input at local hearings, write open letters to editors of
local newspapers and work directly with local politicians. Most of the
time their goal is to make visible the need for funding at the schools.
Indeed, one parent pointed to this form of lobbying effort vis-à-vis the
municipality as the most important task of the school board:
Formally, we do not have much influence. Some of the things we have
done the last few years are related to traffic and other things where we try
to influence the municipality through different channels than the ones
available to the leaders in the school. We can approach the politicians
directly, that is something the leaders cannot do. They must go through
their superiors. In situations where we want to put pressure on their
superiors, we approach the politicians […] I see it as one of our most
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important roles, that we can speak the case of the school. The leadership
of the school is part of the municipality and must fall in line. If the
municipality makes a decision, they must loyally carry it out. We are not
bound by this. We can speak the case of the school. (Interview, repre-
sentative, public school, Denmark)
In nonprofit schools, user boards play a lesser external role. This is partly
because headmasters have more freedom to occupy this role since they
are not part of the municipal hierarchy. The loyalty of headmasters is,
therefore, more clearly defined as belonging to the schools. Another
reason for the limited external role of nonprofits schools is that they
receive very little attention from municipalities. However, this is a nat-
ural consequence of nonprofit students opting out of the municipal
option, and municipalities have limited opportunities for steering. On
the other hand, about 30% of students in Faaborg Midtfyn, less in
Herning, attend nonprofit schools, which consequently means that local
politicians are only informed about a limited portion of the educational
system in the municipality. This is something that users of nonprofit
schools find frustrating: ‘No, there is no attention from the politicians.
That is my impression. Neither when I am here at the school nor when I
am at work [in the local newspaper] do I get the impression that the
politicians are concerned about the nonprofit schools’ (Interview, user
representative, nonprofit school, Denmark). This stands in stark contrast
to the experiences expressed by public school users.
In Sweden, contact between users and local policymakers is less
organised. User influence on the municipal level is not all that different
from influential channels available to other citizens, such as elections,
local political parties and direct approaches to politicians.
Information about schools typically flows through the headmaster in
the municipal hierarchy, and direct contact is not formally organised,
except from user surveys which are subject to scrutiny at the municipal
level. Parents have every opportunity to make further contact with
politicians. In municipalities, meetings of the political committee
responsible for schools are open events where all citizens can attend. In
reality, few citizens use this opportunity. To make politicians better
informed about situations at the schools, a politician from the
236 H.S. Trætteberg
municipality is present at user board meetings of all municipal schools.
This makes local politicians more informed about public schools than
nonpublic schools, an imbalance which reflects where politicians have
room for influence.
There are few initiatives from parents that seek changes at the
municipal level. In one municipality, some parents expressed discontent
with the lack of opportunities to express their voices in relation to a large
overhaul of the school structure. According to politicians, the opportunity
to ‘vote with the feet’ and change schools, should amend this problem.
Table 6.3 summarises the findings from the school sector. As is evi-
dent from the table, this service area displays more differentiation
between different institutional sectors. Nonprofit institutions, in partic-
ular, tend to be associated with more potential for user control through
choice and empowerment, while users of public institutions tend to
participate more in policy influencing.
How Can We Explain Different Potentials for Active
Citizenship?
To make the comparison between service areas easier to grasp, Table 6.4
compares the shared findings from schools and nursing homes.
This table illustrates some patterns of similarities and differences across
the analytic dimensions. In the following sections, I will identify the
most important aspects of these patterns for the different dimensions of
active citizenship. By analysing variations and consistencies across
countries, institutional sectors and service areas, I am also able to suggest
some mechanisms that could expand or limit the capacity for active
citizenship.
Choice—The Importance of Capacity in Supply
Two mechanisms that contribute to explaining differences between ser-
vice areas are the functioning of user choice and the importance of
passing a threshold in capacity. In Danish municipalities, the nursing
home sector formally has user choice, whereas their counterparts in
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Norway and Sweden do not. Potential nursing home users in Norway
and Sweden can ask for a specific nursing home, but public bureaucrats
make the final decision. In reality, the lack of available nursing home
slots restrains Danish user choice, so user experience in the nursing home
sector is very much the same across all three countries. Nursing homes
are an area for cost reduction, something that together with the recali-
bration of the elderly care structure results in insufficient capacity
(Hermansen and Gautun 2011). The consequence is that every new
available space in nursing homes—public, for-profit or nonprofit—is
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immediately filled. Variations between nursing homes cannot be too
large since one cannot know the preferences, interests and needs of users.
In addition, users mentioned geography and proximity to home and
family as the most important considerations when reporting preferences
for nursing homes. Thus, it becomes problematic if the local nursing
home has a profile that does not match a potential user. Moreover, users
can be temporarily admitted to a nursing home before getting a per-
manent place elsewhere. This means that differences between institutions
cannot be too large. From the users’ perspective, the lack of capacity
makes any talk of choice irrelevant, as this user representative from
Norway explains:
My mother in law was diagnosed with dementia in 2001, it almost killed
me, and she lived next door. He [my husband] worked in Sweden and I
had to take care of her in all ways. Then we were so ‘lucky’ to be rude, that
she fell and broke her upper femur. She had surgery and was granted a
short time stay [in a nursing home] and after much begging, she got a
place at [name of nursing home]. […] It is not like you will get a place
when you need it. (Interview, user representative, for-profit nursing home,
Norway)
When users experience a shortage of available places at nursing homes, it
is impossible for them to make demands regarding a single nursing home
in particular. In the above example, the user was first temporarily
admitted to one institution before being moved to a permanent one; this
underlines the need for different institutions to have limited variation in
terms of content. We found similar examples in different institutions and
municipalities in all three countries. Given this situation, there are no
credible nursing home alternatives for users and their next of kin, and
thus exit opportunities are not available to them either.
The contrast with the school sector is striking. Municipalities in all
three countries are responsible for providing enough school places for all
children. Students automatically belong to their local school unless they
actively seek out a different school. Nonpublic schools represent an
addition to this system, as their establishment is not dependent on
approval from municipalities, but is decided instead at a national level by
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meeting certain criteria. Unlike nursing homes, all children are entitled
to a place in school. Inability to meet the necessary capacity is therefore
not an option. In reality, nonpublic schools secure a certain level of
overcapacity of school places since the public schools must accept stu-
dents that want to return from a nonpublic school. This makes the
choice option real and gives families the opportunity to choose which
schools they like best and to change schools when appropriate. Thus,
nonprofit schools develop distinctiveness without these characteristics
being forced upon anyone.
Empowerment—Nonprofit Schools Use Administrative
Freedom to Empower Users
In this investigation, the main finding regarding empowerment is that
users of nonprofit schools enjoy more empowerment than users of other
types of schools and nursing homes. This can be explained by the
administrative freedom afforded to nonprofit schools. Legal instruments
and formal arrangements at the national and municipal level also con-
tribute to explaining levels of empowerment. Individual forms of
empowerment are perceived as more important for users than collective
forms of empowerment.
It is a reasonable assumption that limited access to user choice would
inspire nursing homes to develop their own instruments for empower-
ment. This is not the case, and generally speaking, schools have more
empowered users. In schools, there is no shortage of volunteers to par-
ticipate in user boards. Their role also has stronger legal backing, and on
certain issues, school leaders must consult user boards before making
final decisions. The role of user boards is in most cases well established,
and users do not reflect much on their power. They generally share the
feeling that they have influence and that this makes it worth their time.
The collective influence of the user board varies, but it is a shared feature
that users exploit this arena when they have strongly held opinions on
issues.
In nursing homes, there are small differences in terms of empower-
ment between institutions belonging to different institutional sectors. For
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schools, on the other hand, there are important differences. Nonprofit
schools seem to consistently offer more room for empowerment and a
broader range of services for users. One central explanation for this is the
administrative freedom these schools enjoy. Nonprofit schools are located
outside of larger structures of hierarchical governance, such as munici-
palities and for-profit firms. This gives nonprofit schools fewer sources
for steering, and thus more decision-making power rests locally at these
schools. Fewer stakeholders mean a greater share of power for existing
stakeholders, and parents are the principal stakeholders. Ben-Ner (1986)
has shown how nonprofits are often founded by entrepreneurs who have
strong convictions in terms of their missions and methods. They,
therefore, construct mechanisms that protect what is distinctive about
their services, their steering capacity, and the room they allocate for user
empowerment. As we have seen in this study, parental influence is also
part of the reason why nonprofit schools have been established. There
may also be an aspect of self-selection involved, since families who seek
nonprofit schools often wish to actively influence how the schools are
run. However, for the potential agency of these families to blossom, it is
necessary to allow it to develop, which nonprofit schools do.
Two further arguments underline the importance of administrative
freedom. First, the Swedish example of a public school governed by
parents displays as much empowerment as nonprofit schools.
Accordingly, when public schools have the same administrative room for
manoeuvring, they can empower their users in the same fashion as
nonprofits. However, this potential is seldom used as this school model is
uncommon. A likely interpretation of this is that granting public schools
a significant degree of freedom from public hierarchy undermines the
input channel of the local democracy—the votes cast in elections. Local
politicians are evaluated by how they run schools; thus, appearing to lean
back and leave school operations to parents may be seen as a failure to
assume a central part of their responsibility. This represents a dilemma
between different forms of democratic legitimacy. The dilemma is,
however, not present when nonprofits run schools, since in these cases
local politicians are not held responsible. It is also an indication that even
though earlier reported studies suggested that a growing number of
decisions are being made at the output side of the democratic process
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(Andersen 2006), there is a limit to this development when politicians
seek to remain in charge of services. Aside from the issue of democratic
legitimacy, politicians also seek to safeguard the model of a unitary school
system that all children attend. The idea is that this model promotes
social integration across economic, cultural and religious cleavages in
society. The willingness to give freedom to nonpublic schools may
depend on the willingness to give up or downsize ambitions for a unitary
school system as an arena for social integration.
Second, nonprofit nursing homes do not offer the same level of
diversity and empowerment as schools. This demonstrates how nonprofit
institutions are dependent on the public sector’s approach to service areas
when they are part of the public service system. In all municipalities,
nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes have about the same room for
collective user empowerment as their public counterparts, while variation
does exist between municipalities. This implies that municipal-level
regulations are important for influencing levels of empowerment, which
suppresses any potential nonprofit or for-profit providers may have to
deviate from the public approach to empowerment. Illustrative of this is a
statement from an administrative leader in a Swedish municipality who
pointed out that the number of compulsory demands made of nursing
homes tends to lead them to become ‘all the same’ (Interview, admin-
istrative leader, municipality, Sweden).
What is shared between service areas is the agreement that individual
empowerment is experienced by users as being more important than
collective forms of empowerment. Most users are satisfied with their level
of individual empowerment, both in nursing homes and schools. There is
somewhat more discontent among users at nursing homes, but such users
tend to add that it is not based on lack of will from the staff, but instead
on the shortage of staff and resources. There are few important differ-
ences in this respect across institutional sectors, municipalities and
countries. These differences seem more dependent on the individual
attributes of staff members. In addition, municipal-level regulations and
institutional arrangements in companies or institutions influence indi-
vidual empowerment. A telling example is the for-profit school in
Sweden that has its own ombudsman. Students at this school have
additional opportunities to voice complaints. The commercial interests of
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for-profit schools may also compel them to be more diligent in
following-up on complaints. Whether these incentives work in this way
is an empirical question we do not have the data to answer at this time.
Either way, they demonstrate the potential for increased individual
empowerment in different steering structures.
Participation—Administrative Integration Gives Arenas
for Participation
The main findings regarding participation mirror the findings about
empowerment. When institutions become detached from the public
hierarchy, their users participate less in local policy processes. This means
that, unlike for empowerment, the lowest levels of participation in local
policy processes are found among users of nonprofit schools. Formal
arrangements for user involvement are important as they can explain
variations in user participation between service areas and municipalities.
The countries were uniform in their stated aims regarding user par-
ticipation in policymaking. Open meetings among policymakers, and
regular meeting points between users and policymakers, occur in many
places. The users most capable of taking advantage of these spaces are at
institutions integrated with the public administration. These include
nursing homes, public schools and, interestingly, for-profit schools.
When municipalities outsource services, they do so without reducing
their perceived responsibility for the services. Nursing home users have
no option to opt out of services from for-profit providers, and local
policymakers, therefore, retain their ability to involve themselves in
them. Users of nonprofit schools have consciously opted out of the realm
of local policymakers, and are thus less of a concern for the municipality.
Since decisions regarding opportunities to open up these schools rest at
the national level, there is no process whereby the electorate can hold
local policymakers responsible for the service content of these schools.
Swedish for-profit schools are approved nationally, but are somewhat
more attached to the municipal structure and are thus in a middle
position.
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This dimension exhibits fewer differences between service areas. All
municipalities conduct user surveys, and these are administered in all
institutions except nonprofit schools. User surveys are the only oppor-
tunity for direct communication between users and local policymakers.
In addition, municipalities have arenas for representatives of institutions
to participate. For nursing homes, there is no difference between public,
for-profit and nonprofit institutions when it comes to their participation
in these arenas. For schools, the more detached nonprofit schools are
more isolated when it comes to participation. This is partly because local
policymakers have less influence over what happens at nonprofit schools.
It is a curious situation, since issues discussed in these arenas often
include more than municipal school policies and are thus of interest also
to the parents of children in nonprofit schools.
The implication here is that a trade-off exists between empowerment
at institutions and participation and influence in local policy process.
The institutions where users have more local influence get less attention
and less room for influence from the municipal level. This gives them
more room to manoeuvre locally but also gives them less administrative
support. Albeit to varying degrees, municipalities are important for all
these institutions, and so to be excluded from the municipal
decision-making structure undermines the opportunities citizens have to
influence decision making in their communities. For policymakers, the
exclusion of citizens from platforms for communication with them can
present a skewed view of the opinions of citizens, especially those who by
definition have taken an active stance on particular welfare issues.
There is some variance between countries. In Denmark, user boards at
nursing homes can report about successes in changing municipal policy,
and interactions with local policymakers are a natural part of their tasks.
This also happens in Norway, but to a lesser extent, while in Sweden it is
all but absent. For schools, divisions between the strong influence of
public schools and the lack of influence of nonpublic schools are evident
across countries. The greater presence of participation in Denmark can
be seen in the light of Scandinavian countries’ respective ‘power studies’,
where the Danish research team drew more optimistic conclusions about
the state of democracy on the basis of investigations into the imple-
mentation of policies (Andersen 2006).
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Conclusions
Effect of Institutional Sector Depends on User Choice
and Administrative Freedom
This chapter used experiences from 27 institutions in seven municipal-
ities in three Scandinavian countries to explore whether it matters who
provides publicly funded and regulated services. There is accordingly a
wealth of data underlying the inferences made in this study, but they are
not representative in any statistical meaning of the word. The results in
this chapter must, therefore, be regarded as exploratory. There are many
potential approaches to a comparison of service providers from different
institutional sectors. Here I have chosen active citizenship: the ability for
users to take control over their own lives when they are dependent on
services.
There are differences between public, for-profit and nonprofit provi-
ders when it comes to active citizenship. However, these differences vary
between the dimensions of active citizenship and service areas. Generally,
nonprofits deviate more than for-profits in terms of public options.
These deviations include providing more room for active citizenship
along the dimensions of choice and empowerment, and less so for par-
ticipation. What is needed is an understanding of these variations.
The first step is to look at the interaction of administrative freedom
and user choice. Illustrative in this respect are the differences between
Norwegian and Danish nonprofit schools and the elderly care sector in all
three countries. In all three countries, this study shows nursing homes are
closely integrated with the municipal hierarchy. Municipalities have
ample room to intervene in nonprofit nursing homes, a power that
undermines their autonomy and ability to be different from municipal
nursing homes. For for-profit nursing homes, tender documents are very
detailed and thus leave little room to develop distinctive characters.
Furthermore, they are measured by the same parameters as municipal
nursing homes and provide incentives to strive for the same goals.
Overall, this means that nonpublic nursing homes have little adminis-
trative freedom and limited opportunity to develop distinctiveness.
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This is in contrast with what we find for nonprofit schools in Norway
and Denmark. These schools are outside municipal control since they are
approved at the state level. The directorate for education collects the
opinions of a municipality about establishing a nonprofit school, but the
municipality will not be able to prevent its establishment. Moreover,
municipalities do not supervise or inspect nonprofit schools. In addition,
nonprofit schools are governed by different laws than public schools and
thus have different legal elbow rooms than nonpublic nursing homes. In
comparison, Swedish nonprofit schools can be established without
municipal approval, but municipalities monitor them more extensively
than they do in Norway and Denmark. For example, nonprofit schools
are included in some municipal quality surveys. Moreover, nonpublic
schools in Sweden are governed by the same laws as public schools,
which provide less space and incentives to develop distinctive charac-
teristics. The result is that there is less variation between schools in
Sweden than in either Denmark or Norway. The other side of this point
is that we find competition between schools to be stronger in Sweden
than it is in Norway, with Denmark occupying an intermediate position.
When distinctive characteristics of a school are not used as selection
criteria, general perceptions of school quality determine which school
families ultimately choose. The struggle to create quality perceptions
invites competition and pits schools against each other. Therefore,
Swedish interviewees reported that unhappy families often used com-
petition between schools as a means of changing schools.
This study suggests that user choice is decisive for establishing dis-
tinctiveness in public, for-profit and nonprofit institutions. User choice is
what enables the state and municipalities to let providers develop dis-
tinctive profiles from public options, since this implies that distinctive-
ness is not forced upon any user. This distinctiveness is an important
factor in its own right, but allowing for institutional distinctiveness has
two further implications for empowerment and participation. First,
institutional arrangements that allow for diversity are also more flexible
in how they are run. Institutions can use this flexibility to make changes
based on input from users. The potential for obtaining real changes
through arenas for empowerment at institutions is, therefore, greater
since the room for change is larger. We see this effect in nonprofit
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schools, where their detachment from public hierarchy creates possibil-
ities for the democratic involvement of parents to a larger degree than in
the other institutions.
Second, users involved in nonpublic, and especially nonprofit, insti-
tutions have often obtained the service they preferred by selecting a
provider that was distinct from the public provider. If they had been
forced to remain with a provider within the public hierarchy, they would
be more likely to use voice to seek changes from policymakers. The
existence of a broad range of service providers therefore weakens the
motive for using political channels to influence the content of services.
Moreover, many of the arenas currently in place to inform local poli-
cymakers about the views and opinions of users exclude users of non-
profit schools. Local politicians are more concerned with nonpublic
nursing homes, since the lack of user choice there makes it a political–
administrative decision which citizens use against them.
Emphasis on governance tools must be balanced with an examination
of the characteristics of the users. Of the three analytic dimensions, I
found the greatest variation in active citizenship between the different
service areas. Users of schools have more capacity for active citizenship
than users of nursing home services. They are also more willing and able
to exploit the existing capacity. Part of the explanation for this can be
found in the nature of services and users. Parents are more inclined to
involve themselves in school services than elderly users at nursing homes
who typically are in poor health and do not always have relatives available
to speak on their behalf.
Implications for the Scandinavian Model
A part of the Scandinavian welfare model is that municipalities have
broad and comprehensive responsibilities for providing services to citi-
zens. A reason for this is that assigning decision-making power to the
municipal level is expected to yield services better tailored to the needs of
citizens. When decisions are made at the local level, they are more
compatible with the local context and local priorities (Kjølsrød 2005).
Moreover, Norwegians find local democracy to be an important part of
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the democratic system, but they mainly regard municipalities as service
providers, a belief that underscores the importance of this aspect of their
functioning (Rose 2011). However, this study shows that nonpublic
schools which are removed from the municipal decision-making sphere
can better tailor their services to the interests of users. This demonstrates
how detaching service providers from the municipal level gives them
more room to manoeuvre and enables them to develop distinctive ser-
vices and increased flexibility in order to heed signals from users. The
challenge for the Scandinavian welfare model is whether this develop-
ment challenges the demand for equality in services.
The term ‘welfare municipalities’ describes the trade-off between
universalism and local decision-making capacities (Kröger 1997; Burau
and Kröger 2004; Grønlie 2004). State oversight is normally seen as a
limiting room for both local policymakers and street-level bureaucrats
and thus creates uniform services across municipalities (Henriksen et al.
2012, 471, Tranvik and Selle 2005). Strong, autonomous municipalities
supposedly undermine the universality of services as they create variations
between municipalities. This study gives nuance to this finding since it
demonstrates how the state can also obtain service differentiation by
weakening municipal control—when nonpublic school approval takes
place at the national level. When the state grants freedom to a nonpublic
provider to develop the content of their services, it diminishes municipal
power and increases diversity. In turn, universalism in the context of the
content of services is also reduced.
At the same time, the nursing home case studies also show that there
are no necessary advantages for active citizenship that automatically come
from provider plurality. Rather, the potential for active citizenship is
demonstrated under certain conditions. In the school sector, nonprofit
providers stand out by giving increased autonomy to users both in the
form of catering to niche preferences and enabling user influence in the
operation of schools. In this way, nonprofit providers can be understood
as the prime exponents of a core feature of what has been labelled the
Scandinavian form of citizenship, which democratize[s] all aspects of
society (Hernes 1988; Janoski 1998, 20). It might be a paradox that in a
welfare model dominated by public providers, nonprofit providers
arguably represent the most advanced example of one of its most
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successful tenets. This implies that a natural next step in developing
Scandinavian welfare societies based on core citizenship values is to
actively use the welfare mix to give influence to citizens and curb the
power of public bureaucrats.
On the other hand, the democratising effect of nonprofit providers is
dependent on the state yielding its responsibility and influence to smaller
groups of citizens. It is an individual choice to opt for a nonpublic
school, but collective efforts are necessary in order to obtain such alter-
natives. Fundamental to Scandinavian state individualism is that the state
guarantees services to citizens and thus liberates them from smaller col-
lectives in society (Trägårdh 1997). A future welfare society where
providers are granted more liberty in the welfare mix may make services
more dependent on initiatives of smaller collectives, and the individual’s
integration into alternative structures such as families and religious
groups may become more important, a possibility which could weaken a
central and distinctive value of the Scandinavian welfare model.
Diversity in terms of providers and service content is beneficial for
active citizenship, but it is important not to lose sight of those citizens
who do not want or are unable to exercise active citizenship. Their
interests are as important as the interests of the ones who continuously
and actively seek to influence services for their own benefit. Some studies
from Sweden have shown that user choice schemes in schools have led to
increased differences between schools (Böhlmark and Holmlund 2012;
Lindbom 2010). The goal of for-profits and their incentives—to pri-
oritise profit over quality—has been identified as a threat to the equal
and high quality of the welfare provision (Steinberg 2006). In earlier
studies, Meagher and Szebehely (2013) found that due to tight regula-
tion of services, Scandinavian elderly care has avoided many of the
negative effects of marketisation that have occurred in the US. Tuning
down the level of public regulation in order to enhance diversity between
providers may accordingly have unwanted consequences for service
quality involving aspects not included in this study.
In a study of Danish home care, Rostgaard (2006) found that the new
‘consumer citizens’ can have more influence over services, but that there
are differences in the ability of users to exploit this opportunity. This is
an issue we are not able to answer satisfactorilyin this study, and further
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research on this issue in Scandinavia is needed. Likewise, it is an inde-
pendent value in the school system that children from different back-
grounds with different values and interests meet in a public arena, which
increases integration between different groups in society. This type of
value must always be assessed against different dimensions of active
citizenship.
One can envisage that the more individual constituents of active cit-
izenship, such as user choice and individual empowerment, may some-
times conflict with equality values in Scandinavian welfare. The collective
aspects of active citizenship, such as a user council and close contact
between users and decision makers, are more easily compatible with an
equity ideal. Moreover, the mentioned violations of human rights in
Norwegian nursing homes affect some of the weakest users. This
underlines that it is not sufficient with mechanisms for the individual
advancement of one’s own interests. Collective arrangements are neces-
sary for the whole range of users’ interests to receive attention. The
private resources of individuals cannot decide the level of service for
citizens.
In the nursing home sector, differences between public, for-profit and
nonprofit providers are not large in terms of active citizenship. Here the
differences are rather between municipalities and countries. This shows
how important legislations, regulations and choices made by local poli-
cymakers can affect the capacity for active citizenship. The legal position
of user boards at public schools gives influence to the users. Similarly,
municipal guidelines concerning the role of user boards can secure user
influence in relevant nursing homes. Active citizenship can be promoted
by providing nonpublic, particularly nonprofit, providers a framework
that will promote their user influence models; it can also be extended
through government legislation and directives for the advancement of
user influence at all institutions.
Finally, does it actually matter who performs services? Yes, but not if
there are capacity problems, little real user choice and tight municipal
governance. The state and municipalities decide who will perform public
welfare tasks. If the public sector chooses, it can use nonpublic actors
strategically to promote more and different values than what public
institutions deliver. To get maximum benefit from the diversity that
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nonpublic institutions offer, one must ensure adequate capacity and it is
thus beneficial to have a user choice system. Further, it is necessary to be
conscious of the autonomy institutions should have. They should be
given the opportunity to develop distinctiveness, but at the same time
they should be required to establish venues for user influence. By using
these tools, the public sector can use the welfare mix to promote active
citizenship. However, it is necessary to balance measures to promote
active citizenship against the effects they have for equality values in
Scandinavian welfare. What this study demonstrates is the broad range of
options that exist when designing welfare services and some of the
mechanisms involved in determining the outcome of active citizenship.
Governments can regulate shares of providers in the welfare mix and the
activities of the providers in the welfare mix. The division of strictness
and lenience on those two dimensions is decisive for active citizenship.
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Does the Type of Service Provider Affect
User Satisfaction? Public, For-Profit
and Nonprofit Kindergartens, Schools
and Nursing Homes in Norway
Tord Skogedal Lindén, Audun Fladmoe
and Dag Arne Christensen
Introduction
Are private welfare services better than those provided by the public
sector? One way to address this question is to ask users of public,
for-profit, and nonprofit welfare services to evaluate services. User sat-
isfaction is an important topic as it may influence general support for
social policy and thus has importance for welfare state legitimacy.
However, as social policy research has so far focused more on cash
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benefits than services, we have limited knowledge about how, for
example, service providers influence service quality and user satisfaction
(e.g. Jensen 2011). Thus, we need more knowledge about user satis-
faction. In this chapter, we shed light on this important yet little studied
topic, based on recently collected survey data from Norway within
childcare, education and elderly care (DIFI 2011 2013a, b, 2015a, b;
Kumlin et al. 2016). This supplements the book, which, so far, has
discussed changes in the regulation and provision of nursing homes and
schools at the national level in Denmark, Sweden and Norway as well as
municipal-level case studies. We have included kindergartens as a third
service in this chapter because of the high proportion of private suppliers
in Norway. Substantively, this service is also relevant as it has increasingly
been considered part of the educational pathway in Norway, most
explicitly manifested in 2005 when the responsibility for kindergartens
was moved from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs to the
Ministry of Education and Research.
It is important to distinguish between two feedback mechanisms when
it comes to rating services and providers. One is ‘objective’, consisting of
so-called ‘hard indicators’ such as resources and outputs. These indicators
have traditionally constituted the main, if not the only, sources for
monitoring public sector performance (Bouckart and Van de Walle
2003). It is only recently that ‘soft indicators’ measuring user satisfaction
have become more important as a means to evaluate public services. This
change of focus has gone hand in hand with an increased interest in
accountability (Bouckart and Van de Walle 2003). This approach orig-
inated in the United States during the 1990s and has since spread to
Europe. In fact, the Norwegian Citizen Survey is based on the American
Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) (Christensen et al. 2011). This shift
from hard to soft indicators has provided a new set of tools for evaluating
public services (Van Ryzin 2004). However, the accuracy of these tools
has been a source of concern (Van De Walle and Ryzin 2011). First, it
appears that questions about specific services yield higher overall satis-
faction than questions dealing with the general evaluation of public
services. Second, studies from the United States suggest huge variation in
user satisfaction across services (Miller and Miller 1991). Third, even
citizens who have no experience with certain public services appear to
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have strong opinions about them. Fourth, there is no one-to-one rela-
tionship between user satisfaction and the quality of public services
(Rolland 2003). In addition to their experiences with the services as such,
evaluation is also based on users’ predispositions and expectations (James
2009). Thus, citizens’ satisfaction with a particular service will depend on
a long list of factors, and there is no straightforward relationship between
service satisfaction and the quality of the services.
In the introduction to this volume, Sivesind and Trætteberg asked
whether public, nonprofit or for-profit providers are most conducive to
active citizenship. Active citizenship implies user choice, empowerment,
and participation understood as the actual ability for users to express views
and argue for change. In this chapter, we contribute to the book’s overall
topic by discussing user satisfaction. We are mainly concerned with the
dimension of active citizenship Sivesind and Trætteberg referred to as
choice, which includes two empirical indicators: ‘Promoting a broader
range of services where more users obtain services that cater to their
interests’ and ‘Formal and real exit opportunities give power to users’.
Thus, choice could generate higher user satisfaction through at least two
mechanisms: (1) improved service quality and (2) empowerment.
The first mechanism—improved service quality—rests on the idea
that a well-functioning market, where users can choose freely between
different service providers, will lead to higher satisfaction. Welfare sys-
tems combining public financing of services with for-profit or nonprofit
service providers are referred to as a ‘quasi-market’ (Le Grand 1997,
151). As will be empirically described below, although public suppliers
are dominant in the Norwegian welfare state, nursing homes, kinder-
gartens, and schools resemble quasi-markets to some extent. According to
Le Grand (1997, 159), competition could result in efficiency and
responsiveness: ‘Schools will be more sensitive to parents, for fear that
they will otherwise take their child away—or not apply in the first place
—and the school budget will suffer. And they too will have an incentive
to be more efficient’.
The other mechanism—empowerment—rests on a great corpus of
psychological research that has demonstrated that choice is positively
related to satisfaction, even if the outcome is incongruent with previously
stated preferences (see e.g. Botti and Iyengar 2004). By introducing the
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possibility of opting out and choosing a different provider, users may feel
empowered as active citizens, a feeling which by itself may lead to
increased satisfaction irrespective of actual service improvement.
We draw on two strong data sources to illuminate our research ques-
tions: the biennial Norwegian Citizen Survey (Innbyggerundersøkelsen)
conducted by the Norwegian Agency for Public Management and
eGovernment (DIFI) in 2011, 2013 and 2015, and a survey on social
capital and welfare attitudes (SuppA) conducted by the Institute for Social
Research (ISF) in 2014 and 2015 (Kumlin et al. 2016). The DIFI data
provide comprehensive information about satisfaction with public and
private welfare providers and has one major benefit compared with other
data sources: It distinguishes between actual users with service experience
and respondents evaluating services based on other sources of informa-
tion. Unfortunately, the DIFI data does not distinguish nonprofit from
for-profit providers. To be able to fully discuss the importance of
the service provider for user satisfaction, we thus introduce a second
data source. The SuppA survey not only differentiates between users
and non-users, but also includes questions for distinguishing between
nonprofit, for-profit providers, and public providers.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, we give a short
overview of existing research on welfare services, followed by a brief
presentation of characteristics of the kindergarten sector, schools, and
nursing homes. We then present our data sources and describe charac-
teristics of users of private and public services in terms of social back-
ground, education, and income. Next, we analyse results on user
satisfaction from two angles: differences in user satisfaction between
public and private providers in general based on the DIFI data, and then
we further elaborate on user satisfaction between different groups based
on the SuppA survey for distinguishing nonprofit from for-profit pro-
viders. We discuss the general high-level of user satisfaction with
Norwegian welfare services as well as differences between the three
welfare services with respect to the room needed to create distinctive
services. The dependent variable is user satisfaction, and the predictor we
are mainly interested in is who is delivering the service. The last section
concludes our discussion.
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Welfare Services and User Choice
Privatisation is a disputed issue in Norway. While the previous centre–
left government largely resisted privatisation, the conservative govern-
ment that took office in 2013 stated explicitly in their political manifesto
that they ‘will promote private and voluntary initiatives and allow for the
participation of a wider range of actors, including in the provision of
welfare services’.1 By focusing on kindergartens, primary and lower
secondary schools, and nursing homes, we included three important
sectors of the welfare state. As mentioned by Sivesind in Chap. 2, the role
of commercial and non-commercial service providers may vary sub-
stantially between sectors. While around 50% of Norwegian children
attending day care institutions use a private service, some 3% attend a
private primary or lower secondary school, and some 10% of nursing
home residents live in privately run institutions. The three sectors vary
with regard to the room for creating distinctive services, which is relevant
for active citizenship. Overall, analysing important welfare services
extends the limited existing knowledge on the consequences of welfare
providers for user satisfaction and active citizenship.
As described above, in addition to supposedly increased
cost-effectiveness, one of the main arguments in favour of the privatisation
of public services is that choice and competition enhance service quality. In
academic debates, this has been most boldly stated by Julian Le Grand,
who argued that if policies are appropriately designed, extending choice
and competition among providers will enhance service quality in most
areas of public welfare (Le Grand 1997, 2007). Other studies, however,
question this claim. A large meta-study on elderly care in the US has, for
instance, suggested that public providers in most cases perform better than
commercial providers (Comondore et al. 2009). And in 2015, two leading
scholars provided a very critical overview of the results of New Public
Management reforms in the UK (Hood and Dixon 2015).
Research conducted in Norway and other Nordic countries on the
welfare provision of kindergartens, primary and lower secondary schools,
and nursing home services is limited and ambiguous. According to
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Børhaug and Lotsberg (2012, 30), we have little knowledge of the
relationship between competition and quality in general, and with regard
to kindergartens in particular. Gulbrandsen and Eliassen (2013) found
few differences in quality between public and private providers in
Norway. Børhaug and Lotsberg (2012, 31), however, referred to some
recent studies which showed that parents with children in private
kindergartens are more pleased than parents with children in public
institutions. There is also little research on the quality of public and
private primary and lower secondary schools in Norway. Swedish
research (e.g. Hartman 2011; Böhlmark and Lindahl 2012; Skolverket
2012) has provided both positive and negative lessons which, however,
are not necessarily directly transferable, as conditions vary (e.g. with
respect to school profiles and opportunities to yield a profit). Moreover,
as many as 27% of Danish and 14% of Swedish pupils attend a
non-public lower secondary school, compared to 3% in Norway (Udir
2015b, 32; see Chap. 2 in this volume and Sivesind 2016 for more
information). Research on quality in public and private nursing homes is
also scarce and inconclusive, and as Trætteberg and Sivesind (2015, 16)
have stated, this literature is mostly concerned with differences between
public and private providers and hardly distinguishes between for-profit
and nonprofit. Vabø et al. (2013) gave an overview of existing research
on elderly care and concluded that there is no clear answer to the
question of whether privatisation improves quality. Bogen (2011),
Gautun et al. (2013), and Petersen et al. (2014) reached similar con-
clusions. A large Swedish study of nursing homes summarised the mixed
nature in this research field by suggesting that commercial and public
suppliers outperform each other on different quality indicators.
Commercial suppliers perform better on certain service indicators, such
as user participation in the formulation of care plans, while public
suppliers perform better on structural quality (hard indicators), such as
the number of employees per resident (Stolt, Blomqvist and Winblad
2011). As this short overview of existing research reveals, it is difficult to
develop clear expectations on user satisfaction with public and private
providers based on findings from the Norwegian and Nordic context.
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Scope and Characteristics of Public
and Private Kindergartens, Schools
and Nursing Homes in Norway
Table 7.1 displays the level of public, nonprofit and for-profit private
providers in kindergartens, schools, and nursing homes in Norway.2
Within childcare, Norway has a substantial level of private providers:
53% of kindergartens are private (Statistics Norway 2015).
Unfortunately, this statistic does not distinguish between for-profit and
nonprofit providers. Even though kindergarten coverage is now more or
less universal, the choice of provider is not an option for everyone as
private kindergartens are not available everywhere. Moreover, there is a
fixed maximum fee irrespective of the service provider, and public
demand for kindergartens may in some areas exceed the supply, forcing
parents to choose the first available offer. Nevertheless, when it comes to
the room for creating distinctive services, private providers do have
flexibility (Børhaug et al. 2011, 183; Børhaug and Lotsberg 2012). There
are many minimum requirements, but the provider decides, for instance,
priority areas, admission requirements, opening hours, and the number
of staff beyond minimum requirements of pedagogical leaders (NOU
2012; Kindergarten Act 2005).
Approximately 6% of primary and lower secondary schools are private,
and as few as 3% of Norwegian pupils attend a private primary and lower
secondary school (Udir 2013, 2015a). Private schools in Norway









Public 47 94 91
Nonprofit 53 6 5
For-profit 0 4
Sources aStatistics Norway (2015). bUdir (2015a). cSt. Meld (2012–2013, 71)
Note Statistics Norway distinguishes only between public and private providers of
kindergartens. The entry (53%) is thus the sum of nonprofit and for-profit
providers
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receiving public subsidies can only be nonprofit. With a few exceptions,
they have to offer a ‘religious or pedagogic alternative’ to be approved—
the Montessori schools being one example. Of the 208 private schools in
Norway in 2014–2015, 74 were approved on a religious basis and 99 as a
pedagogic alternative (Udir 2015b, 35). Private schools often have few
pupils. Sixty percent of new private schools are established after a public
school has been closed, typically in remote areas. However, this does not
suggest that this happens very often: only 10% of the closed public
schools are replaced by new, private schools (Udir 2013, 3). We find
most of the private schools in or around large cities (Udir 2015b, 36).
This means that private schools in Norway often have clear alternative
profiles, but they also sometimes serve as substitutes for public schools
that have been closed.
In contrast to the school sector, living in private or public nursing
homes is usually not a conscious choice, as demand is much larger than
available institutions can offer. However, in some large cities, Oslo for
example, private nursing homes constitute a large share of the total
number of institutions, allowing some degree of choice. Nationally,
around 90% of nursing homes are run by public providers, while private
for-profit and nonprofit homes are responsible for some 5% each (St.
Meld 2012–2013, 71). Providers’ scope of action is limited due to tight
municipal regulations (see Feltenius’ chapter), but while it is illegal for
service providers to distribute profits from primary and lower secondary
schools, it is allowed in private kindergartens and nursing home services.
As the literature review in the previous section suggested, it is difficult
to establish clear hypotheses concerning variations in user satisfaction
between different providers. Nevertheless, as this overview of the present
state of the scope and characteristics of kindergartens, schools and
nursing homes in Norway has shown, we may propose some expecta-
tions. First, based on the observation that real user choice is most evident
in the school sector, we expect higher levels of user satisfaction among
those intentionally choosing a private (nonprofit) school. This may be
the result of quality differences between providers; through
well-functioning quasi-markets, private providers have strong incentives
to enhance service quality. Alternatively, satisfaction with private
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alternatives may increase by the act of choosing, which itself can generate
feelings of empowerment. Second, as nursing homes are a scarce com-
modity which barely meets the demands of the public, we expect the least
variation in user satisfaction in this sector. The case studies presented in
Chaps. 4 and 6 in this volume have shown that there are few differences
between nursing homes across the municipalities, implying that variation
in user satisfaction should also be limited. Following this logic, we expect
the level of variation in satisfaction among users of kindergartens to be
located somewhere in between the other two.
Data and Measurement
The data originate from two sources: The first is the Norwegian Citizen
survey, consisting of over 30,000 answers from individuals who received
the survey in 2010, 2013 and 2015 (response rates were around 42%).
The survey was conducted by the Norwegian Agency for Public
Management and eGovernment (DIFI) by means of postal question-
naires and with the option to answer online. The survey was introduced
in 2010 and was intended to assess citizens’ satisfaction not only with
public services, but also included several questions about political par-
ticipation and attitudes towards politicians. In each of the surveys,
respondents were asked whether they had used the services they were
asked to evaluate. Respondents answering ‘yes’ to this question received a
second (and much shorter) questionnaire that focused on various aspects
of that service. These are the datasets used in this study, and the final
analysis includes 1998 kindergarten users, 2264 primary and lower
secondary school users, and 1622 nursing home users.
The dependent variable in the citizen survey was derived from a single
item (here exemplified in the kindergarten survey): ‘Think back on the
experiences you have had with your child’s kindergarten. Overall, how
satisfied or dissatisfied are you with this kindergarten?’ The items had (in
addition to ‘Do not know’) seven response categories ranging from very
dissatisfied (−3) to very satisfied (+3). In addition, the three user surveys
also asked respondents if the institutions they used were public or pri-
vate. Hence, the citizen survey does not allow us to differentiate between
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for-profit and nonprofit welfare institutions. Because of the limited
number of private schools and nursing homes, we are left with few users
of private institutions in those policy fields (3.3% in primary and lower
secondary schools and 4.1% in nursing homes); but when it comes to
kindergartens, 40% had their child in a private institution. Thus, the
analysis is exploratory in nature.
The second dataset comes from a survey on trust and welfare attitudes
carried out in Norway in two waves (2014 and 2015) as part of the
project ‘Support for the affluent welfare state’ (SuppA), financed by the
Norwegian Research Council (Kumlin et al. 2016). The data were col-
lected by means of a web survey. Most respondents were recruited from
TNS Gallup’s access panel, which is a pre-recruited, web-based pool of
respondents who have been randomly sampled from the Norwegian
population (recruited by means of telephone). As people with an
immigrant background are underrepresented in the panel, additional
respondents were recruited to the panel from the National Register. Both
samples were stratified with an overrepresentation of respondents from
the four largest cities. A total of more than 10,000 interviews were carried
out in 2014 and 2015, of which about one half of the respondents
answered the survey in both waves. In the data analysed for this chapter,
we included all respondents who participated in 2014 (n = 5420) and all
newly recruited respondents in 2015 (n = 2161), for a total of 7581
respondents. Response rates from the pre-recruited panel were 50–60%
(Kumlin et al. 2016).
The advantage of the SuppA dataset is that it allows us to differentiate
between public, for-profit and nonprofit providers of kindergartens and
nursing homes, in addition to distinguishing between public and private
(nonprofit) providers of primary and lower secondary schools. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first Norwegian survey to differentiate
between for-profit and nonprofit providers. The dependent variable relies
on a single item: ‘How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following
services in your municipality/country?’ followed by a list of different
services (e.g. a kindergarten operated by a nonprofit organisation or as a
family cooperative). Responses were given on a 5-point scale, from ‘Very
dissatisfied’ to ‘Very satisfied’ (in addition to ‘Do not know’). The
number of respondents reporting experience with the different services
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varied between 166 (nonprofit kindergartens) and 1905 (public primary
and lower secondary schools).
In both surveys, it is important to emphasise that ‘users’ typically refer
to relatives; parents usually answered the survey for kindergartens and
schools, while both residents and relatives may have completed the
surveys for nursing homes. Thus, the actual users of the two services
aimed at children were their parents, while users of nursing homes may
have been either residents or their relatives. This warrants caution, as
earlier research has shown that relatives are often more critical than actual
users (cf. Christensen and Midtbø 2016). However, all respondents had
some kind of user experience, either personally or as relatives, which is
different from many other surveys where some respondents have had no
experience at all.
The two surveys operated with somewhat different structures. In the
citizen survey, each respondent only evaluated one service provider
within a maximum of five welfare sectors. If respondents had experience
with more than one provider, they were instructed to evaluate only one
of them based on a fixed criterion (e.g. respondents evaluating kinder-
gartens were asked to only think of experiences with their oldest child).
In the SuppA survey, no such criterion was stated, and respondents could
evaluate every service provider they had some sort of experience with.
We will first look at the results from the citizen survey. We specify two
models for each dependent variable—with and without control variables—
but since the two datasets have different structures, the empirical strategy is
somewhat different. In the analysis based on the citizen survey, we analysed
user satisfaction with the three welfare services, controlling for the provider
(public/private). Public welfare institutions are the reference category in
the regression. In the analysis based on the SuppA dataset, we analysed user
satisfaction independently for each service/provider. In order to evaluate
the difference between each provider, we reported 95% confidence inter-
vals for the constant in each regression model.
It is important to mention that differences in user satisfaction can be
related to characteristics of those who choose alternatives to public services
and not just qualities of the services as such. Still, in the second regression
models, we controlled for some indicators associated with the use of
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different types of institutions. In the analysis, we included two social
background variables thatmay be associated with the use of different service
providers or service satisfaction: Education (1 = University/College) and
gender (1 = Male). Education is important as an indicator of social
resources. One expectation is that the more social resources people have,
the more likely they are to take advantage of the possibility to make active
user choices.We also included the respondents’ political party choice in the
previous parliamentary election (1 = Right-wing parties [Conservative
Party/Progress Party] and 1 = Christian People`s Party). The latter was
included because nonprofit welfare institutions in Norway can be attached
to different religions, ideologies or alternative ways of life. Finally, we
controlled for the time trend in service satisfaction using 2010 (citizen
survey) and 2014 (SuppA) as reference categories. Since respondents from
the four largest cities were overrepresented in the SuppA survey, in the
analysis based on this dataset, we also included a control variable indicating
whether the respondent lived in one of the four largest cities in Norway
(1 = Large city).
Results
Are users of private welfare institutions more satisfied with the services
than users of public services? We start by presenting the results from the
three citizen surveys (Table 7.2). We present two models—one with only
the private/public indicator (Model I) and one with controls (Model II).
Starting with the relationship between service satisfaction and service
provider, the table illustrates that using a private welfare institution is
associated with higher satisfaction (see Model I for all three services).
This goes for all three services, but the effect is weak and not statistically
distinguishable from zero when it comes to nursing homes. This is in line
with the expectation that due to a supply shortage of nursing homes, we
would find less variation in user satisfaction in this sector. The two
services oriented towards children, kindergartens, and primary and lower
secondary schools, have more satisfied users among those using private
service providers compared to those using public sector institutions. Also
in line with our expectation based on the possibility of real user choice,
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the difference is biggest among the few respondents in private schools
(0.76). Having children in a private school increases satisfaction by 0.80
points on the 7-point scale. The corresponding increase in satisfaction
among users of private kindergartens is 0.24 on the 7-point scale. For
both kindergartens and primary and lower secondary schools, the coef-
ficients are significant at the 0.01 level.
Adding controls does not change the results substantially (Model II for
all three services). The coefficients measuring the type of service provider
are more or less identical after adding control variables. Note also that
none of the controls turns out to be significant when it comes to satis-
faction with kindergartens, but male respondents are less satisfied with
schools than female respondents. Regarding schools, it is also worth
noting that satisfaction increases over time. Compared to 2010, satis-
faction with primary and lower secondary schools among actual users
increased by 0.21 on the 7-point scale by 2015. Turning to nursing
homes, our controls have substantial influence over service satisfaction.
Male respondents, those with a university education, and respondents
Table 7.2 User satisfaction by public or private service providers: Kindergartens,
primary and secondary schools, and nursing homes. Unstandardised coefficients
(OLS)
Kindergartens Primary and lower
secondary schools
Nursing homes
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II
Constant 5.98 5.98 5.49 5.44 5.45 5.55
Private 0.236*** 0.238* 0.802*** 0.759*** 0.062 0.105
Male −0.080 −0.136*** −0.141*
University 0.009 0.082 −0.342***
Right-wing 0.013 −0.083 −0.178**
CPP 0.043 0.146 0.437***
2013 0.023 0.110 0.236***
2015 0.068 0.211*** 0.218**
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03
N 1,998 1,998 2,264 2,264 1,622 1,622
Source DIFI Norwegian Citizen Survey 2010, 2013, 2015. *P < 0.1 **P < 0.05 ***P < 0.01
Note Right-wing (Conservative Party and Progress Party) and CPP (Christian People’s Party)
denote voter intention
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voting for right-wing parties are significantly less satisfied with the ser-
vices provided by nursing homes. Respondents voting for the Christian
People’s Party are significantly more satisfied with nursing homes, and
satisfaction increased over time compared to the first survey conducted in
2010.
In addition, we carried out supplementary analyses (not shown),
including variables such as income, type of user experience, and age, and
the coefficients for the type of service provider remained unchanged (but
the number of missing values increased). It should be noted that general
service satisfaction with services related to children (kindergartens and
schools) is high compared to services for the elderly (as nursing homes).
Still, users with experience with private kindergartens and schools seem
to be significantly more satisfied with these institutions compared to
users with experience with public kindergartens and schools. It should
also be noted that the explanatory power of the different models is weak.
For example, Model II (nursing homes) in Table 7.1 explains 3% of the
variation in the data.
What does it look like when we include data which allow us to
separate between for-profit and nonprofit service providers? Table 7.3
reports regression results based on the SuppA dataset. As in the citizen
survey, these results also suggest that the service provider is irrelevant
when it comes to nursing homes. The constants reported in columns 7–9
(Model I and Model II) are virtually identical (4.13–4.20). Contrary to
the citizen survey and our initial expectations, the SuppA survey does not
suggest any differences in satisfaction levels between users of public and
private (nonprofit) providers of primary and lower secondary schools,
neither in Model I nor in Model II. The level of satisfaction is somewhat
higher among users of private schools, but the difference is small and far
from statistically significant.
However, turning to kindergartens, we do find some differences. Looking
first at Model I, users of for-profit kindergartens report higher satisfaction
than users of both public and nonprofit kindergartens. The difference
between users of for-profit kindergartens and users of public/nonprofit
kindergartens is 0.22 and 0.37, respectively. Interestingly, users of nonprofit
kindergartens report lower levels of satisfaction than users of public
kindergartens; however, this difference is not significant. These results
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suggest that the differences between public and private kindergartens as
reported in the citizen survey in reality reflect differences between public and
for-profit providers.However, in contrast to the analysis of the citizen survey,
these differences do not hold when adding controls (Model II). The con-
stants do not change substantially, but the differences between them become
insignificant. This may indicate either that the results are driven by
self-selection bias, i.e. that those choosing for-profit kindergartens are dif-
ferent from those choosing public or nonprofit kindergartens, or that the
number of observations (n = 573–980) is too small to yield significant
differences between public/nonprofit and for-profit providers.
Among the different control variables, we see that supporters of
right-wing parties report higher satisfaction with for-profit kindergartens,
and that supporters of the Christian People’s Party report as much as a
scale point higher satisfaction with nonprofit kindergartens. This is not
surprising and suggests that some of the selection bias is related to
political ideology. Right-wing parties have traditionally been the stron-
gest proponents of private/commercial providers, while the Christian
People’s Party (together with other centrist parties) has traditionally been
the strongest proponent of nonprofit providers. Finally, as in the citizen
survey, we also see a somewhat higher level of satisfaction with public
nursing homes over time (2014–2015).
Based on our empirical analysis of these two data sources, the overall
findings are first that the provider is unrelated to user satisfaction with
nursing homes; and second, that user satisfaction is higher among users
of for-profit kindergartens than among users of public and nonprofit
kindergartens. Third, the results are more mixed when it comes to sat-
isfaction with primary and lower secondary schools. In both surveys,
users of private schools report higher satisfaction than users of public
schools; however, in the SuppA survey, this difference is small and
insignificant. This may be explained by selection bias or too few obser-
vations in the SuppA dataset. However, it may also be explained by the
methodological differences between the two surveys described above. In
contrast to the citizen survey, in the SuppA survey, users were not
restricted to evaluating only one service provider. We cannot rule out the
possibility that variations are reduced when respondents evaluate more
than one service provider in a single question battery.
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Concluding Discussion
One of the core ideas behind offering users alternative suppliers of welfare
services is to improve service quality. The argument is that quasi-markets
combined with user choice empower citizens, increase participation,
adapt services to the individuals actually using them, and improve service
delivery. With respect to these assumptions, our results do not show a
substantial for-profit or nonprofit premium over public services. Rather,
the results suggest a mixed picture, where there is a weak tendency for
users of for-profit kindergartens and private (nonprofit) primary and
lower secondary schools to be somewhat more satisfied than users of
public providers, but there was no difference when it came to nursing
homes. These results must be interpreted against the backdrop of the
generally high level of satisfaction with Norwegians welfare services.
The main reason why differences in user satisfaction between service
providers are small in Norway is simply that the overall level of satis-
faction with public welfare services is high across services and providers.
The majority of respondents place themselves on the positive side of the
satisfaction scale irrespective of the type of welfare services rated (see also
Christensen and Midtbø 2016). For instance, in the SuppA survey,
satisfaction levels for the different services and providers examined here
are all close to 4 on a 5-point scale. Consequently, we are analysing
variations between generally satisfied users of welfare services. In effect,
the significant differences in satisfaction levels we found between service
providers are indeed relatively small—the largest being 0.7 on a 7-point
scale (primary and lower secondary schools in the citizen survey).
Looking more substantially at the variations we do find in our data,
different mechanisms may be more or less relevant in explaining differ-
ences between welfare services. Regarding primary and lower secondary
schools, private alternatives are scarce, and since such alternatives can
only be approved if they provide either a religious or a pedagogic alter-
native, intentionally choosing either of them is a very active choice by
parents compared to sending their children to a public school. It is easy
to imagine, as the analysis of the data from the citizen survey indicates,
that such an active choice is justified in terms of high user satisfaction.
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Added to this, several alternative pedagogical schools in Norway have
recently been established based on parent initiatives to compensate for
the closing of a public school. The latter should also result in satisfied
users of such schools. As such, the observed differences in user satisfac-
tion between private and public schools may be the result of both
well-functioning quasi-markets where private initiatives improve service
quality (cf. Le Grand 1997) and also the act of choosing. By being
empowered to choose, some citizens may respond with higher user sat-
isfaction. This latter mechanism cannot be ruled out because our data are
vulnerable to self-selection: users were not randomly assigned to different
schools, and those choosing a private alternative are different from those
choosing the standard public option. Nevertheless, we only found sig-
nificant differences in satisfaction levels in one of the datasets.
Kindergartens are a somewhat different story. Private providers are
widespread and there is little regulation of the field, with the exception of
some minimum requirements for staff. Moreover, as the overall supply of
kindergartens barely meets public demands, parents rarely have the
opportunity to make an intentional choice between different suppliers.
As such, the differences we saw between public and for-profit kinder-
gartens are more likely to be explained by differences in service quality.
Although real choice is limited in this sector, the observed differences
may be the effect of quasi-markets where different suppliers have
incentives to improve quality (cf. Le Grand 1997, 2007). Again, we are
hesitant about these interpretations. This is partly because the observed
differences are very small: 0.2–0.4 points on either a 5- or 7-point scale,
and partly because in the SuppA dataset, the differences are no longer
statistically significant when including control variables. A cautious
conclusion is therefore that users of for-profit kindergartens are somewhat
more satisfied than users of public and nonprofit kindergartens, but that
this difference is very small. This is in line with some previous studies
(Børhaug and Lotsberg 2012, 31).
Finally, regarding nursing homes, the lack of variation in user satis-
faction supports the findings in the case study by Feltenius (see Chap. 4).
As with kindergartens, the supply of nursing homes is scarce; but in
contrast to kindergartens, municipal regulation of nursing homes is tight.
Through standardised quality indicators and contracts, different
278 T.S. Lindén et al.
providers have limited options to develop distinct profiles, and users
receive more or less the same service irrespective of provider. In sum, the
main finding in our data is that users of the three sectors generally report
a high level of satisfaction, producing limited variations between different
service providers. We also found indications that users of private
kindergartens and schools are somewhat more satisfied with the services
compared to users of public services. This finding does not apply to
nursing homes. One possible explanation for the variations between
services is that real user choice is most present in the school sector and
least so in the nursing home sector. Distinguishing further between
for-profit and nonprofit services, we still found hardly any differences
between different types of nursing homes. With regard to kindergartens,
we did, however, find that users of for-profit options are somewhat more
satisfied than users of nonprofit options.
In other words, based on our data and other studies from Norway
(Christensen and Midtbø 2016), one should be reluctant to use evidence
based on soft indicators of service satisfaction as an argument in debates
about privatisation. This is partly due to general methodological concerns
(cf. Van De Walle and Ryzin 2011; James 2009). The main reason,
however, is that the substantial differences in user satisfaction are very
small in Norway. As opposed to evidence from the US (Miller and Miller
1991), the vast majority of users are satisfied irrespective of supplier,
making user satisfaction a quality indicator with limited value (see also
Christensen and Midtbø 2016). This limitation is further underscored by
the limited degree of freedom suppliers have in tailoring services. State
regulations and user rights often limit the possibility of private as well as
public suppliers to offer qualitatively different services. If soft indicators
are to have any value in public debates on privatisation, future studies
need to develop more accurate indicators that will measure relevant
dimensions in a context with limited overall variation at the outset.
To conclude, user choice may result in increased user satisfaction.
However, as our analysis shows, Norwegian welfare services already enjoy
a high-level of user satisfaction. User choice may thus have more
importance for active citizenship by empowering citizens. This quality,
though, may have other challenging implications, as in the classical
trade-off between equality and freedom to choose. Freedom to choose
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may increase social inequalities because resourceful citizens are better
informed and take advantage of available opportunities to a higher extent
than less resourceful citizens. How to balance such values is thus an
important political question for a welfare state that increasingly seems to
emphasise services over cash benefits.
Notes
1. “Political platform for a government formed by the Conservative Party
and the Progress Party”. Sundvolden, 7 October 2013. Retrieved from
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/
a93b067d9b604c5a82bd3b5590096f74/politisk_platform_eng.pdf.
2. A better statistical measure of the size of each provider/sector would be the
number of man-years. Unfortunately, we have not been able to retrieve
these numbers from Statistics Norway.
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8
The Future of the Scandinavian Welfare
Model: User Choice, Parallel Governance
Systems, and Active Citizenship
Karl Henrik Sivesind, Håkon Solbu Trætteberg
and Jo Saglie
Introduction
In this concluding chapter, we summarise and discuss the main findings
regarding national and EU regulation of welfare services and welfare
governance in municipalities and institutions, as well as the impact of
these factors on active citizenship. More precisely, we focus on four
questions: (1) What are the main similarities and differences between
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden? (2) What are the conditions for active
citizenship—here defined as choice, empowerment, and participation?
(3) Does institutional sector matter for the users? (4) What are the
consequences of user choice and other forms of market-emulating
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regulation? Finally, we discuss the consequences of recent developments
in Scandinavian welfare policies for the so-called Scandinavian welfare
model: Where are Scandinavian welfare policies heading?
The Three Countries Compared
When we compare the countries, service areas and economic sectors, we
generally find that the users in the Danish school system are more
empowered and have access to better systems for participation in
decision-making. This has to do with the combination of long traditions
of the free school system in Denmark, few legal restrictions on the
content of the teaching, and the parents’ rights to establish new schools.
The users and the administrative system have clear and coherent
expectations of ‘self-owning institutions’ to such an extent that the new
type of private kindergartens and ‘independent nursing homes’, which
may take out profit, so far tend to operate in a similar way to the
traditional free schools.
Whereas the importance of the nonprofit sector in Denmark consti-
tutes a stable element, Scandinavian welfare provision is also changing.
The role of user choice is increasing. In Sweden, this has been combined
with increased involvement of for-profit service providers. This has
resulted in a strong growth and concentration of ownership in a small
number of welfare conglomerates partly owned by international venture
capitalists. The large Swedish conglomerates appear to use their financial
foundations to gain shares also in the emerging welfare markets in
Denmark and Norway (Herning 2015). Moreover, some of them have
established businesses also in the UK and other European countries.
The case of Denmark nevertheless illustrates that a relatively strong
nonprofit welfare provision is possible within a Scandinavian welfare
model, and this has dampened the commercialisation process to some
extent. The long-standing tradition for independent nonprofit schools in
Denmark points to the importance of path dependency. The strength of
the nonprofit sector in Denmark has been conducive to a strong political
support across party lines. In contrast, the marginal nonprofit sector in
Sweden has not been able to muster much political support. In this respect,
Norway occupies a middle position between Denmark and Sweden.
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However, none of the Scandinavian countries seem to have a recipe for
how to create growth in the nonprofit welfare sector in combination with
increasing user choice and other market-emulating tools of governance.
Norway has succeeded in keeping up the nonprofit share in a rapidly
expanding welfare service sector through prioritising nonprofit in certain
service areas, using contracts without termination dates, and invitations
to tenders and closed negotiations for nonprofit. This option, however, is
now being questioned.
In all three countries, public-sector procurement comes within regu-
lations at the European level. The Norwegian authorities have cast doubt
on the possibility of maintaining such exceptions for nonprofit actors
after the implementation of the EU’s revised Public Procurement
Directive in national laws in 2016.1 However, as Segaard and Saglie
argue in Chap. 3, it appears that each individual country still will be able
to use discretion to organise its welfare mix, taking its cultural context
into consideration. Although the EU regulations constitute an important
framework for national policymaking, the intention is not to standardise
the welfare mix but, rather, to create competition between providers
from different countries where there are potential markets. However,
social, health, and educational services are considered by the EU directive
to be linked to different cultural traditions and have a limited
cross-border dimension. Differences between countries may thus be
maintained within regulations at the European level. However, the
question is how the Scandinavian countries approach and utilise this
latitude. Some Scandinavian politicians and administrators appear to
endorse a stronger ‘competition fundamentalism’ than the EU itself does.
The Conditions for Active Citizenship
We have used the concept of ‘active citizenship’, defined as choice,
empowerment, and participation, in our qualitative case studies, in order
to measure aspects of users’ experiences with welfare services. This
approach emphasises what the citizens can do when they are not satisfied
with their current situation. Do they have a real opportunity to choose a
welfare provider with a desired profile or to change to another provider if
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they are not satisfied? Can they influence their own situation at the
institution through individual, day-to-day contact with staff or through
participation in user boards? Is there participation in municipal
decision-making, either through representatives or mediated by civil
society organisations? The active citizenship approach focuses on
dimensions that enable users to deal with quality problems in relation to
the staff, and the administrators, and local politicians at the municipal
level. Our findings indicate that administrative systems, real opportuni-
ties for choice, and participative structures matter for active citizenship.
These are aspects of the welfare system that policymakers may change
through normal tools of governance.
The combined insight from the case studies reported in Chaps. 4–6 is
that we find the best conditions for active citizenship when there is a real
opportunity for users to choose between institutions, and the service
providers have room to create distinctive services. This situation typically
occurs when there is a right to establish new service institutions,
depending on approval on the national level rather than tight regulation
at the local level. There must also be some excess capacity in the welfare
system to create flexibility between the public and private providers.
Active citizenship is less likely to occur when the municipality assigns
users to the different institutions, there is insufficient capacity, and public
regulation allows little room for distinctiveness. Then the users tend to be
more passive both when it comes to seeking adaptation to their particular
needs and in participation in decision-making at the institutional level.
The power is shifted from the users to the service providers.
These conditions for active citizenship have more to do with regula-
tion, funding, and norms than with whether the providers belong to the
public, for-profit, or nonprofit sector. However, the distinctiveness of
services and empowerment of users through formal arenas is most
prominent in nonprofit service providers, to the extent that they have
operative autonomy from public regulation and external owners with
privileged steering rights.
The comparative case studies in schools and nursing homes presented
in Chaps. 4–6 show that there are considerable differences between the
two service areas with regard to active citizenship. As we elaborate below,
two key features are decisive for explaining similarities between nursing
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homes as well as variations between schools: the user choice enjoyed by
the citizens and the level of operative autonomy enjoyed by the insti-
tutions. The consistency of this finding across countries and service areas
suggests that the importance of these mechanisms have a general scope
that may apply also to other service areas and welfare contexts.
In no nursing home in this study did users find that they had the
power to demand changes based on an opportunity to exit the institu-
tion. Moreover, there are no differences between the nursing homes
stemming from their institutional sectors. The fragility of some elderly
care users makes it difficult to envision that the benefit of user choice is
the same for all groups. In a study based on Swedish data, Meinow et al.
(2011) concluded that ‘those elderly people who are most dependent on
care services and who could benefit most from a “good choice”, are also
those who have the highest prevalence of cognitive and physical limita-
tions associated with the capacity to act as a rational consumer of care
services’. This implies that choice mostly benefits the ones who need it
the least. Differences in elderly care may thereby increase, since the ones
who are weakest and least able to formulate their wishes do not enjoy the
benefits from a choice opportunity. To compensate for this and avoid
service failures and breaches of human rights that have been documented
in elderly care (Norwegian Centre for Human Rights 2014), it is
important to involve relatives, institutional boards, and user organisations
to play the role of an active citizen on behalf of the frail elderly.
In contrast, we found both a stronger element of user choice and more
variation between institutional sectors in schools. All three countries
have, in principle, some level of user choice. In all instances, nonprofit
schools were distinctive from the public option and thus represented a
broadening of the profile of services offered. In Sweden, for-profit schools
are to a lesser degree different, and their lack of an alternative vision is
explicitly explained through the non-ideological status of the for-profits.
However, the for-profits seem to contribute more than the nonprofit in
stimulating competition between schools. This is the only place where
parents report they can use the possibility to exit as a bargaining chip
with the schools. In Denmark, nonprofit schools and public schools do
experience competition, but students do not threaten to change schools.
This point about for-profit schools must be qualified, however, since
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for-profit schools are only found in Sweden. There is thus a possibility
that specific institutional factors operating in the Swedish context
interact with factors related to the institutional sector of the for-profit
schools to produce this effect.
Both schools and nursing homes are mainly financed and regulated by
the government; and yet, there are differences in terms of how much
freedom the providers have. In the school sector, non-public schools are
regulated at the national level, while nursing homes are contracted to
municipalities. The latter contracts are given after a public tender or are
part of long-standing frame arrangements whereby municipalities have
ample room to intervene in detailed aspects of their operations. This
gives nonprofit schools more room to set their own goals, establish their
own unique organisation, and allocate their resources as they wish. This
also gives them the opportunity to create distinctive services and involve
users in them to a greater extent. The combination of user choice and
administrative freedom is important for nonprofit schools, since students
who attend non-public schools actively seek to join them, something that
makes their distinct operation possible.
Does Institutional Sector Matter?
There is reason to believe that the nonprofit have an advantage in provision
of welfare services, because they have less incentive to use the information
asymmetry to their own advantage (Hansmann 1987). In addition, in
voluntary organisations, that own a major part of the nonprofit providers,
member-based democracy has been identified as amechanism that provides
autonomy from public and market forces (Eikås and Selle 2002, 52). In a
recent publication, Selle (2016) argued that this mechanism has been
weakened, which has in turn also weakened nonprofit distinctiveness.
However, distinctiveness may still be secured through alternative mecha-
nisms. Many nonprofit nursing homes and schools are organised as
foundations without a membership democracy. The statutes have mech-
anisms for electing board members that are responsible for realising the
mission statement, and not just for economically sustainable operation.
There also seem to be an ability and willingness on the part of nonprofit
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schools to involve users in the governance of the institutions. The dis-
tinctiveness of the institutions is the reason why users have chosen them,
and they thus look to safeguard this distinctiveness when they are able to
influence the operations of the schools. In these cases, users, therefore,
function in a comparable manner to members in the above-mentioned
studies. At times, users can be both members and users, but by involving
stakeholders other than members, nonprofit are able to preserve their
distinctiveness. Again, this effect seems dependent on user choice, as user
choice is necessary for stakeholders to be sufficiently entrenched in the ideas
behind the distinctive profile of the institutions.
These advantages are also recognised by policymakers. For example, an
Official Norwegian Report (NOU 2011:11) argued that as society
becomes more heterogeneous, welfare sectors will suffer from an
increasing lack of labour and more demanding citizens; thus, more
diversity in services is needed, especially when it comes to the institu-
tional sector of the providers. The report goes so far as to suggest that by
2025, nonprofit providers should run 25% of the care sector. Although
unwilling to support this ambition, the Norwegian government followed
up by declaring that user influence, active citizenship, and local
democracy will be key features of the future care sector (Report to the
Storting (White Paper) nr. 29 2012–2013). In these reports, the con-
nection between service providers, citizenship roles, and services is
assumed. However, the mechanisms with the potential to produce the
desired outcome received little attention.
The public policy thinking described above reveals faith in the inde-
pendent importance of institutional sectors. As we have discussed above,
the findings in this book suggest that the institutional sector of the
provider alone will not produce effects like the ones suggested in the
public policy documents. To obtain changes through the strategic use of
providers from different institutional sectors, changes in institutional
sectors must be combined with other changes to the organisation and
governance of the institutions. The substantial differences between ser-
vice areas demonstrate how looking at the provider alone elucidates only
part of the picture. Trætteberg (2015) has documented how detachment
from public steering, regulation, and financing is what makes the insti-
tutional sectors distinct. It is unclear if this distinctiveness will produce
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the effects policymakers want, but without distinctiveness, it is difficult to
believe that active governance of the welfare mix can achieve anything at
all. Providing conditions that enable the distinctive operation of insti-
tutions is, therefore, the first step in actively using the welfare mix to
obtain societal goals. This has implications for how policymakers
approach their steering of the public sector. For a government wishing to
reach goals such as social investments in schools (Jenson 2013; Morel
et al. 2012) or limiting public expenses in elderly care (Christensen 2012;
Brennan et al. 2012) it is natural to increase the level of public steering as
a means to reach them. New Public Management may require large
administrative resources to make sure that contracts are complied with
(Diefenbach 2009). Paradoxically, such public steering undermines the
opportunities to develop distinctive services, which is fundamental for
reaping some of the benefits of active citizenship.
In addition, Lindén, Fladmoe, and Christensen’s analyses in Chap. 7
show that the impact of the institutional sector on user satisfaction is
limited. These Norwegian data shows that although there are some
differences between the institutional sectors, these differences are very
small. In elderly care, there are no differences in user satisfaction in either
of the two surveys analysed. In schools, there are some minor differences
that disappear after control variables are included. In kindergartens, the
users of for-profit institutions are slightly more satisfied after control
variables are included. Basically, most users are highly satisfied irre-
spective of supplier. In elderly care, the finding is consistent with the
analysis of Feltenius, showing that the service profiles hardly differ
between the sectors because of tight regulation by the municipalities.
A high level of satisfaction may be more a result of finally getting a
much-needed place than a reflection of the actual quality of the services.
In welfare policymaking, there tends to be a strong focus on measures
of user satisfaction but too little analysis of the reasons for satisfaction.
User satisfaction is not only related to service quality as such, but may
increase with low expectations, lack of alternatives, and even powerless-
ness. We, therefore, argue that active citizenship dimensions should be
brought into research on welfare service quality. By doing so, the results
will give clearer advice on which changes are needed to enable users to
define and deal with problems in their own situation. This approach is
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also in line with welfare goals set in policy documents with broad
political support in all the Scandinavian countries. The concept of active
citizenship strengthens the analytic approach to service quality mea-
surement as well as the relevance for policymaking.
In the introductory chapter, we discussed the theory of interdepen-
dence. According to this theory, providers from different institutional
sectors each have their benefits and drawbacks. The welfare field thus
functions best if all providers are present in the welfare mix. This explains
why all three institutional sectors appear in most welfare fields and
countries (Salamon 1987). The Scandinavian nursing home sector has
been an outlier in this sense; up until 25 years ago, there were hardly any
for-profit nursing homes, and in Sweden there were also few nonprofit
(Meagher and Szebehely 2013). This has changed considerably since
then, but it looks as if municipalities have not yet been able to reap the
potential benefits of a differentiated provider structure for active
citizenship. As Feltenius shows in Chap. 4, the municipalities have
arguably made some economic and administrative gains from the use of
open tenders. Yet, Trætteberg (Chap. 6) finds no such effects for active
citizenship, and consequently, there seems to be an unused potential for
active citizenship. Furthermore, Lindén, Fladmoe, and Christensen
(Chap. 7) find no important differences in user satisfaction between the
institutional sectors. The lack of differences between the different pro-
viders may be related to the principle of equivalent service quality that is
a basic value in the Scandinavian welfare model, but the downside is that
it also reduces the possibility for services to be adapted to a more mul-
tifaceted and demanding population. A prerequisite for a successful
welfare society is the ability to adapt to changing conditions. The pos-
sibility to use the welfare mix to develop distinctive service profiles seems
to be underutilised in the context of Scandinavian elderly care.
These findings also indicate that under the present system of gover-
nance in Scandinavia, there may be an unused potential for interde-
pendence between the non-public providers and the state (Salamon
1987; Steinberg 2006). The lack of available places in nursing homes is
not the result of administrative inability to expand the capacity but,
rather, the result of economic considerations in a system where the local
governments in the end are responsible for financing the development of
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new nursing home places within tight budgets. The public administra-
tion is also in charge of allocating users to institutions. Under these
circumstances, the ability of for-profits to rapidly expand their service is
not interesting for the policy makers. The nonprofit ability to cater to
niches is also superfluous, as there is no way for users to choose what
these niche-oriented providers offer. Competition about public contracts
with a focus on costs but with too little emphasis on quality and inno-
vation also gives little room for developing a distinctive profile
(Trætteberg and Sivesind 2015). In Sweden and Norway, we have even
seen examples of nonprofit organisations that have stopped operating
elderly care institutions because they are not able to promote the goals
and values set in their mission statements. If nonprofit services do not
have room for developing a distinctive character, they cannot fill gaps in
the services offered by the public sector (Trætteberg and Sivesind 2015).
This underlines the importance of user choice, sufficient capacity, and a
minimum of administrative and economic autonomy for distinctive
service profiles, which are preconditions for synergies between the in-
stitutional sectors. Further empirical research within a Scandinavian
context may add robustness to such a conclusion.
Consequences of User Choice and Market
Regulation in Scandinavian Welfare
Provision
In the introduction to this book, we identify the Scandinavian model
with its fundamental ideals, which are public funding and regulation of
core welfare services, decentralisation of governance, equal access for all
to high-quality services, and adaptation of services to the user’s needs and
preferences. There is broad political agreement about these goals in all
Scandinavian countries, and they appear to be rather stable features. In
contrast, there are rapid changes and large differences in how the welfare
system is organised between the Scandinavian countries and between the
service areas. This is a result of the implementation of different kinds of
NPM tools of governance in order to reform the relations between users
and public authorities, and between funders (public) and providers
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(irrespective of the sector) of welfare services. This has been clearly
demonstrated through the chapters of this book, comparing changes in
welfare mix (Chap. 2), the legal and institutional contexts (Chap. 3), and
governance in the municipalities and service institutions in elderly care
and schools (Chaps. 4 and 5). However, the regulation of the welfare
service provision is also of critical importance for the promotion of active
citizenship, defined as choice, empowerment, and participation (Chap. 6).
Nonprofit providers have the potential to cater for special interests, ide-
ologies, and faiths that are not interesting business opportunities for
private investors and are unsuitable tasks for the state. When nonprofit do
not play a sufficiently big role in a welfare field, these niches are in danger
of being ignored because of government focus on producing alternatives
acceptable to the majority and for-profits’ desire to cover large markets,
according to economic theories (Salamon 1987; Steinberg 2006). If the
nonprofit sector’s share of services offered is too small, there will be
demands in the population that are not accommodated by the welfare
system. How large a share the nonprofit sector should have depends
on the heterogeneity of the population (Weisbrod 1977; Sivesind and
Selle 2009).
This should be of particular concern for the Scandinavian countries,
where the nonprofit sector has much smaller shares of the welfare
employment than in other Western European countries (Salamon and
Sokolowski 2016). When the Scandinavian welfare states emerged, the
populations were rather homogenous with regards to ethnicity, religion,
and language, and hence welfare provided by the state was acceptable to a
large majority. The primary objective was equal rights to services of high
quality given scarce resources (Kuhnle 1983; Seip 1994). With increasing
private wealth, and social and cultural diversity, it may not be sufficient
to aim for this goal anymore. A dilemma has emerged between providing
services of equal quality to all and adaptation to special needs and par-
ticular interests. If the latter is ignored, users may opt out of services
funded by the government and consequently be less willing to pay taxes.
In other words, the legitimacy of the Scandinavian welfare model de-
pends on finding a critical balance between equivalent service quality and
a sufficient diversity in service profiles to keep up support for
government-funded services. Not all current welfare governance reforms
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are equally suited for this purpose. Something may have to give: the
public funding and regulation, equivalent quality, or adaptation to the
users’ needs and interests. Failing to find the balance between these
sometimes contradictory priorities may result in an inability to reach
Scandinavian welfare goals that still have broad political support.
This raises the question of whether we are witnessing an unintended
change in welfare goals because of reforms of the governance structures.
One of the fundamental changes in the Scandinavian welfare model
results from the gradual introduction of user choice in more service areas.
In Sweden, this development started in the municipalities in the 90s.
Reforms in education were followed by more laws and regulations, which
have been gradually imposed on different administrative levels and service
areas, most recently the Freedom of Choice Act (LOV 2008:962). In
Denmark, there has for a long time been a larger share of nonprofit
service employment, which represents a broader spectrum of services to
choose from in some service areas. Recently, Denmark has also intro-
duced user choice in several service areas and opened up for new legal
categories of independent service institutions in the elderly care and
kindergartens, which are disconnected from the municipal governance
and funded through a kind of voucher system (Thøgersen 2013, 12 and
16–17). Although they may also take out profits, this has so far not
resulted in strong growth in the for-profit share of welfare employment in
Denmark in contrast to Sweden (see Chap. 2). This is probably because
the Danish population is used to—and therefore still prefers—nonprofit
providers similar to the free schools and self-owning institutions at the
same time as Denmark has nonprofit providers with the capacity and
strength to retain their dominant share of the non-public service provi-
sion. In Norway, there has been more emphasis on a supply-side model
with competition for contracts mostly within the public welfare system,
but also between public, nonprofit, and for-profit providers in some
service areas. However, recent legal changes in health, psychiatry, and
drug and alcohol addiction treatment imply a shift towards a
demand-based model also in Norway (LOV-2016-06-17-48), although
on a very limited scale so far. Nonetheless, there is sufficient determi-
nation behind these initiatives to potentially produce broad changes over
time. In line with global NPM trends, an administrative separation
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between public purchasers and service providers was introduced in
Scandinavia in the 80s and early 90s, creating a supply-based system with
tender competition. A logical next step is to develop a demand-based
model with user choice, simplified rules for the establishment of private
service units, and funding per user.
As a result, more weight is put on individual responsibility for
choosing services with the suitable profile and quality and less weight on
the government’s responsibility for providing equivalent services for all.
The consequences could be that the government, also in the
Scandinavian countries, assumes a role of ‘proactive architect’ and
coordinator of the welfare provided by the state, the market, the third
sector, and by the family and communities (Evers and Guillemard 2013).
This emerging citizenship regime relies more on the autonomy of indi-
viduals and their capacity to make their own decisions, and it strengthens
social rights and responsibilities.
However, to give more power over the profile of welfare services to
citizens means reducing the power of public administrators and politi-
cians. When users have increased influence over services, they must also
take more responsibility for how the content of welfare functions.
Verhoeven and Tonkens (2013) showed that the British government
attempts to encourage citizens to take more responsibility for services by
emphasising its empowering effects, while in the Netherlands, the
emphasis is placed on the duties and responsibilities of citizens. In
Chap. 6, Trætteberg takes the perspective of citizens, not governments,
and the findings indicate that both experiences exist in the Scandinavian
welfare regime. In schools, parents feel empowered and in control when
the state reduces its level of control; in nursing homes, users find
themselves disempowered. In the first case, users feel they can decide the
content of the service; in the second, they feel obliged to take an undue
responsibility for the service. In much of the research literature,
inequality is regarded as the most likely drawback if power is transferred
to individuals (Rothstein 1998, 31–32). Our research does not contra-
dict this point but identifies powerlessness and the burden shift as other
possible negative side effects (Trætteberg 2016).
Although user choice gets an increasingly broad implementation in
Scandinavia, this is not in principle new to the social democratic regime.
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The justification for user choice is and has been to move power from
public employees and to the users. This is because frontline service
providers need to have room to exercise their professional discretion and
decide what measures are suitable in a concrete case for welfare institu-
tions to function. It is then an open question if the outcome that the
users experience in fact is related to what has been decided by demo-
cratically elected assemblies. This is where the ‘black hole of democracy’
occurs, according to Blomqvist and Rothstein (2008, 16). The parlia-
ment, and regional and local governments, have very limited influence
over the shaping of the welfare policy citizens and users in practice meet.
The solution, Blomqvist and Rothstein claim, is to let them reject service
providers they dislike. There is a potential for improving the democratic
rights to fair and equal treatment through user choice.
Recently, the distance between democratic decisions and shaping of
services may have increased even further. Provision has to a larger extent
been decoupled from the political decision-making through decentrali-
sation and outsourcing, in line with NPM ideals. Instead, citizens and
users of welfare services are invited to take part in the evaluation of these
services, in consultative arrangements and in limited development pro-
jects. Historically, the dominant means for citizen involvement have
shifted from popular movements in the formative face of the welfare state,
through frontline service providers or street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky
1980), towards participation in ‘user democracy’ and consultative
arrangements. The forms of involvement are to a large extent defined by
the operators of decentralised or even subcontracted services. Moreover,
the citizen participation is shifting to an ever lower administrative level,
from national, through municipal, to the organisational level.
If this is the case, the ‘black hole of democracy’ has grown wider, and
influence through user choice or consultative arrangements may be more
important than ever. Will this challenge the Scandinavian welfare model?
Not necessarily, Bo Rothstein argues, based on a historical analysis. One
of the main intentions of social democratic policies was to give people
autonomy and a right to choose how to use the resources made available
to them by the welfare system. For example, the preference for universal
rights and monetary allowances over means testing and material support
is a result of this (Rothstein 1998). The broader implementation of user
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choice thus does not in itself contradict the ideals behind the social
democratic model.
The question is what will happen if the broader implementation of
user choice is combined with increased competition for market shares
between service providers. For-profit providers have the fastest growth in
Sweden, while the changes in Norway and Denmark are more moderate.
This is a result of increased use of open tenders and other
market-emulating forms of governance, in particular in social services. In
Sweden, this development has been much faster because the system of
user choice is combined with the free right to the establishment of new
service units depending on approval by national agencies enforcing
general guidelines. Furthermore, there are no limits on transfer of profit.
The purpose of this system is to create competition between the provi-
ders of services funded by the government and thereby stimulate quality
development. In some service areas, there is also competition on prices, as
in elderly care. The tender documents may specify the relative weight
that should be put on quality and price. However, studies show that it
has been difficult to make these quasi-markets function according to the
intentions. There is no clear indication that increased competition has
created more efficient services (Hartman 2011; Hood and Dixon 2015;
Helby Petersen and Hjelmar 2013; Helby Petersen et al. 2014). The
larger differences between high-performing and low-performing students
in Swedish results from the PISA tests (Böhlmark and Holmlund 2012),
which we discussed in the introduction, may indicate that there are
quality issues as well. Such unintended consequences may occur because
of double selection effects: Private institutions may prefer to establish
themselves in neighbourhoods with a high socio-economic status.2 In
addition, users with more education and cultural capital may be more
selective. Furthermore, in many types of services it is, in practice,
complicated to change provider if one is not satisfied. The users do not
always have the competence to evaluate information that is complex and
difficult to measure. They can hardly fulfil their indispensable role of
assuring quality and promoting innovation in systems of user choice that
expand in the welfare services (Hartman 2011).
In addition, private ownership of Swedish and Norwegian welfare ser-
vices tends to be concentrated in a few conglomerates. Marketization of
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Scandinavian welfare may gradually pull back a public welfare monopoly
only to give way to a private oligopoly consisting of a few for-profit con-
glomerates competing for market shares. According to standard economic
models, oligopolies have the potential power to determine prices and to
squeeze out smaller competitors and nonprofit with less access to capital
(Perloff 2007). Effective markets in such situations may require strong
regulation. The reality in Scandinavian welfare services is very different
from the theoretical model for quasi-markets, which presupposes easy
access to the market for smaller units while those who do not provide good
enough service are effectively put out of business (Le Grand 2007).
However, the priority of the Scandinavian governments seems to be more
on getting the private share up than to establish regulation that structures
the ownership in a way that promotes competition.
Competition between providers may have positive effects on service
production. As Feltenius shows in Chap. 4, a mix of welfare providers
makes it possible to compare providers in terms of costs and quality.
Private providers may be useful for benchmarking, seen from the per-
spective of the municipal administration. From the perspective of the
user, competition provides alternatives to choose from. However, these
alternatives do not necessarily have distinct profiles, and there is a reason
to ask whether a choice between similar alternatives provides the kind of
freedom of choice that is necessary to sustain the legitimacy of the
Scandinavian welfare model. As we have seen, nonprofit providers seem
to have a greater potential to offer distinct alternatives—even though this
potential is not always realised under the present administrative regime.
A substantial nonprofit sector is not a sufficient condition for distinctive
service profiles to choose from, but may be a necessary one.
In current welfare debates, there is not enough consciousness about
the consequences of changes in governance for the mix of providers in
publicly funded welfare services. The question is whether the services
should be operated by the public sector or the private sector. The
solution is often to use economic incentives to increase the private share.
An underlying assumption, based on economic theories, seems to be that
if all providers have equal conditions, the needs in the population will be
met in the most efficient manner coordinated through market mecha-
nisms. We find, however, that in the case of the nonprofit welfare
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providers, this may not be the case. If they are put under too strong
pressure by market mechanisms, they may become too similar to the
for-profit providers (Salamon 2012). In addition, they may not respond
to market opportunities by expanding operations as the for-profit pro-
viders do. This is because nonprofit providers have stakeholders that are
not interested in growth if it fails to realise the mission statement of the
organisation. The specific conditions of the nonprofit providers, there-
fore, need special attention to ensure a certain share of the welfare
employment.
Two fundamental questions are, therefore, how the nonprofit can get
resources to expand at a rate comparable to the commercial companies,
and how they can do so without losing their distinctive features. If there
should be any chance for the nonprofit to have any systemic effects on the
welfare provision, the economic and institutional contexts must promote
nonprofit welfare entrepreneurs with resources to take risks and expand in
several service areas. This will reduce their dependency on single markets
and key funding institutions. Unless this happens, the current develop-
ment towards user choice in more service areas will result in growth only
in the for-profit sector. This is a lesson we can learn from the analysis in
Chap. 2 of the changes in the employment shares in service areas with
open tenders or user choice in Norway and Sweden. There is a clear
tendency that when commercial incentives are introduced, it is the
for-profit sector that increases. The challenge for the Scandinavian welfare
system is how to continue increasing user choice while also regulating the
welfare mix. The risk is that the third sector in Scandinavia will not have
strength to play its distinctive role by complementing the services of the
state and the business sector. The nonprofit sector in the Scandinavian
countries has a much weaker institutional foundation than in other
countries with advanced welfare systems, as we saw in Chap. 2. Because of
the nonprofit welfare sector’s small size and weaker historical role, it is also
difficult to get political understanding and support for improving frame
conditions that will allow it to expand.
In Chap. 3, Segaard and Saglie show that there are parallel systems of
governance that may be used to regulate welfare mix in the Scandinavian
countries. Service concessions are used in education in Norway and
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Denmark with a requirement for getting public funding that there can be
no transfer of profit to private owners. This promotes nonprofit alter-
natives to the public schools in contrast to the development in Sweden.
Another example is Danish municipalities that use in-house contracts
with self-owning, nonprofit institutions in certain policy areas like
nursing homes.3 This limits their freedom of operation. They get all the
users assigned by the municipality and cannot operate in a market at the
same time. However, that would be the situation for many of them
anyway. It is difficult to develop a distinctive profile when there is too
tight steering by the municipality. However, this is no different from
what we see in the regulation of non-public welfare provision in general:
a certain level of operative autonomy is a precondition for a distinctive
service profile.
A third example of parallel governance systems is the Swedish
Freedom of Choice Act (LOV 2008:962), which is an alternative to the
Public Procurement Act (LOU 2007:1091). However, as we saw in
Chap. 2, the LOV-system with built-in economic incentives results in
growth only in the for-profit sector, so it is not suited to secure a bal-
anced development of the welfare mix. However, it could be possible to
give the nonprofit sector a stronger position within the system for user
choice, as suggested in a recent Swedish Government Inquiry (Swedish
Government Inquiries SOU 2016:78).
Even the new EU directive for public procurement allows parallel
governance systems. It even suggests that the member states establish a
separate system for contracting in education, health, and social services.
Because services to individuals are highly dependent on the cultural
context, there is little potential for cross-border competition. The
member states have the opportunity to give funding without using
competitive tenders, as long as there are transparency and equal condi-
tions. The EU directive even allows giving contracts to new nonprofit
service providers in these service areas for a 3-year period without
competition. The UK has already established a Light Touch Regime with
guidelines for how to implement these new directives. The Scandinavian
countries are now in the process of implementing provisions to their new
laws within the framework of the new EU directives for public pro-
curement and service concessions. It is too early to tell how this may
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affect the composition of welfare service providers. However, these
examples illustrate that there are several possibilities for establishing
parallel systems of governance that can be used to regulate the welfare
mix within a Scandinavian welfare model. The question is whether these
opportunities will be used, or if the priority is on promoting competition
on equal terms in the welfare services.
Scenarios of the Future for the Scandinavian
Welfare Model
Our study shows that different tools of governance have been used in the
Scandinavian countries and in the various service areas. We can use this
natural experiment to outline some possible future scenarios or at least
some development trends. There are lessons to be learnt from the
divergent Swedish development of the welfare provider mix, resulting
from user choice in combination with open tenders or free rights
to establishment—with no restrictions on transfer of profits. When
such commercial incentives are implemented and there are no parallel
governance systems, there will be growth in the for-profit sector and
nonprofit stagnation (See Chap. 2). Some would say that this shows that
there is no market for nonprofit services in Sweden. However, our
findings indicate that the nonprofit sector needs special conditions to
grow, in particular when it is small and has a weak institutional footing as
in Sweden. The downside of a too small nonprofit sector is that there will
be unmet needs in the population for services with certain distinctive
profiles.
Here we see two possible scenarios for the Scandinavian welfare
model. One possible development is to let market mechanisms decide
which services will be provided. We can call it the ‘Swedish model’ for
simplicity. This means using market-emulating tools of governance such
as open tenders or user choice with some kind of voucher system where
money follows the users. It is combined with free right to establish new
service units pending public approval according to general regulation,
and no restrictions on transfer of profit. The users get the critical role of
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selecting which services will survive. The consequences will be a growing
supply of for-profit welfare and decline in the public sector in areas where
there are profitable market opportunities, as we saw in Chap. 2. In a
Scandinavian context where there is a lack of nonprofit welfare entre-
preneurs with a strong economic underpinning, the third sector will not
grow under such circumstances. In the USA, the nonprofit sector has
increased through market competition; however, the distinctiveness of
the sector has suffered under such circumstances (Salamon 2012).
The alternative scenario is to create parallel governance systems. For
simplicity, we can call it the ‘Danish model’. User choice and
market-emulating tools of governance are combined with service con-
cessions and in-house contracts for nonprofit welfare institutions. In
addition, the establishment of new nonprofit welfare entrepreneurs is
encouraged by reserved service contracts for a limited period as the EU’s
public procurement directive allows (article 77, Directive 2014/24/EU),
or by giving nonprofit organisations public support or loan guarantees to
expand service provision in areas where there are increasing demands. In
this way, it is possible to compensate for some of the growth disadvan-
tages the nonprofit organisations have because they cannot raise capital
from investors by issuing stocks.
How large a share the nonprofit sector should have in different welfare
service areas is a political question that depends on striking a balance
between different welfare goals. In some areas, the priority may be on
equivalent services for all. Some would argue that the government must
be able to regulate the school system to promote integration and equal
opportunities. However, since parents are legally responsible for the
education of their children, they must have some power to decide. In line
with basic human rights, the public system cannot be totalitarian. The
priorities are different in elderly care, where it is difficult to see that more
diverse service profiles would be in contradiction with other political
goals. It may be more a question of costs containment, quality assurance,
and what is practically possible to arrange for. Many Scandinavian local
communities are too small for several alternatives with different profiles
that the population can choose from.
We have presented several arguments for promoting the nonprofit
sector’s role in Scandinavia. The sector already has a very small share of
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the welfare service employment. This limits its potential to fill niches in
areas where there are no interesting market opportunities and no suitable
tasks for the public sector. If there is less diversity of services offered to
the users, certain demands in the population will be unsatisfied. As
Scandinavian societies become more socially and culturally heteroge-
neous, distinctive alternatives to choose from are also important for the
legitimacy of a welfare model funded by taxes. In addition, a small
nonprofit sector also limits its potential as a corrective to the for-profit
services in areas with information asymmetry between users and service
providers. It also limits the potential for innovation in reducing
inequality and solving common problems in society, promoted by
stakeholders that are dedicated to a mission statement and the common
good and have other priorities than profits. Finally, our case studies
indicate that the nonprofit welfare providers may promote active citi-
zenship when given adequate frame conditions and government regula-
tions. A certain share of nonprofit sector welfare employment would
therefore be important for balancing the Scandinavian welfare goals
within an increasing system of user choice. However, this is not what is
happening in Sweden, with growth only in the for-profit sector. The
Danish case shows that with parallel governance systems it has been
possible to regulate the share of nonprofit and for-profit providers under
such conditions. These choices are important for the ability to reach the
defining welfare goals within a system where core services are funded by
the government and, consequently, for the existence of a Scandinavian
welfare model in the future.
Notes
1. Directive 2014/24/EU, 114 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0024.
2. See data regarding the location of private schools in Sweden: https://
ekonomistas.se/2014/03/14/var-finns-friskolorna/.
3. According to the EU, this is not public procurement and thus not reg-
ulated by the directive for service concessions, see article 17, Directive
2014/23/EU.
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